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ABSTRACT
Land rights claims remain the major focus o f world indigenous movements.
Lands relate to the formation of indigenous identity, religious practices, and the
material base for indigenous cultural survival. From a spatial/geographical
perspective, this dissertation explores the influences of Taiwan’s state policies on
indigenous peoples, their cultures, identities, and human-land relationship. The LiShan area, in central Taiwan, is the focus o f the research due to the fact that the most
severe land disputes are in this area, as well as longest history of economic
interactions among indigenous peoples, the dominant Han people, and the State, in the
postwar Taiwan.
The rise o f indigenous movements in the mid-1980s in Taiwan indicated that the
indigenous peoples remain the victims o f colonialism. Appreciating this fact, the
movements made demands against the State in struggling for “ethnic space.” Although
the movements drew significant concessions from the State, the majority Han people
systematically fought back with appeals which deny the existence o f any indigenous
peoples in current Taiwan and requested the abolishment of Aboriginal Reservation
Lands.
Political economy, new cultural geography, and post-colonial theories provide
the major theoretical framework for this study. The perpetual uneven ethnic power
relationships between the dominant Han people and the dominated indigenous peoples
are examined from the critical perspective o f political economy. The new cultural
geography offers the theoretical backgrounds for discussing cultural and identity
politics, and multiculturalism. Post-colonial theories are especially helpful in
v
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explaining the social construction o f a new indigenous/Taiwanese culture through the
combination of the colonizing and the colonized cultures, as well as in deconstructing
mainstream social values, and in illustrating the geography o f resistance.
Finally, I wish to summarize the impacts of indigenous movements on three
aspects of mainstream culture. First, indigenous movements shatter the mainstream
definition of social justice and question the superficial multiculturalism. Second, the
indigenous claim of “ natural sovereignty” challenges the ideological myth enshrined
by modem nation-states. Third, indigenous ecological wisdom injects a new and
different ethic between society and nature. The formation of respect o f the indigenous
“situated” knowledge through an appropriate application in eco-tourism will uphold
the improvement of ethnic relations.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have only recently been re-discovered from longlost historical collective memories concealed by successive colonial regimes since
their first contacts with Han Chinese in the sixteenth century. Although the collective
histories of the Han majority in Taiwan have been gradually recovered from the forty
years long martial law implemented by the ICuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s indigenous
peoples continue to struggle both with respect to their land claims and also their
cultural revitalization.
Around the world, land rights claims are essential to indigenous peoples and all
other issues seem inevitably tied to land conflicts. The transnational connections are
now the important characteristics of the world’s many indigenous movements in terms
o f producing mutual support in indigenous struggles against both physical violence
and cultural hegemony, mostly from modem nation-states. Their collective memories
of colonial sufferings brought about by foreign domination in contemporary world
politics provide solid base for the formation o f various pan-indigenous identities in
many locations and countries.
1.1 Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan
As many other indigenous peoples around the world, Taiwan’s indigenous
peoples suffer from hegemonic state policies, socially, politically, and culturally.
Mandatory education imposed by the State is conducted in an alien language.
Standardized textbooks and curricula systematically discriminate against indigenous
cultures and customs (Chen Hsin-yi 1993). The current national official language
policy restricts the transfer of indigenous oral histories from the elders to the youths.

with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

Ancestral lands were either taken by eminent domain in the name o f national security
or economic development, or alternately fell into the hands o f Han farmers and
business groups. The introduction o f capitalism into areas where tribes now live
destroyed the traditional subsistence economies as well as social and political
structures (Huang Ying-kuei 1981). Authority over tribes no longer comes from
inherited/hereditary chieftains, but rather from taking hold o f positions in public
office. Traditional ways of hunting and gathering are prohibited by the national park
system, which epitomizes the colonial controls over indigenous territories. The
development of ethno-tourism as a designated showcase o f the State’s cultural policy
has become powerful forces that shape and direct the allocation o f resources for a
modern indigenous cultural “renaissance.” Although land rights claims and landrelated issues are the focuses o f this research, a thorough examination o f all the related
social, cultural, and political dimensions o f aboriginal problems are essential to build a
more meaningful understanding o f indigenous peoples, and their way o f life, thinking,
concerns, and values.
Many foreign regimes have established control over Taiwan in the past four
hundred years (Table 1.1). The rugged terrain and high-rising mountains in central
Taiwan blocked west to east expansions and deterred the territorial growth of the early
regimes into the mountainous areas and along the eastern coast. Prior to the
establishment o f prototypes o f any state apparatus, o f course, indigenous peoples have
lived in Taiwan for thousand o f years. The subsequent relationships o f the indigenous
peoples with other “foreign” groups have never been equal since these very early
times. Many archaeological sites discovered in the past few decades clearly

2
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demonstrate that humans, most likely the ancestors o f current indigenous peoples in
Taiwan, have peopled this island since at least 4000 years ago (Liu Yi-chang 1994; for
a more complete list, see web site:
http://com 5.iis.sinica.edu.tw :8000/~rita/pre_culture/part6.htm l).
Table 1.1 The “Foreign” Regimes in Taiwan and Their Control Areas
Rulers
Dutch
The Chengs
(Koxinga)
Ching Dynasty
Japan
KMT
Source: Shepherc

Control Areas
southern Taiwan only
southern Taiwan, control points in mid- and
northern Taiwan
1683-1895 almost all western plain
1895-1945 western plain and most of eastern Taiwan
1945the whole island
1993; Chuang Ya-chung 1993.

Years
1624-61
1661-83

Early Han settlers referred to indigenous peoples living in the plains areas (i.e.
the plains aborigines Pin Pu Tzu or Pin Pu Fan), who had frequent interactions with
the agriculturally more advanced Han people, as “cooked f a n ” Those aborigines
living in the broad Central Mountain Ridges, with little interactions with Han people,
were, in contrast, called “raw f a n ” The term "fan” is an expression of Han-centrism,
which literally means “savage people” and is often used to allude to different peoples
surrounding the China proper other than ethnic Han. It was these terms o f “cooked”
and “raw” that allowed Han settlers to measure the various degrees of Sinicization (i.e.
assimilated by Chinese culture) o f aborigines in Taiwan. They are, ultimately, another
expression of Han people’s sino-centrism.
During the two hundred years’ span o f the Ching Dynasty’s rule (1683-1895), no
academic or systematic classifications of aborigines were ever conducted. Japan
undertook extensive ethnological and resource surveys immediately following their
control of Taiwan (Chen Chao-ju 1992). The mountain aborigines were divided into
3
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either eight or nine or ten groups by Japanese anthropologists, according to different
criteria (Pan Ying 1995). The ten groups from this classification are Atayal, Thao,
Bunun, Tsou, Saisiat, Rukai, Amis, Dawu (formerly known as Yami in Lan-Yu
island), Puyuma, and Paiwan. The Sinicization of the Pin Pu Tzu aborigines in the
plains areas was already considerably complete and thus it became difficult to
distinguish group differences even during Japanese colonial rule. However, the
academic classifications o f indigenous peoples, as Wu Mi-cha (1996) argued, were
derived from certain assumptions and presumed criteria, and were often subject to
opposition from the peoples in question (Figure 1.1).
The recent resurgence o f Pin Pu Tzu identities, which are associated with the
rise o f Taiwan’s indigenous movements, is merely a by-product of the gradually
popular idea that Taiwan “should be” a multi-ethnic nation-state. This Pin Pu Tzu
identity does not constitute a separate national identity within Taiwanese nationalism.
Rather, it is only part of phenomena pertaining to Taiwan’s resurgent nativistic
identities, which were only allowed to emerge after the lifting of the martial law in
1987. The impacts of Pm Pu Tzu identity on Taiwan’s society is far less significant, in
terms o f political and cultural influences, than the construction o f a pan-indigenous
identity, which is one o f the main topics in this research (see Chapter 5). The studies
on the early histories of reclamation and frontier development in Taiwan often neglect
even the Pin Pu Tzu peoples, who had much more frequent social and economic
interactions with Han settlers than the mountain aborigines. Rather, most histories
focus overwhelmingly on the intensive communal strife among Han sub- ethnic
groups in the nineteenth century and generalize indistinguishably about the

4

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

|

| A m is

E M ] A U iyal

EE3

Bunun
D a w u (Y a m i)
P a iw a n
| R ukai
S a isia t

|

* /'ii/V > r i A /

s/Vij ■'/<.*«/'
njui]) ‘
jirirwt/
ruAVb'.'TJuV'/bi/miijyiH

i >j»A A ' 11'/ / / '
I 'A iP*Vt*
,'^vi
i * (Ui iNihfi 1111 c* ft it (* (t ( \ »
UK lyi *i.K
.iin iV

Ijyyu 'IIVI/M

iUutf+frhj' /(IU'.'/A.A;W>X>A'1/U'.'ifWui

A .A /'V i’n i i / i (O ' a ; n '/ > / |n / i ; i / i . A a /

twi

inii.t\)

A A / i/ i A j V 'A / i ! 'A n A /n \A A A A .r tA .iV u ‘i i \ i 1''.m ir f
( u V A / i i V 'A n n A f i i i A / i i 'i V
A .n .n A n n /i.n n r
V A /i/V ' <t / i / '/ '/ U V i A A cu
n / i / i it i^ a ft n
iW U ' A A / ' j
O '/ '/ u v A 'U '.i u 'u V a u b '/ V u i U A n p 7 \ A i
^ y V M 'i U '. O A.' ..pro t I.I iA A C r II
r \n .A m \.M n a 'a A a .A a n /tfcri
a/
A m A A .- i/ o tA r t /tA f '.n /'W 'A 'V '.A f i.A A /iA /i
11/> A A A A
A b i / 1/ 1A.f >i t.A.A.i

AiVoWAKJ'

Sflft

( V A 'A A p ^ b 'i I 'a ' I ' a A /T A A'.‘V i A n /> A /’A n /
U m im j W ’.mj i / t i C u V '/ '/ '/ i a / > a a a A
r r ( i A j 'A n A 1 1 /'n i l iT ni/iA A n / u iA AA
A j >.A.A.i U \A ' >*’0V i m l V b V U 0 V u
A A A .n /u b i n a ^h a a / i a m a '

»>uVU*AA.i*n.ii/iAA.njtA
riA n j V ' / j ' I"i A / i / ' A / u
V '/ ' T l n / V a u i / 'A

iiA
AAA.n
iW

w

V)

Figure 1.1 The Distribution of Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan
Source: GIO 1997:21
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Shepherd 1993:3), without carefully
considering the different degrees o f aboriginal Sinicization over time and space.
When the Chinese Nationalist party, the KMT, took control o f Taiwan in 1945,
the traces o f Pin Pu Tzu were barely found in the island, and the mountain aborigines
had just began their “modernization” process due to Japanese controversial colonial
development. The KMT’s “mountain policies” promoted Han-centrist assimilation
policies and a stigmatized ethnic identity which aborigines faced (Hsieh Shih-chung
1987a) was institutionalized through the mass media, standardized textbooks, and
government-controlled cultural industries, such as films, literature, and tourism. The
implementation of prolonged martial law effectively silenced not only indigenous
peoples, but also the majority of native Han Taiwanese. The rise of indigenous
movements in Taiwan in the mid-1980s, then, presented tremendous challenges to
various mainstream ideas and conceptions, such as the homogenizing tendency of
nation-state ideology, discrimination against “the other” peoples, the superficial
institutional arrangements of multiculturalism, and human-land relationships. These
issues will be examined in this study.
I use indigenous peoples and aborigines interchangeably in this dissertation. In
many literatures (such as Shepherd 1993; Wilmer 1993), the term “aborigines” is no
longer confined to native people in Australia. I use the term “people” in a way similar
to the word “nation.” In order to respect their internal differences, the plural form of
people, peoples, is used when the whole indigenous population is mentioned.
However, the term “people” implies a more or less political neutrality, while the term
“nation” hints that a group of people has a stronger will to seek a special status, not

6
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necessarily an independent statehood, within nation-states. The best example to
illustrate the meaning of “nation” from the perspective o f indigenous peoples is the
term “First Nations” used widely among indigenous groups in Canada.
“Ethnic group” is used in referring to a group of people within a nation-state
seeking a “sub-national” identity. There are at least four “ethnic groups” in current
Taiwan by popular definition: Holo (73%), Hakka (12%), mainlander (13%), and
aborigine (2%) (Wachman 1994:17; also estimated by the author). The first three
categories are all sub-Han ethnic groups. In fact, the classifications o f people were a
political taboo during the martial law era, when identities other than “Chinese” were
viewed as threats to national security. In this dissertation, for demonstration o f the
successive immigrating waves in the history of Taiwan, the term “native Taiwanese”
includes only Holo and Hakka groups, in contrast to the late-coming mainlanders, who
mostly came to Taiwan in 1949. Ironically, the smallest group, the aborigines, was not
included in my category o f native Taiwanese. However, this just reflects the political
reality in contemporary Taiwan.
I often refer to indigenous peoples as ethnic groups despite the fact that the
development of indigenous ethno-nationalism is theoretically and practically
unfeasible in current Taiwan. However, the use of “ethnic groups” does not imply that
the author denies or neglects the “potential” and willingness o f Taiwan’s indigenous
peoples to become “nations” in the future.
The KMT regime officially divided Taiwan’s indigenous peoples into two
groups: aborigines registering in mountains and aborigines registering in plains. They
are called mountain aborigines and plains aborigines respectively for short by the

7
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KMT. However, these terms should not be confused with their early usage during the
Ching Dynasty. The early Han colonists called all the Pin Pu Tzu peoples (the
“cooked” fan) as “plains aborigines” who were assimilated into the Han people and
virtually disappeared before the KMT came to Taiwan, and all the “raw" fans living in
the mountain areas as “mountain aborigines.” In the KMT era, Pin Pu Tzu are
essentially indistinguishable, while the remaining indigenous peoples in the mountains
have often been forced to migrate to the cities for better economic opportunities.
Therefore, the KMT’s two categories o f mountain and plains aborigines are in fact, the
same peoples o f the so-called “raw”/a/7S in previous regimes.
1.2 Colonialism and Politics of Identity
Taiwan’s current social, cultural, and political situations have been significantly
shaped by, and re-constructed through its colonial histories and their legacies.
Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945 was succeeded by, arguably, another
colonial regime, the KMT. Taiwan and mainland China were “united” under the KMT
control from 1945 to 1949 as parts of Republic o f China (ROC). After losing the civil
war to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the KMT fled to Taiwan with nearly
two million military personnel and refugees, who are known as “mainlanders” later.
Taiwan did not benefit from the “independence wave” after World War II, when many
Third World countries obtained statehood following their political de-colonization.
The international Cold War structure enabled the ROC government in Taiwan, which
claimed that its territory includes mainland China and Mongolia, to be considered as
the sole legitimate government of China until 1971, when the KMT-led ROC
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government’s seat in the United Nations was displaced by the People’s Republic o f
China.
The “imagined China” (i.e. the Republic o f China) constructed by the KMT in
postwar Taiwan served as an important basis o f legitimacy for its ironfisted military
rule. The political structures o f the ROC were “transplanted” almost completely to the
island to maintain the ROC’s Chinese orthodoxy. An imagined China was built upon
Taiwan from the naming o f the streets, the four-layer government structure in a small
island, and through the destruction and recreation o f people’s historical collective
memories and landscapes.
Japanese colonialism in Taiwan was based not only on economic exploitation,
but also on cultural assimilation. The economic dimension o f colonialism is a muchexplored topic in theories o f political economy, such as Dependency Theory, World
Systems Theory, and the early stage o f Internal Colonialism. Nevertheless, the cultural
impacts o f colonialism take a much longer time to be thoroughly explored and
theorized. The rise o f post-colonial literatures reflects the critical reflections on the
political, social, and cultural impacts of colonialism. The influence o f colonialism on
the formation of identities is as significant on the colonized as on the colonizing
people.
It is generally accepted, especially from left-wing theorists, pro-Taiwan
independence scholars, that in many aspects, the early KMT’s military rule in Taiwan
was akin to colonial rule (Chen Fan-ming 1996:128-41). The right wing pro
independence scholars tend to describe the Chinese KMT simply as an “alien” regime
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which neglecting Taiwan’s colonial experience (Huang Chao-tang 1994; and most
articles in Shih Cheng-fong ed. 1994).
Both Japanese colonialism and Chinese nationalism had forced many o f Taiwan’s
intellectuals into a self-exiled status. As described by Chen Fang-ming (1996:119),
this “only way out” for the intellectuals include two “geographical” types: internal
exile and external exile. The former refers to the intellectuals who remain at home,
and at the same time, refuse to recognize the legitimacy o f the political establishment
imposed by the ruling class/colonizers on the society where they reside. The cultural
and value system associated with the rulers fails to obtain identification from the
internal-exiled intellectuals. External exile refers to the elites who are either
expatriated by the ruling power, or choose to leave their homeland for an alternative
form of resistance. Internal exile is a form of spiritual exile, while external exile is
both spiritual and physical. For Taiwanese intellectuals, internal exile was the major
form o f resistance during the Japanese colonial rule, and external exile developed
during the KMT’s martial law era (Chen Fang-ming 1996:120).
Despite KMT’s construction o f the Chinese Nation identity in Taiwan, a
nativistic identity movement surged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when economic
success provided a sound material base, and international pressures offered spiritual
support for a political democratic movement. Traditional theories of nationalism might
emphasize/imply the “mutually exclusive” characteristic o f two hostile nationalisms
(see Blaut 1987). However, the post-colonial literatures recognize that the formation
of identity as a much more complicated process (see Zhang Jingyuan 1995). Two
hostile nationalisms are often “mutually constructed” concurrently. In Taiwan’s case,

10

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission.

the development of nativistic identity cannot be separated from both the superimposed
Chinese nationalism, and the previous experience of “Japanization” (see Chen Fangming 1996). From the indigenous perspective, the formations o f a pan-indigenous
identity and indigenous movements are also inseparable from and inspired by
aborigines’ interactions with Han people, as well as the collective sufferings of their
tribes and people which resulted from the State’s hegemonic policies.
The emergence of Taiwan’s pan-indigenous identity is associated with
democratization and the recent breaking of political taboos, particularly the
homogenous and one-dimensional identity. Hsieh Shih-chung (1987b) also points out
that the increasing tolerance o f social movements by the ruling KMT was a major
factor to explain the eruption o f Taiwan’s indigenous movements in the mid-1980s.
Indigenous movements offer the pan-indigenous identity as the third possible identity,
other than Chinese and Taiwanese identities. This relatively “new” identity poses
challenges to the current two major national identities, to the national territorial
planning for the accommodation o f indigenous autonomous zones, and to decision
making regarding choices for political alliance among major political parties (see
Chapter 7). However, the actual strength o f these challenges will depend on the
political clout generated from the indigenous movements.
1.3 Land Rights Issues and Environmental Problems
The protection of land rights is the basis of all indigenous movements and claims
today (Wilmer 1993:183). For indigenous peoples, land relates to culture, society,
religion, dignity, food production, hunting, and the formation o f identity. The land
rights issues involve not only virtually all aspects o f indigenous lives, but also the
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basic characteristic of nation-states that claim to have “sovereignty” over a certain
territory. Indigenous peoples claim that they are not merely native to their countries,
but they are also the first people and are still there, and so have rights o f prior
occupancy to their lands (Maybury-Lewis 1997:7). It was the conquerors’ “frontier
colonialism” which often drove the “first peoples” into marginal lands and
underprivileged status.
The first and most important organization in Taiwan’s indigenous movements,
the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA), was founded in December 1984. The ATA
was also the first pan-ethnic organization which systematically developed an
indigenous movement (Hsieh Shih-chung 1986). Before the establishment o f the ATA,
an ethnic social movement organization had never systematically evolved due to its
highly political sensitivity. Land rights have always been one o f the central concerns
of the ATA (see Chapters 5 & 6), and the “Return Our Lands” movements, initiated by
the ATA, were by far the most successful ethnic mobilization among Taiwan’s
indigenous movements.
The KMT inherited the Japanese Aboriginal Reservation Land system, which
conferred a certain amount of lands from national forest land to each indigenous
household. Despite the official claims that Aboriginal Reservation Land aimed to
preserve indigenous peoples’ subsistence economy and improve their living
conditions, the Reservation Land System exposed indigenous peoples to a constant
police surveillance and limited their traditional hunting-and-gathering grounds. On the
one hand, ironically, the invading Japanese and Chinese conferred lands and
resources, in the name of the countries, to the island’s original masters, the indigenous
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peoples. On the other hand, the reservation lands, however limited or “unfair,” do
provide the final refuges for aborigines in facing both Han cultural hegemony and the
exploitation o f a capitalist mode o f production. Radical indigenous activists argue that
indigenous peoples have “natural sovereignty” (see Chapter 6), i.e. prior occupancy
over the island. Therefore, the “Return Our Lands” movements should be a
negotiation between two “nations,” between indigenous peoples and invaders, and
between colonizers and the colonized peoples (Interview G). For indigenous
organizations, to be simply considered as “pressure groups” within a liberaldemocratic society, will conceal the fact that indigenous peoples do not recognize the
legitimacy o f the invading regime and its social and political institutional
arrangements.
Land disputes often relate directly to environmental and resource management.
Indigenous people’s close relations to nature and their ecological wisdom have been
widely recognized. It is this changing politics o f nature that provides us a critical
reflection on the relationship between society and nature. In Taiwan, indigenous
peoples’ involvement in resource management, environmental protection, and local
community activism has apparent geographical variations. The variations reflect the
different degrees of aboriginal communal consciousness and organizational strength at
the grassroots level. In a case in southern Taiwan, under the banner of “tribalism,”
aboriginal local knowledge, together with the cooperation from some academics, have
created a new perspective in empowering indigenous communities in their struggles
against deteriorating wildlife resources, illegal deforestation, and the rampant
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development of tourism without attention to environmental and cultural implications
(Chapters 6 and 7).
1.4 Case Study: Land Conflicts in the Li-Shan Area
Li-Shan, with an average altitude o f around two thousand meters above sea
level, is the earliest and most important location for the production o f temperate-zone
agricultural products in Taiwan. The opening o f the Central Cross Island Highway in
1960 permitted the introduction o f commercial fruit and vegetable production suitable
for cultivation in high-cold mountainous areas extending into the Li-Shan areas. In
1957 and 1963 respectively, the government set up two public-sponsored farms to
relocate retired servicemen and to “develop” mountain resources (Lin Fang-chi
1984:55-59). The indigenous people in the Li-Shan area, the Atayal people, learned
the agricultural skills necessary to grow vegetables and fruits from the veterans in the
public farms, and gradually converted aboriginal reservation land into orchards and
farmlands to take advantage of this new economic opportunity.
Han people in the plains areas were also lured by the potential profits which
could be made producing temperate-zone crops in the high mountains. Armed with
more abundant capital and advanced technology, Han farmers came to Li-Shan and
purchased or leased lands from indigenous people. From a historical perspective, the
arrival o f Han settlers in the mountains seems a continuation o f their unfinished
“reclamation” process. What is different from their ancestors centuries ago is that the
object of the current Han “adventure” is the “internal frontier.”
Originally, the legal land titles o f the reservation lands did not belong to
individual aborigines, but to the state. Despite the fact that a certain amount o f land
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was allocated to each indigenous household, aborigines were simply the nominal title
holders. Only indigenous peoples are allowed to lease lands from government and to
cultivate land within the reserves. The high profits from growing fruits, especially
apples and pears, soon attracted Han people. On the one hand, it is clear that Han
farmers “illegally” lease or purchase reservation lands from aborigines. Inter-ethnic
land disputes increase as all the land transactions are conducted “under the counter.”
On the other hand, the developmental state apparatus systematically relaxes the limits
of laws related to the uses of reservation lands and so has opened a loophole for the
operation of capital from the plains areas. All the actions, including the relaxation o f
land use laws, are justified in the name o f economic development (see Chapter 4). As
essential land surveys in the disputed areas are long overdue, the KMT government’s
reservation land policy has drawn severe criticism from both Han and indigenous
peoples with interests in the region.
This extensive, essentially unlimited slopeland cultivation has dramatically
shortened the life expectancy of one of the major dams in Taiwan, the Te-Chi
reservoir on the Da-Chia River, downstream from Li-Shan. The amount o f siltation
from natural landslides has been accelerated by human interventions. The huge
amounts of fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides applied to fruits and vegetables are
washed into the downstream reservoir, resulting in eutrophication and deteriorated
water quality. The safety and capacity of the reservoir are the major concerns of the
government. Soil erosion and its potential threat to lives and properties reveal an even
more urgent issue for local farmers and residents. Policies that were encouraged by the
state intent on developing and exploiting mountain resources are now issues of public
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condemnation. Environmentalists demand a comprehensive reflection on the current
“development first” policy and also a restoration of forests in the mountains,
particularly after a series of typhoons caused catastrophes which resulted in a large
number o f casualties in recent years. Thus, land disputes in Li-Shan are not only
correlated with ethnic relationships, but also involved locally-specific environmental
problems.
As I write this dissertation, Han people still cannot legally own the titles o f
reservation lands, and cannot run for the position of the “head” o f the mountain hsian
(a sub-county administrative unit), where most indigenous peoples live and, where
virtually all the aboriginal reservation lands are located (Figure 1.2). Although in
many mountain hsiam, the number of Han residents has exceeded aborigines, the
official position of chief for the thirty mountain hsians are all reserved for indigenous
peoples.
A group of Han people living in mountain hsians in Nantou County founded an
organization to promote Han people’s rights in 1993. However, the most influential
Han people’s organization, the Plains People’s Rights Association (PPRA), was
established in Hoping Hsian, where Li-Shan village is located. The PPRA was formed
as a politically opposing group to counteract the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines
(ATA). The PPRA aims to legitimize Han people’s “ownership” of reservation lands
and to promote the candidacy o f Han people for hsian chiefs. While the ATA’s
“Return Our Lands” movements demands that the State to confer more lands to
aborigines and will work to prevent the losses of reservation lands to Han capitalists,
the PPRA, in contrast, demands the deregulation of all reservation lands (PPRA
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1997a). That is, the PPRA wishes that laws be changed so that all lands are subject to
the mechanism of the free market.
The PPRA also accuses that the indigenous activists do not identify themselves
with the “Chinese Nation” and insists that, in fact, there are no indigenous people in
Taiwan at the present time (PPRA 1997b). With plentiful capital for lobbying and well
established political and business connections, the PPRA had become an organization
with considerable political clouts within a few years.
The rise of the PPRA represents a counterattack o f sorts by conservative forces
by some elements in mainstream society against the indigenous movements.
Nevertheless, it is more complex than to simply dichotomize the AT A and PPRA as a
progressive indigenous group versus conservative Han people (see Chapter 6). It is the
locally specific historical and geographical contexts that constitute and shape this
particular political environment. The application of some so-called “grand theory” has
a certain strength in explaining the formation of the overall picture, such as uneven
ethnic power relations, the political economy o f the East Asian newly industrializing
countries, and indigenous sufferings from colonialism. However, a more delicate
exploration of local history, economy, and politics must rely on more sophisticated
field work. It is this personal involvement with the people and causes imbedded in this
research that bring up the question of the representation o f “the others” (Chapter 2).
The land disputes in the Li-Shan area in Taiwan is singled out as my case study,
with other land related issues o f identity, cultural representation, and environment that
constitute the three major issues in my dissertation. My central concerns are the
impacts of Aboriginal Reservation Land system on the indigenous society, and the
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influences o f the indigenous movement, which to a large degree is a response to the
reservation land policy, on the entire Taiwan’s mainstream society. The reason for me
to choose Li-Shan as my study area is because it is the earliest locations to introduce
commercial agricultural activities into the high-cold mountain area. Li-Shan also
presents the most intensive land conflicts between indigenous and Han people. The
research will investigate the extensive impacts of reservation land system on the
indigenous societies: What is the historical and political context under which the
policy was formed? What does this policy mean to Taiwan’s aborigines, especially on
their identity formation, cultural and landscape representation, as well as on the
“modern” concerns on environmental problems? Under what circumstances and
through what media does the current ethnic relationships in Taiwan are constructed?
How do indigenous people’s calls for a “national” status challenge the mainstream
ideology of modem nation-states? In terms o f the identity issue, what is the
relationship between the indigenous movement and the mainstream socio-political
movements, especially the Taiwan independence movement? What can we leam from
the severe environmental degradation in Li-Shan, and from indigenous “situated”
ecological wisdom?
In this dissertation, Chapter 2 will present a review o f literature. I give a brief
outline on the histories o f indigenous peoples prior to the arrival o f the KMT regime in
Chapter 3. The focuses are on the pre-modem Ching Dynasty, and the first modem
regime, the Japanese era of colonial rule. The KMT’s “mountain policies” are
introduced in Chapter 4, including the evolution o f laws which most directly effect the
Aboriginal Reservation Land. The greater picture for both the current conditions of
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indigenous peoples in Taiwan and on the physical characteristics of the reservation
lands are also provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines (and deconstructs) KMTpromoted dominant ideology and its impacts on Taiwan’s identity politics, including
both Han and indigenous peoples. The wax and wane of Taiwan’s indigenous
movements are also incorporated in this chapter. Chapter 6 focuses on both the land
conflicts and the emergence o f the PPRA in the Li-Shan areas. As one of the major
factors that has brought Li-Shan to the national spotlight, the environmental problems
resulting from extensive cultivation on steep slopes are also examined critically in
Chapter 6 .1 review the impacts of indigenous movements on three dimensions in
Chapter 7: the cultural hegemony and the fundamental assumptions o f interest-group
pluralism, the relations between indigenous ethno-nationalism and native Taiwanese
nationalism, and the establishment o f new human-land relationships. Finally, Chapter
8 provides a summation of issues in which I will give my own conclusions and point
out possible further research topics and ways to improve the understanding o f other
cultures.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: PREVIOUS RESEARCH
AND APPROPRIATE THEORIES
In this chapter, different interpretations on the causes and effects of the current
conditions facing indigenous people throughout the world will be presented. Some
consider indigenous populations as the not-yet-“de-colonized” people in the world
political arena due to situations which are best called “internal colonialism.” Different
kinds and intensities of colonialism prevail and are practiced in different places and I
shall make a more general review o f these conditions later. The appropriateness of
applying postcolonial theories under the contexts o f both indigenous peoples and East
Asian societies has also raised concerns for some local scholars (Liao Bing-huil995).
Indigenous movements also give rise to critical reflections on the ideology of
national sovereignty around the globe. In spite of the rise of various trans-national
indigenous groups, the political clout o f indigenous peoples is still vulnerable to State
violence, resource developers, and cultural hegemony. Fourth World theory is still
under construction and has not yet exercised significant impacts on international
politics.
To conduct fieldwork under “other” social and cultural contexts raises the
ultimate question of representation: Is the researcher capable o f legitimately speaking
for his/her objects being studied? On the other hand, how can we, as academic
researchers, minimize the existing uneven power relations embedded within the
interactions between the researchers and the research objects, who in this case are
politically and culturally underprivileged groups? What social and political stances, do
we, the researchers choose to stand? As we might know, the researcher’s location on
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the ideological spectrum not only reflects in his/her theoretical frameworks, but also
the “academic” interpretation o f “field data.”
Some works on indigenous peoples in Taiwan will be reviewed in areas related
to my concerns: reservation land, cultural and identity politics, ethnic relations, and
environmental ethics. It is worth noting that the majority o f documents on indigenous
peoples in Taiwan prior to the rise of indigenous movements in the mid-1980s were
produced mostly by anthropologists, which provided a “thin description” o f
indigenous customs and traditions. Less attention was paid to political, economic, and
social conflicts (Huang Ying-kuei 1983).
2.1 Colonialism in Various Forms
The burgeoning focus on colonial studies has recently led to more extensive re
examinations of colonial impacts on various dimensions than classical Marxism.
Corbridge (1993) identifies four key points or activities o f colonial rule:
First, ‘colonialism established territories and territorial boundaries
where [sometimes] none had existed before’... Second,
colonialism established within each territory a political order and
the administrative hierarchy to run it. The ultimate basis o f this
political order was, invariably, force... Third, colonialism
brought with it a series of ties which bound a colony into the
wider networks of trade and production which defined the
colonial world-economy... Finally, colonialism brought with it a
culture o f rule bound up with the imposition o f an alien language
(Corbridge 1993:176).
Internal colonialism separates space within a nation-state into two familiar units:
the core and the periphery. Uneven spatial “modernization” processes create a
relatively advanced core with superordinate group, while also resulting in a less
advanced periphery with subordinate group (Lee Tsu-min 1991:56). There are
crystallized separations based on the unequal allocation o f social resources between
22
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these two groups. High prestige roles are reserved for members of superordinate
group, while less privileged roles are inevitably left to the dominated group (Hsieh
Shih-chung 1994a). Some high prestige spots do go to members o f the subordinate
group in a symbolic action to reinforce the legitimacy o f the hierarchical system
(Hsieh Shih-chung 1994a) and the associated cultural/ethnic division of labor. This
social stratification system contributes to the formation of distinctive ethnic identities
within these two groups.
Spatially, the core is characterized by a diversified industrial structure whereas
industrialization in the periphery, if it takes place, is highly specialized and usually
complementary to the core economy. Therefore, the peripheral economy is most
vulnerable to price fluctuations in the world market (Hechter 1975:9-10).
Modernization theory and economic determinism seem to be the underlying
presumptions of internal colonialism, given its emphasis on economic perspectives
and industrialization, and its ignorance o f colonial cultural and psychological imprints.
However, in its later application, the idea of internal colonialism has been employed to
explain other factors, such as cultural differences and social status (NPQ 1989; Walis
YuGan 1994a).
The uneven spatial development of the core and the periphery in internal
colonialism, is often associated with the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. The
ethnic groups in peripheral areas suffer economic exploitation and political
marginalization, while the dominant groups in core areas enjoy greater prosperity and
privileges. Ethnic inequality develops along both class and spatial lines (Lee Tsu-min

23

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

1991:57). Thus, internal colonialism successfully integrates both ethnic groups and
class issues within a geographical dimension.
In the 1990s, postcolonialism receives simultaneously the insights and
controversies both political and cultural which emerged from the postmodern polemic
of the 1980s. However, the term “postcolonialism” suggests a misleading concept in
that it implies that postcolonialism only deals with a society whose colonial period has
been terminated. Postcolonialism not only deals with the current various forms of
colonialism (political, cultural, and economic), but also analyzes the colonial impacts
on contemporary societies, including effects on both the colonized and colonizers. In
fact, the influences of centuries-old colonial expansions are so profound that even
political de-colonization has only been partially achieved. Thus, “postcolonial” refers
to only the termination of “formal,” “political” colonial rules in many Third World
countries. In brief, as an intellectual project rather than a chronological moment,
postcolonialism shifts the wisdom and loads of critical culture studies to the
relationship between the colonizers, the colonized, and the colonies (Duara 1997).
Although the opponents of postcolonialism heavily criticize it as nothing more
than the product o f intellectuals from the Third World in search o f academic posts in
the West, there are insights from postcolonial ideas that are espoused and applied by
many Third World intellectuals. In a sense, postcolonialism inherits the celebration of
differences from postmodernism and provides a sharp analysis on the politics of
cultural representation derived from cultural studies. But it takes a step further to
disclose the mutual construction o f self-identity between the colonizers and the
colonized. Identities in the “mother countries” are as much constituted by the
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colonizers’ experience in the colonies as the identities of the colonized by the foreign
hegemony. While the Orient’s self-imaginations - geographical, cultural and social and identity are powerfully shaped by the Western construction o f “Orientalism” (Said
1979), the Western self-identity and its imagination o f both self and others are also
inextricably influenced by this very Orientalism.
It is important to identify the social, historical, and geographical backgrounds
behind the seemingly “popularity” o f postcolonialism in the 1990s. Its popularity,
ironically, is partially the result o f colonialism that leads to global migrations in an
effort to settle “frontiers” and civilize “savages.” Because of past colonial relations,
many intellectuals from the colonized world come to their colonial “mother countries”
for further studies. Many o f the important scholars in postcolonialism, such as Said,
Bhabha, and Spivak, possess this Third World background (Liao Bing-huil995; Zhang
Jingyuan 1995). The characteristics o f postcolonial studies, which rise in Western
academic contexts and are, then, colored with some “foreign” attributes, makes the
direct application on East Asian societies problematic (Liao Bing-huil995). Liao
argues that discussions about postmodernism or postcolonialism in Taiwan has, in
fact, the appearance of neocolonialism in promoting or embracing the newest Western
theories (Liao Bing-huil995). It is this time and space that challenges scholars, with
different training backgrounds (studying in North America, Europe or Japan) and
different “locations” (ages, social status) to develop their own views on local political,
social, and cultural issues within the framework of multi-national economic and
academic institutes (Liao Bing-huil995).
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Colonialism left different imprints and operated in different “intensities” across
different space and time. Japanese colonialism left behind different cultural impacts,
created different sentiments towards ethnic identities, and drew different evaluations
in Taiwan and Korea. “If there is indeed no singular time and space o f
colonialism/postcolonialism... it is also impossible to speak o f a singular colonial
discourse” (Willems-Braun 1997). There can be no global theory o f colonial culture
and discourse, only “localized theories and historically specific accounts that provide
insight into varied articulations o f colonialist and countercolonial representations and
practices” (Willems-Braun 1997).
It is also important to point out that neither internal colonialism, nor
postcolonialism and neo-colonialism is aimed directly at interpretations o f the
relationship between indigenous people and their opposite, the settlers which came
later. Internal colonialism, in particular, in its most significant analysis by Hechter,
addresses the uneven economic power and modernizing process between England and
its Celtic fringe. Nevertheless, this is as much a limitation as it is a point of departure
to introduce new dimensions and case studies into these theories by putting them into
“alien” societal contexts. A more comprehensive research on aborigines will involve
virtually all aspects o f societies in the modern nation-states and in all tangent
disciplines. The development o f indigenous movements in Taiwan also introduces new
perspectives in re-examining some policies that used to be viewed as beneficial to the
aborigines, whose oppressions were brought to light only recently. For example,
universal mandatory, but Han-centrist, education and textbooks are criticized as
educational colonialism (Interview C). The inappropriate social welfare system that
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helps to trap the aborigines into the social construction o f poverty (Chen Hsin-yi 1993)
which has also been referred to as welfare colonialism by indigenous activists is also a
case in point (Interview C).
2.2 Indigenous Peoples and W orld Politics
To limit the concerns related to indigenous peoples within a nation-state context
so as to ignore international dimensions and their impacts on world colonial history
will mislead our reflections to a narrowly isolated path. Before examining the roles of
indigenous peoples in world politics, it seems inevitable that a definition must be
given to the central term, “indigenous peoples.” To provide a universal definition for
any term is never easy work, especially when the term itself involves diversified
peoples in different comers o f the world suffering various cultural, political, economic
and social oppressions imposed by different conquerors. I have no intention of
attempting a universal definition to this term. However, it is essential to distinguish
several aspects that differentiate indigenous peoples from other groups, such as
minorities.
Indigenous populations are not necessarily minorities in a nation-state. In certain
Latin American countries, such as Guatemala and Bolivia, indigenous people are in
fact the largest ethnic group (Wilmer 1993:217). Although the conditions facing
indigenous peoples and minorities are sometimes similar: oppression, low social
status, poverty, degradation o f ethnic cultures, and discrimination, there are exceptions
in the case of minorities if we define minorities exclusively and mistakenly only on
“head counts.” Minorities can be the ruling class who establish authoritarian regimes
and hold the majorities from contesting politically powerful posts, such as the country
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o f South Africa during the apartheid era. According to Daes (1996), “a group must not
only lack political power, but lack the numerical strength ever to gain power through
democratic means, before it qualifies as a “minority.” An oppressive group that
constitutes a numerical minority o f the national population would, accordingly, not
qualify automatically as a “minority” (Daes 1996). Minorities can also be
economically successful, such as Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia. Under this
condition, whether they can be qualified as minorities is open to different ideology
with different presumptions.
But there are at least two concepts that have never been associated with the
conditions of minority that serve to distinguish indigenous peoples from minorities:
priority in time and attachment to a particular territory (Daes 1996). Indigenous
peoples are widely regarded as maintaining a special relation with their “ancestral
territories.” They inhabit some particular land since time immemorial, long before any
modern political regime was established. However, “peoples from other parts o f the
world overcame them, and by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a
non-dominant or colonial situation” (U.N. Working Definition, see Wilmer 1993:216).
From the above discussion, we can add a third aspect to indigenous peoples: they are
the peoples who have not yet experienced de-colonization, and so, by definition, do
not benefit from independent statehood.
In 1970, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of Minorities called for a study on
indigenous peoples. In 1981, the Commission on Human Rights created the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations and since then a yearly meeting has been held to
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develop a drafted declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. The U.N. announced
1993 as the “International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples.” In 1995, a draft
o f the “Universal Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous Peopled was submitted to
the Commission on Human Rights (TIVB 1994). The year o f 1995 also marked the
start of the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (Mercer 1997). In
this decade, significant progress is anticipated to be made on the official U.N.
document o f the Declaration.
The “Convention no. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries”
ratified by International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1957 was another influential
international document pertaining to the rights o f indigenous peoples. Its
comprehensive coverage on various aspects, including respect for aboriginal land
rights, protection for job opportunities, improvement of social security and health care,
equal access to language and education, and enhancement of economic and social
conditions, however, was flawed by its basic assumptions o f assimilation and
integration. Therefore, indigenous peoples’ autonomy for culture and social
institutions was ignored. In 1989, a revised version of the ELO Convention no. 107,
known as Convention no. 169 “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries,” was adopted by the general conference in response to
aborigines’ request for a higher degree of autonomy on culture, natural resources, and
self-identity (Wilmer 1993: 179-80).
The International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) was founded in
Copenhagen in 1968 by a group of scholars. Such academics have played significant
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roles in recent developments, such as the Survival International (SI) found in 1969 in
Britain, and Cultural Survival (CS) in 1976 in Massachusetts. IWGIA and CS reach its
audience mainly by publications, reports, and related activities. Representatives from
these two groups regularly attend the U.N. Working Group’s meetings. IWGIA
recently turned its attention to indigenous human rights and assisted delegations from
different countries to go to the U.N. meetings (Wilmer 1993: 141; TIVB 1994).
In 1975, George Manuel, joining indigenous leaders from Australia, New
Zealand, and Scandinavia, founded the World Council o f Indigenous Peoples (WCIP).
WCEP, advocating human rights and cultural rights, self-determination in the direction
of development, indigenous ownership of natural resources and lands, and education
in nativistic languages, represents another significant achievement of international
indigenous movement (Hong Chun-hu 1992: 68).
All around the world there are far too many examples o f human rights abuse
against indigenous peoples, who are often seen as standing in the way o f economic
development, and who are paying the price for opposing the destruction o f their
traditional cultures, way o f life, and local environments (Mercer 1997). Indigenous
movements around the world must contend with various forces and trends, such as
multinational corporations, inappropriate policies and violence from the States in
which they reside, cultural hegemony, the invasion of the capitalist mode of
production, and the deterioration o f the environments that are crucial for their survival.
Despite the fact that some significant progress on indigenous rights has been made in
Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., and Canada (see Mercer 1997; Salee 1995),
indigenous peoples are still vulnerable to all the forces mentioned above.
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Another international ethnic political movement initiated by indigenous peoples
is the Fourth World movement. The proposal and usage o f the term, Fourth World,
indicates the strong appeals of indigenous peoples to distinguish themselves from the
First, Second, and the Third Worlds (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990). The term “Fourth
World” also possesses a symbolic function to raise the international status of
indigenous peoples, one of the most underrepresented groups in international politics,
to a hoped-for equality with other international political entities that constitute all
other “worlds.” Although the “Fourth World movement” is still an ongoing process on
its theoretical construction, it has almost become an exclusive term for the worldwide
indigenous population, and has attracted some attention within the academic
community (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990).
2.3 Field Work in “Other” Cultures: the Issue of Representation
For geographers’ and anthropologists’ fieldwork, or other social scientists as
well, the description of the “real” world and the issue o f representation has been a
major issue in the past decade. In the work following his Orientalism in 1978, Said
pointed out that representation o f other cultures, societies, histories, as well as the
relationship between power and knowledge constitute his central concerns (Said
1986).
Duncan and Ley (1993) have pointed out four major types o f representation
theories. The first two modes are roughly based on the same “mimetic” theory of
representation, which believe that researchers should exert themselves to reflect and
describe the external world as authentically as possible. First, there was a period where
“descriptive” fieldwork based on the observation o f “trained” professionals dominated
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the methodology o f fieldwork. This continued until the 1950s. The second form of
mimesis is based on positivist science. The major difference of these two modes is that
the former whose central concerns are description and classification (or pattern),
values the concrete and emphasized particularity. On the other hand, the latter is more
concerned with abstraction and generalization, and strives to construct spatial theories
through a set o f presumptions and reductions (Duncan and Ley 1993). One of the wellknown examples o f spatial theories developed by geographers is Central Place Theory.
Postmodernism represents the third type and was a radical departure from
mimetic representations. Its “destroying forces” come from two strategic
displacements. The first is to remove the “privilege sites from which representations
emanate, notably Western, male intellectuals” (Duncan and Ley 1993:7). Second,
postmodernism interrogates and distrusts the totalizing ambition o f meta-narratives
known as Enlightenment projects. It is the second strategy that shifts the
representational control from Western male academics to the “polyphony o f voices” of
multiple sites and decentralizes a single authority.
The hermeneutic method is the fourth mode of representation identified by
Duncan and Ley. It recognizes the author’s position in an interpretative text where
interpretation is a “dialogue” between the researchers and their data - which are
collected for representing other places and other people (Duncan and Ley 1993:3). A
neutral, value-free observer (which never existed) is displaced by an intellectual who
is embedded deeply in his/her intellectual and institutional context and whose
interpretation of external world is subsequently influenced by his/her social and
political positions. The hermeneutic way o f research in a broad sense can
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accommodate a number o f theoretical positions in geography and I will adopt this
mode of representation in this interpretation of my own fieldwork in Li-Shan.
Geographers may borrow from anthropologists, particularly ethnographers, for
their critical reflection on cross-cultural fieldwork. The new cultural geography, in
fact, borrowed heavily from works of cultural/social anthropologists, especially
Clifford Geertz’s differentiation between “thin” and “thick” description. Thin
description emphasizes human behavior in the sense o f physical motions; in contrast,
thick description reveals its significance in the social and cultural context.
Ethnography, and by the same token, cross-cultural fieldwork in geography, “is a
matter of interpreting the meaning o f behavior with reference to the cultural context
within which it is ‘produced, perceived, and interpreted’” (Jacobson 1991:4).
Despite all the new developments in the field of cultural geography, the
“traditional” concerns of cultural geographers, dated back to Carl Sauer, such as
cultural diversity, distributions, and diffusions, have been by and large maintained
(Mathewson 1996). Nevertheless, with the new development in theories and
methodologies, geographers are equipped with new weapons to examine the same
themes with different perspectives and interpretations (Gregory 1989).
Unbalanced power relations are seemingly inevitably embedded in the
relationship between the researchers and the subject o f the research. The researchers
seize the power o f controlling and interpreting the data or information collected from
the fields. These data function as “raw materials” that can be utilized. The rewards of
using/consuming these data almost exclusively flow towards the researchers; rarely do
they benefit the research objects (Bostock n.d.). Moreover, the usage of research
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information is often channeled towards the re-confirmation of these uneven power
relations, or the institutionalization o f these relations (Bostock n.d.).
I made two field trips to Taiwan from April 1997 to August 1997, and from
November 1997 to February 1998. During my field work in Li-Shan, I resided at the
Li-Shan Presbyterian Church, with the family o f one of my most important
informants, Minister YuRaw PaSang. I went to their orchard and church, visited
church members and other local indigenous activists, as well as engaged in local
election campaigns. The head of Hoping Hsian is the Minister’s brother-in-law and
thus I was able to obtain specific data and took a closer look at the local election.
Because I cannot speak any indigenous language, the most used language between my
informants and me is the Mandarin. In addition to field work in Li-Shan, I also
interviewed several indigenous activists and academics in Taipei and Pingtung, as well
as participated in one conference, one public hearing and some reading group
meetings on the aborigine-related issues. O f course, I also developed some
connections with the core members o f the Plains People’s Rights Association (PPRA)
and Alliance of Taiwan’s Aborigines (AT A).
2.4 The Politics of Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan: Land, Culture,
Identity, and Environment
Hong Chun-hu’s study (1992) on Taiwan’s aboriginal reservation lands was the
first dissertation devoted exclusively to this topic. As a conservative, pro-ruling party
scholar, he fail to critically examine the KMT’s mountain policies and ignored, almost
completely, the meaning of land to aboriginal cultures and social structures. This pro
establishment study, in my view, only contributed to the re-enforcement o f current
ethnic power relations, and made no attempts to change this power structure. Other
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studies on the reservation lands, such as Lin Fang-chi (1984) and Chang Fen-chien
(1962), gave insufficient considerations to social, political, and cultural dimensions. It
is not until the rise of the indigenous movement that the studies on the impacts of both
the capitalist mode o f production and modem technology upon indigenous societies
appear (Yang Kuo-chu 1996). Sociologists also studied the process o f ethnic
mobilization associated with two indigenous “Return Our Lands” movements in the
late 1980s (Lee Tsu-min 1991). Chen Hsin-yi (1993) explores the social construction
of indigenous peoples’ poverty in Taiwan’s society. The economic dependence of
aborigines upon the State is not an internalized characteristic o f aborigines, but rather
a result o f the State’s minority policies (Chen Tzung-han 1994:9). Geographers’
research on reservation lands tends to focus on land use patterns and their changes
over time to reflect the economic re-structuring in the mountain areas (Chen Hsienming 1984 & 1986; Chang Chang-yi 1989 & 1992). However, few recognize that
aboriginal land rights movements are, in fact, struggles against the State or business
interests over space - the maintenance of ethnic space, and the rights to interpret and
utilize this space.
Most ethnic studies in Taiwan focus on the relationship between native
Taiwanese and the mainlanders (such as papers in Chang Mao-kuei et al 1993 and
Shih Cheng-fong ed. 1994). Hsieh Shih-chung’s series studies (1987a, 1987b, 1992,
1994b, 1994c, and 1994d) on ethnic relationships between Han and indigenous
peoples laid the foundation for further exploration into this relatively new dimension
of ethnic studies. His pioneer study on the “stigmatized identity” among indigenous
peoples was among the first researches on the social construction of identity politics.
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Hsieh (1987b and 1994a &d) also introduced Western theories applied to local case
studies, such as internal colonialism, theories of ethno-tourism, and the American
Indian Movement, into the field o f Taiwan’s indigenous studies. He argued that the
ethno-tourism and the social “re-discovery” of Taiwan’s indigenous culture were the
results of the state policies. Huang Ying-kuei (1981) opened a new broad field on
economic transformation and its impacts upon indigenous societies, particularly the
commercialization o f agricultural products. Chen Tzung-han (1994) provides a very
comprehensive and critical analysis on the post-war KMT policies towards aborigines.
There are also works that are heavily supportive of KMT policies, and filled with an
uncritical acceptance o f the KMT’s political propaganda, including the work done by
the indigenous peoples (Kao Te-yi 1984; Chen Jui-yun 1990). This kind of
“academic” works only serves to legitimatize unequal ethnic power relationships and
re-enforce the already rigid nation-state ideology, which accelerating the assimilation
trend imposed upon the minorities by the hegemonic state policies.
Aborigines’ call for self-autonomy in Taiwan’s mountain areas and efforts
directed at the formation of a pan-indigenous identity stimulate more delicate
discussion and critical reflection on the existing nationalism discourses. Western
theories of nationalism cannot be applied uncritically to different social and cultural
backgrounds. Anderson’s “Imagined Community” (1991) is often interpreted as
emphasizing the importance of “print capitalism” and its widely diffusion in a country
where the “imagined” political unit is built. In Taiwan, I will argue, it is this
“imagined geography” that is essential to legitimatize ruling power. Chao Kang (1996)
borrowed heavily from Hobsbawn, Greenfield, Habermas, and Geertz to construct a
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radical theory of a democratic nation. He claimed that various forms of nationalism,
given primordial nationalism that stresses blood relationships, liberal nationalism, or
reactionary nationalism (what he called hyper-ethnonationalism, or “voodoo”
nationalism), are the crisis o f modernity, rather than the hope of human beings (Chao
Kang 1996). Nationalism, with its xenophobia and “organic” connections with modem
nation-states, is too often associated with wars and genocide. In this regard, both Chao
Kang (1996) and Hsieh Shih-chung (1990) coincidentally argue that the pursuit o f
independent statehood is not the ultimate truth in the process of human history.
Political economy approaches to environmental problems often associate with
development issues and the empowerment of underprivileged people (see Blaikie
1985; Peet and Watts 1996). Indigenous peoples’ close connection to the mother earth
is the result of their cultures and economic modes of production, rather than simply a
romantic imagination. Therefore, the “return” of rights to natural resource
management to indigenous peoples means not only the utilization of indigenous
wisdom about local environment, but also requires a full respect and support for each
indigenous cultural renaissance. The recent combination o f academic, “scientific”
knowledge with the aboriginal, local, and grassroots knowledge in managing mountain
and forest resources in southern Taiwan, seems to provide a promising future for local
aborigines, and the restoration o f their cultures, and ethnic pride (Chang Chin-ju
1997).
Tien Ke (1994) argues that Chinese scholars studying Taiwan’s aborigines
reflect a similar propensity to the pro-KMT scholars in Taiwan: they both are blinded
by rigid nationalist ideology and, moreover, some o f the researches seem simply to
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serve for the purpose of state policies. According to Tien, the errors that Chinese
scholars make about Taiwan’s indigenous peoples include an ignorance o f plains
aborigines, the homogenization o f indigenous peoples, and the imagined “single
origin” theory which advocates that Taiwan’s aborigines were in fact, originated from
South China (so they are also “Chinese” in origin!) (Tien Ke 1994).
The indigenous peoples themselves are now also speaking up after a long silence
during the martial law era. Indigenous scholars, activists, artists, and novelists, such as
Sun Da-chuan, TaiBong SaSaLe, and Walis YuGan, provide an “insiders’ view” for
students of indigenous studies. However, Sun Da-chuan (1995b) cautions readers with
two critical reviews. First, the common feature of these indigenous elites is that they
all master the mainstream communication tool, the Chinese language and are able to
manipulate the writing codes. This skill allows the more-educated indigenous elites to,
at least partially, replace the elders in tribes as the source of authority. Nevertheless,
these young indigenous elites are deeply Sinicized and many of them were absent
from childhood memory o f their tribes (Interview E). Second, in the process of
constructing a pan-indigenous identity or “tribalism” (see Sections 6.3 and 7.3), any
essential fundamentalism of indigenous ego- or tribal-centrism, which promotes
superiority or excludes other ethnic groups’ perspectives on indigenous affairs on the
basis of their being “inauthentic,” should be avoided.
Few studies in the Li-Shan area have considered the complex relationships
among current land use patterns, the history of the local political economy, aboriginal
culture and land rights claims, and the dominant developmental ideology. To blame
local indigenous and Han fruit or vegetable growers without critically reflecting on the
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appropriateness and “legitimacy” of reservoir construction, and State-led development
policies, only reveals how deeply the developmental ideology and cultural bias has
penetrated into Taiwan’s civil consciousness.
In brief, political economy, new cultural geography, and post-colonial theories
provide the major theoretical framework and methodology for this study. The
perpetual uneven ethnic power relationships in Taiwan are examined from the critical
perspective of political economy. Environmental degradations are also investigated
with the theory generated from both political economy and cultural ecology, the
political ecological analysis. The new cultural geography offers the theoretical
backgrounds for discussing cultural and identity politics, cultural and landscape
representation (especially in ethno-tourism), as well as multiculturalism. Post-colonial
theories are especially helpful in explaining the social construction of a new
indigenous/Taiwanese culture through the combination of the colonizing and the
colonized cultures, as well as in deconstructing mainstream social values, and in
illustrating the geography o f resistance. The collection and analysis o f “field data,”
and even the theories that are chosen by a particular researcher are not only limited by
also inevitably influenced by his/her training backgrounds and ideological stances.
Messages of “subjectivity” are not what a hermeneutic research tries to convey.
Rather, I will argue, a clear stance on the study topic will clarify the researcher’s
social responsibility towards the objects being studied and influenced by the research
project, as well as clarify the blindspots and limitations embedded in every research.
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CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES INFLUENCING
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN TAIWAN
The writing o f histories is also a writing of politics. Histories are never simply
repetitions or description o f realities. Rather, histories always involve the politics of
representation and reflect contemporary power relationships. The interpretation and
writing o f histories are contested “fields” for those with different agenda and
ideologies.
The “official” history o f Taiwan traces the course of Chinese “common
ancestors” back approximately five thousand years ago. The mythical figure of Huang
Di (the Yellow Emperor) is said to be the common ancestor of all Chinese. Peripheral
Taiwan, from Chinese point o f view, is hardly a stage of historical events. Moreover,
due to the highly oppressive socio-political controls and the ideological indoctrination
superimposed by the KMT regime, the idea o f a common ancestor, Huang Di, became
a symbol of subordination o f certain ethnic or national identities in Taiwan. Although
both the ROC and PRC claim that Taiwan is an “integral and inseparable” territory of
China, Taiwan was not officially incorporated into the Chinese Empire until as late as
1683 during the Ching Dynasty and has never been ruled by the PRC.
The early Taiwanese national discourse, however, was also Han ethno-centric,
which blinds the capability o f viewing history with the co-presence of the indigenous
peoples. Therefore, Taiwan’s history was often referred as a “four hundred years’
history” (Su Bing. 1986). Only until the mid-1980s when the indigenous movement
righteously challenged both Taiwanese and Chinese Han chauvinism, did the historical
writings alter their routine assumptions o f Sino-centrism.
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The new historical writing on Taiwan’s histories includes not only the Chinese
cultural and lineal backgrounds, but also includes the colonial Japanese culture,
American global pop culture, and the Austronesian culture o f the indigenous peoples.
The new imagined geographical location of Taiwan is no longer in the peripheral area
of the culturally “greater China,” but in a new location where various cultures and
political powers meet, contest, and co-exist. Taiwan, as the arguable original place of
the Austronesian peoples (Bellwood 1991), is capable o f looking not only westwards
to its old connection with China, but also southwards and eastwards to the histories o f
Austronesian migration.
The insertion or “discovery” of indigenous histories regarding the writing of
Taiwan’s histories is itself an ontological breakthrough. Critical reflections on both
colonial representations and cultural politics of the indigenous peoples will provide an
epistemological re-examination on traditional historical writings and must challenge
the old, “orthodox” interpretation.
3.1 The Policies towards Taiwan’s Aborigines under the Dutch,
during the Koxinga Era, and the Pre-Modern Ching Empire
The Dutch East India Company was awarded a monopoly o f Dutch trade in the
East in 1602 (Shepherd 1993:47). In a effort to break up Portuguese and Spanish
monopolies of the China trade, and given the Company’s already strong trading
presence in Southeast Asia, the Dutch managed to occupy southern Taiwan in 1624
(Shepherd 1993:47-48; Chuang Ya-chung 1993). O f course, the main objective of the
Dutch East India Company was to conduct profitable trade in its colonies. Deerskins
hunted by the aborigines were exported to Japan while other deer products such as the
antlers and hooves went to China (Shepherd 1993:62; Lin Tao-sheng 1995). The
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Dutch drew “foreign” guest workers from nearby southeastern China to Taiwan’s then
indigenous society and thereby completely changed Taiwan’s social structures forever
(Wu Mi-cha 1996). The Dutch also used aborigines to subjugate several Han people’s
rebellions (Lin Tao-sheng 1995) in an effort to “pacify” the “raw /an.”
The subjects of Dutch colonial rule were mainly indigenous peoples in the plains
areas in the southern portions of the island. The Dutch colonialism, as any other
colonial rules, was more than merely economic exploitation and political domination.
Western colonialism and its associates, such as geographical expeditions, journals,
missionaries, and technologies, involve the politics o f representation and the
displacements of indigenous cultures and value systems (Chuang Ya-chung 1993).
The regional surveys conducted by the colonizers signaled both the incorporation of
Taiwan into the Dutch mercantile trade network, and the new epoch of cultural
reconstruction undertaken mainly by Dutch Christian missionaries (Chuang Ya-chung
1993).
The construction of the colonial “otherness” is the prerequisite to justify the
righteousness o f religious conversion. The “mission” to convert Formosa natives to
Christianity, to some extent, on the prevalent idea o f the times that the native religions
and customs were inferior, immoral, and uncivilized from the perspective o f Western
Christians (Chuang Ya-chung 1993). Therefore, the process o f conversion always
involved the displacement and interruption of indigenous cultures and the alienation of
aborigines from their traditional spatial concepts. Both romanization of, and the
translation of the Bible into, the indigenous languages produced controversial
consequences. The introduction of a writing system into the indigenous societies by
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the Dutch missionaries represented both empowerment and at the same time,
accelerating dissolution o f indigenous customs and resistance against the colonizers.
The influence o f the romanized Bible was so profound that it was still in use even
when Taiwan was under the rule of both the Koxinga (Cheng Cheng-kung) and
subsequently the Ching Dynasty (Lin Tao-sheng 1995).
Koxinga’s fleets landed in southern Taiwan, defeated the weak coastal defenses
o f the Dutch, and quickly seized control over southern Taiwan. As a loyalist family of
the Ming Dynasty, the Chengs vowed to expel the Manchus from China proper and
reestablish the Ming Dynasty and its royal family. Taiwan was Chengs’ solid base for
re-taking the mainland. (Ironically, history seemed to repeat itself about two and half
centuries later when the KMT promised its followers that it would return to mainland
to overturn the “tyranny o f Communism.”) However, Koxinga and his successors
controlled Taiwan for only 22 years, from 1661 to 1683.
Because of the military purposes of the Koxinga, the people o f Taiwan, mostly
peasants, were treated as a reserve army, and the land o f Taiwan was reclaimed
extensively for the production o f food to feed the large standing military that Koxinga
was developing. During the Cheng’s reign, most of the southwestern plains areas in
Taiwan had been reclaimed by the Han immigrants (Lin Tao-sheng 1996). The
Chengs’ eagerness to build up military strength resulted both in unprecedented efforts
to reclaim arable lands within the aboriginal territories, but also harsh policies towards
the indigenous peoples in the plains areas (Lin Tao-sheng 1996).
Even though under the Chengs’ aggressive cultivation policies, the middle and
northern Taiwan saw only limited Han reclamation and the lands remained mostly
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held by the plains aborigines, the Pin Pu Tzu. At this time then, the majority o f the
indigenous peoples still possessed their social and political organizations, and
maintained their own cultural autonomy in interpretations o f the outside world (Hsia
Chun-hsiang 1992:74). However, the Han people, with more advanced land
management skills and more effective agricultural production systems gradually
instituted an efficient state apparatus for further development of this “frontier” island.
The Ching Dynasty ruled Taiwan from 1683 to 1895. The first documented
effort to erect stone-marked boundaries to delimit"fan territory,” which literally
means savage’s lands, from the Han-colonized land occurred in 1722. This miniature
“Great Wall” was the earliest prototype of the recognition o f aboriginal reservation
lands. The line o f demarcation was subsequently shifted and re-constructed to become
an island-wide set of boundary trenches which changed from time to time according to
the dynasty’s changing pro-colonization or protectionist policy toward indigenous
lands. In the early Ching period, only men were allowed to come to Taiwan for
reclamation, while their family members had to stay in the mainland. The overall goal
of the Ching policy was to prevent Taiwan from becoming an overseas rebel base. It
was believed by many Ching officials that the government’s interest was best served
by preserving the livelihood o f indigenous peoples, both mountains and plains
aborigines, including their access to lands (Shepherd 1993:3). Han immigrants and
their reclamation activities were held to lands within the official boundary.
It was important to be “economical” in terms of the overseas frontier
management for a land-based empire. Clarifying land titles and preventing title
disputes were activities which were necessary to reduce control costs. One efficient
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way devised by the Ching administration to strike a balance between the control costs
and the extraction of local revenues was to enlist young mail plains aborigine in
pacification campaigns against rebellious Han immigrants and other plains or
mountain aborigines (Shepherd 1993:3). Therefore, the Ching’s frontier policy was the
product of careful consideration weighing factors including the frontier’s strategic
importance, control costs, and potential revenues (Shepherd 1993:3-5). The balance
between control costs and revenues generated by taxes on agricultural lands decided
whether the State backed the land claims of plains aborigines, or at other times
permitted the Han people’s expansion o f reclamation into the “/a « territory” (Shepherd
1993:5).
During the reign o f the Yung-Cheng emperor (1723-35), who was renowned for
his aggression in expanding frontiers and his eagerness to increase revenues for the
military, a pro-colonization policy was adopted to enable Han settlers to rent deer
fields from plains aborigines (Shepherd 1993:17). To respect the aboriginal prior
claims, Han people’s reclamation corporates (the farmers’ organizations) had to pay
“large-rents” before reclaiming tribal lands. From 1738 to 1766, extensive land
surveys were ordered to scrutinize land contracts between Han and plains aborigines
for official inspections (Shepherd 1993:18-19). The frequency of surveys reflected the
fast changing boundaries of “fa n territory” due to the Han encroachment. In 1788, the
Ching government came to realize that the protection o f plains aborigines land rights
was no longer feasible and formally legalized land transactions between Han migrants
and plains aborigines. While reclamation activities pushed toward the ancestral lands
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of mountain aborigines, plains aborigines were Sinicized and eventually assimilated
into the Han agrarian society.
The history of the Han people’s reclamation in Taiwan can be described as the
gradual encroachments upon the indigenous ancestral lands. The Ching government’s
policies were forced to frequent changes over certain period o f time to reflect the
social reality that aborigines, plains and mountains alike, were losing lands to the Han
immigrants. In 1724, Han settlers were first allowed to lease lands within the fan
territories from plains aborigines. Then, in 1788, the Ching government acceded to the
demands of Han people and allowed them to officially purchase lands from plains
aborigines. Finally, in 1875, even the lands within the traditional territories of the
mountain aborigines were open to Han settlers (Huang Fu-san 1981). It is obvious that
Han people used more than legal measures to obtain arable lands within fa n territory
and forced the government incapable at the time o f putting down revolts, to legalize
the land transactions.
A complicated land tenure system evolved in conjunction with ethnic
interactions between indigenous and Han peoples. This system arose from locally
specific socio-political relations in the frontier colonization. In order to conform to the
official order that ruled against illegally acquiring aboriginal lands, many Han farmers
acknowledged that tribal lords owned the titles to their lands. These Han settlers also
agreed to pay annual rents to the aboriginal landlords, as well as investing capital and
labor to improve the productivity (Chen Chiu-kun 1994; see also Figure 3.1). Some
Han peasants asked the land titleholders to permit their cultivation in perpetuity so
long as the required rents were appropriately paid. Thus, the Han peasants were able to
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gain the privilege o f using their improved lands independent o f tribal authority (Chen
Chiu-kun 1994).

tenant cultivator
(permanent tenancy)
cultivation right

subsoil right

primary-rent holder
(aboriginal landlord /
or land title holder)

Figure 3.1. One Plot, One Owner Pattern
Source: Chen Chiu-kun 1994.
The second type o f land tenure system involves even more parties, usually more
than one ethnic group, into the land in question (see Figure 3.2). The three-layered
relationship in which the original tenant cultivator became a usufruct right holder. The
usufruct right holder paid primary rent to the landlord (either the titleholder or
aboriginal landlord) from the rental crops collected from the subtenant, the actual
cultivator (Chen Chiu-kun 1994). In this three-layer system, the ownership of a plot of
land was separated into title (or subsoil, large-rent) right that owned mostly by tribal
authority, and cultivation (or topsoil, small-rent) right that mostly own by Han settlers
(Shepherd 1993:8; Chen Chiu-kun 1994). By paying “large-rent” to the tribal
landlords, Han settlers were able to “legally” reclaim the lands within the fa n
territories.
The “headhunting” mountain aborigines and their territorial claims continued to
be the counterforce to Han-sponsored reclamation. Efforts made to conquer and pacify
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the “raw” aborigines extended throughout the Ching and continued even during the
Japanese occupation. This land tenure system was partially modified and finally
abandoned by the Japanese colonial government. The large-rent system was abolished
in 1904 within the surveyed territories. The abolition of the large-rent system reduced
the condition o f split ownership and simplified the majority o f arable land areas into
“one lord to a field” and therefore, raised the efficiency o f the statecraft o f the
Japanese empire in controlling land resources (Lin Chia-ling 1996:45-47). The tribal
authority in collecting large-rent had been gradually in decline from the late Ching
period. However, the abolishment o f the large-rent system by the Japanese
government accelerated the process of deterioration of tribal economic sources, and
inevitably elevated the pressures upon minorities and politically underprivileged
groups to assimilate into the mainstream (Lin Chia-ling 1996:46).

subtenant
(actual cultivator)

topsoil right

subsoil right

usufruct right holder
(secondary-rent)
primary-rent holder
(aboriginal landlord /
or land title holder)

Figure 3.2. One Plot, Two or More Owners Pattern
Source: Chen Chiu-kun 1994.
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3.2 Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan under Japanese Control
The Japanese Empire was the first political entity with the characteristics o f the
prototype o f the modem nation-state to rule Taiwan. Various modem surveys,
including land, ethnology, and natural resources, were undertaken extensively and
aggressively by the Japanese regime to better manipulated export potential during
colonial rule. During the period from 1910 to 1914, the Japanese conducted a “Forests
and Wild Fields Survey” with the goal o f confiscating lands without official patents
and ownership certificates. From 1915 to 1925, the plan of “Survey o f Official Forests
and Wild Fields” was implemented and aimed at the clarification between state-owed
forest lands, including fa n territory, and those lands that were subject to later
development. Even as late as 1925, not all the territory o f mountain aborigines was
surveyed completely by modern methods (Chen Tzung-han 1994:34; Lin Chia-ling
1996:57-60). These ambitious “forests and wilderness” surveys arguably laid the
foundation for the future exploitation of Taiwan as a colony and promoted the process
of capitalization o f state controlled fa n territory.
The earliest Japanese survey demarcated around 450,000 hectares as the “lands
for the fa n peoples.” These lands were discrete and disseminated from the locations of
tribes (Chang Fen-chien 1962; Interview A). Successive surveys on mountains,
forests, and fa n territory classified land uses into three categories according to the
different degrees of potential for future development. One category o f land,
accounting for around 240,000-250,000 hectares, was reserved for the use of
aborigines (Lin Chia-ling 1996:61; Chang Fen-chien 1962). The powerful modern
state apparatus thus shrunk the areas allocated for aborigines by about 200,000
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hectares. The fact revealed that the Japanese Empire, with the assistance of advanced
technology and an effective bureaucratic system, had a more thorough control and
understanding o f both the peoples and the land o f Taiwan than any previous regime.
The reserved lands, based on the previous “lands for the fa n peoples,” were in discrete
units and were mostly scattered around, or emanated from, the location where
aboriginal tribes were still living. A limitation to indigenous hunting grounds and
slash-and-burn fields was disguised through the creation o f aboriginal reservations,
which, in fact, circumscribed aborigines, and their way of life within a space
designated by the colonial state.
A series of coercive collective movements directed at the indigenous tribes was
imposed throughout the whole period o f Japanese colonization. At its outset, the
policy of collective movement was a tentative experimental method in “managing”
mountain aborigines by local governments. It later became a formal policy o f the
Japanese empire. The purpose of collective movements was at first, for the
convenience of exploiting natural resources, most notably, hardwood logs and
camphor, within mountainous fa n territories. It also served as an instrument for the
ensuing authoritarian control over aborigines and lowered the costs of management of
fa n peoples by moving aboriginal tribes to more accessible sites. The new sites were
often located within the jurisdiction o f regularly administrated areas to reduce the area
offan territory. This encirclement assuredly placed the aborigines under a much
greater degree o f police surveillance. By disconnecting people from their homeland,
the assimilation and acculturation o f uncivilized fa n would be accelerated, and thus
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prevented the indigenous peoples, who often took the advantage of local rugged
topography, from revolting against the Japanese Empire (Hwu Sheau-Shya 1996:28).
Taiwan, as a colony of Japan, was driven into the Second World War. Taiwan
provided not only natural resources for colonial exploitation, but also its people were
coerced to serve the war machine o f the Japanese Empire. Throughout world history,
governments have conscripted minority groups in multi-ethnic states for military
service. Peled (1994) has categorized three types o f ethnic conscription: by force, by
ideology, and by contract. In responses to such drafts, he argues that there are three
reasons which caused ethnic youths to be enlisted: fear, ideological conviction, and the
expectation of future civic benefits. Colonial mother countries differ from each other
in terms o f the power of the colonial regimes vis-a-vis ethnic minorities, so that the
priorities o f methods to enlist their minority groups and the reasons for ethnic
minorities to be conscripted by the colonial regimes might vary. The Japanese way of
conscription, to a large extent, was the combination o f force and ideology, with more
emphasis on the promotion of ideological conviction. For any place, this was, perhaps,
the most thorough control of minority groups. With the ideological loyalty to the
Japanese Emperor, the possibility o f domestic insurrections against Japan was
reduced.
An ethnic division of labor was emerged under the supervision o f the Japanese
imperial war machine. On the one hand, Japanese-introduced the agricultural
technology in conjunction with the labor force o f the Han youths generated massive
food exports to Japan. On the other hand, the hunting skills and great endurance,
which characterized the tribal societies (in perhaps a somehow stereotypical way), of
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the indigenous youths were transformed into the skills o f war (Chen Tzung-han
1994:35).
The Japanese also conducted comprehensive ethnological, flora, and fauna
surveys in the mountain areas. Japanese anthropologists’ classification o f Taiwan’s
(mountain) indigenous peoples into either nine or ten distinctive groups has had
profound influence even long after the end o f World War II (Chen Chao-ru 1992).
The consequence of Japanese colonialism is a controversial and ideology-driven
topic. Progressive academics condemn colonial impacts on the formation o f a
confused identity, resource exploitation, political oppression, and cultural distortion.
While at the same time, ironically, these scholars were later proud o f the cultural
“hybridity” (see Chapter 7) that distinguishes Taiwanese culture from others.
Advocates o f Taiwan independence tend to positively credit the Japanese
“achievements” in modernizing Taiwan and efficient law enforcement. Those who
believe in unification with China denounce the Japanese because o f either Chinese
nationalism or the hatred which developed during war. The different collective war
memories experienced by different ethnic groups helped breed later ethnic tensions in
Taiwan. In this way, the current ethnic tensions in Taiwan are, in part, a legacy o f
Japanese colonial rule.
For a brief review o f the relationships among indigenous peoples, alien regimes,
and Han settlers, then, some generalizations can be drawn from the above discussion.
The Dutch desired mostly economic profit, coupled with some limited efforts to
convert nearby aborigines to Christianity. The overall relations between indigenous
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peoples in Taiwan and the Dutch were benign, if in some specific cases also
oppressive (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992:112-113).
The Ming loyalist Koxinga and his successors brought the first large-scale Han
immigrants to Taiwan. Because of Koxinga’s purpose of re-taking the mainland from
the Manchus, he undertook the military buildup by aggressively acquiring lands from
aborigines to promote higher food production to feed his large military force. The
relations with indigenous peoples were, therefore, in tension (Hsia Chun-hsiang
1992:112-113).
In the early Ching period, only (single) men were allowed to come to Taiwan.
The intermarriages between Han men and indigenous women became common and
were also helpful for friendly ethnic interactions (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992:112-113).
As more and more Han settlers came to Taiwan and the demands on lands escalated,
ethnic tensions gradually built up.
Japanese colonialism and its natural resource extraction policy generated very
tense relations with the indigenous peoples, particularly those lived in the mountain
areas. A relatively stable condition was finally reached in the mountains only after
series of pacifying policies, oppressive measures, and the introduction of rice-growing
agriculture into these areas, which resulted in improvements in material life. Of
course, ideological indoctrination was also carried out by the authoritarian colonial
government as it was throughout the Empire (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992:112-113).
Nevertheless, the era of Japanese colonial rule, in fact, still enjoys a highly positive
position in the thoughts o f many indigenous elders (Sun Da-chuan 1991:20).
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CHAPTER 4. MOUNTAIN POLICY AND RESERVATION
LAND POLICY UNDER THE KMT
This chapter will illustrate the current social and economic circumstances facing
Taiwan’s aborigines after nearly 100 years colonial rule by both the Japanese and the
KMT, and then, follow by detailed and critical reviews on the evolution of reservation
land-related provisions and laws. The last section of this chapter is devoted to the land
conflicts in Taiwan’s mountain hsians (the sub-county administrative units).
It is interesting that the KMT continued the Japanese indigenous policies,
despite its denouncement o f the Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Whether the KMT’s
rule of Taiwan is also a form o f colonial rule is subject to debate (see the debate
articles in Chung Wei Literature Monthly during 1995). However, a simplified
dichotomy o f either pro-Taiwan independence or pro-unification with China is useful
to distinguish two ideologies towards both the evaluation of the Japanese colonial rule,
and the nature of the KMT regime. Still, we must recognize that there is a wide
political spectrum reflected in different strategies and opinions about these issues. The
locations of the arguments on the spectrum are decided not only by
independence/unification positions, but also by left or right ideological stances in the
political arena. The overall popular perspective is that advocates of Taiwan’s
independence tend to value the Japanese colonial rule for its achievement of
modernizing Taiwan, and in turn tend to consider the KMT’s takeover Taiwan simply
as the actions of yet another colonial regime.
In contrast, those who are pro-unification, including the KMT itself, are inclined
to discount Japanese development efforts and to emphasize the exploitative side of
colonial rule, while at the same time playing down the KMT’s “alien” characteristics
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vis-a-vis the native Taiwanese. Despite all those stances, the recognition that the
indigenous people have been under some form o f colonial regime, while under the
KMT or the Japanese, constitutes one o f the few agreements reached by the debates in
various issues of the Chung Wei Literature Monthly during 1995 and on other
occasions (Chao Kang 1993; Walis YuGan 1994a).
Recently, the full complexity of the colonial experience has received more
attention, mostly from post-colonial scholars. Colonial rule involves the colonizers’
manifest superiority toward the colonized, and the promotion o f labels o f
modernization versus primitiveness (Wilmer 1993:60). All regimes that have
established control over Taiwan have considered the mountainous area to be a special
administration district. The relationship between the indigenous people and the
successive alien rulers was dependent on the capacity for governmental control in the
mountainous area.
The reservation land policy has been one o f the most profound mountain policies
that influence indigenous peoples’ livelihoods while re-defining indigenous peoples’
conceptions of both land and spatial organization.
Similar to the treatment of many other aborigines around the world, the
indigenous peoples of Taiwan were thought to be unable to cope with the dramatic
social changes induced from the “outside.” This belief led to the creation o f both, what
Kariya’s (1993) calls, “paternalistic administrative structures,” under both Japanese
and KMT rule, and the reservation land system.
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4.1 The Current Situation Facing the Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan
The current conditions facing indigenous peoples in Taiwan cannot be
understood without looking at both the broader historical and political contexts of
Taiwan over the past few centuries, as well as considering world colonial history
which subordinated indigenous peoples in many different places to marginalized
positions. This marginalizing process of Taiwan’s indigenes is summarized by Hsieh
Shih-chung (1986) according to a set of different eras o f alien domination in Table
4.1.1 briefly discussed the eras o f the Ching dynasty and a detailed description o f the
policies carried out by the Japanese empires toward the indigenous Taiwanese in
Chapter 3. This section will focus on the KMT’s policies on Taiwan’s indigenes.
Table 4.1 provides not only the numerous alien dominations, but also
summarizes the changing power relations among different social/ethnic groups. The
Ching and those regimes (the Dutch, Spanish, and that o f the Ming loyalist Koxinga)
that preceded it had only loose controls over raw fan, the aborigines living in the
mountains, and thus had only limited access to mountain territories and resources.
With the assistance o f modem technology and the introduction of more intensive
bureaucratic control, both the Japanese colonial rulers and the KMT strengthened their
authority and policy influences to an unprecedented extent while subjugating virtually
all the indigenous territories under the surveillance of the state apparatus. By the late
Japanese era, the indigenous peoples in Taiwan had completely lost their status as
“masters” of this island, and total domination of these people and their lands by
external groups had become firmly rooted.
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Table 4.1 The Process of Marginalization
Taiwan
Eras
Positions of Aborigines
ca. 1620 B.C.
Only master
One Mostly being masters 1624-1661
of
1661-1875
Half master
mast
1875-1930
Being masters in
ers
Fewer areas
1930 - upLosing position of master
to-date
completely
Source: Hsieh Shih-chung (1986)

o f Indigenous Peoples in
Alien Powers
None
Holland & Spain
Koxinga & Ching Empire
Ching Empire & Japan
Japan & KMT (China)

Hsieh Shih-chung (1994) later defines the term “master” as
[t]he group identifies itself positively, and that its sociocultural
institutions are still effective. It does not refer to relationships
between the majority and minority groups in the sense of
population. ... although objectively the Han Chinese had already
become the superior group [in 1875], some aboriginal groups,
having almost no contacts with the outerworld, still interpreted
the whole in their own terms. Their ethnic position was not
different from the time when alien powers had not yet arrived.
They were still masters, so to speak.
The “master’s” status refers not merely to effective control over certain territory,
but also to social and cultural viability. I will discuss the changing social status of
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples and their social and cultural revitalization movement in
Chapter 5.
4.1.1 Economic Conditions in the Mountain Areas of Taiwan
The KMT’s early “protection policy” toward the mountain compatriots was in
fact aimed at accelerating the modernization process affecting the indigenous cultures,
with the purpose of controlling resources and preempting resistance from mountain
area residents (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:10). Poverty is quite prevalent among the
indigenous population (Table 4.2), but it is unfair to say that living conditions in the
mountain areas have not improved given the remarkable economic growth during the
past five decades or so. However, the average income o f an indigenous person is
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slightly greater than sixty percent of the average income level of a Taiwan Province
resident. This estimate excludes Taipei and Kaohsiung, the island’s two largest cities.
If these two cities are included to estimate, the average income per capita in Taiwan as
a whole, the percentage is even less, dropping to 36.95% and 37.60% for aborigines in
the mountain area in 1978 and 1985 respectively (RDEC 1991:64). A simple
quantitative comparison o f the differences in wage levels or the uneven distribution of
wealth, or even a qualitative approach on the “relativity o f exploitation” and other
social psychological indicators will not satisfactorily demonstrate the social
mechanisms that produce poverty. Poverty, is constructed by the socio-economic
relationship that cannot be reduced to the economic dimension alone.
Table 4.2 The Income Comparison Between Indigenous and Average Family in
Average Indigene’s
Average Farmer’s
Income in Taiwan
Income
Province
48644
65.2%
54558
73.1%
100%
1985 74626
96608
62.0%
116636
74.9%
100%
1991 155731
Average Income of Average Income o f
Average Income of
Indigene in Plains
Indigene in Cities
Indigenes in Mountains
67.4%
57.6%
45012
60.3%
50311
42989
1985
72.3%
96524
62.0%
112586
59.1%
1991 92117
Source: Calculated from both 1996 Tahvan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book. Ministry
of the Interior. Taipei, Taiwan & The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in
Remote Areas in 1991, Department o f Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government,
1993.
*Not include Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities
Average Income in
Taiwan Province

The island’s economic transformation is conspicuously reflected in the changing
income components. Taiwan has undergone a thorough and rapid industrialization in
the past fifty years. Over time, industrial production substituted for agricultural
products as the major source of income for people in Taiwan. Considering the spatial
distribution o f wealth, a parallel example o f core and periphery relations originating
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from Dependency Theory can be drawn between plains and mountain economies, and
indeed even on a larger scale, between First World countries and Taiwan as a whole
(Koo 1987). Along this path toward modernization, peripheral areas have limited
autonomy in the direction and pace of their development. Within the framework of
Dependency Theory, the indigenous mountain economy situated so clearly in the
periphery of a peripheral capitalist country has but little control over the core-initiated
modernizing /industrializing process.
Two major economic trends can be identified in indigenous societies. Table 4.3
shows the first trend of economic transformation in a rapidly capitalizing mountainous
area. Within a six-year period, wage income accounted for an increasing proportion in
the income component structure. In turn, the proportion o f incomes generated by
agricultural activities steadily declined in all three categories o f indigenous population.
The portion of income remitted by family members working outside the area provides
a broad possibility of interpretation. The family members working outside could mean
either wage laborers or seasonal agricultural workers. Whatever the interpretation, it
reveals that income from working outside was a significant source o f revenue, at least
to the plains aborigines.
The long declining trend o f the contribution o f agricultural income to total
income is illustrated in Table 4.4. Before capitalism was introduced into mountain
subsistence economy, the indigenous living relied exclusively on agriculture-related
activities, such as the production o f subsistence crops and hunting. During the process
of the capitalist development in Taiwan, the original subsistence economy collapsed as
the agricultural income decreased in significance. This overall tendency, however,
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fails to reflect the minor, local differences resulting from different spatial locations
and specific environmental conditions. Agricultural income in Li-Shan, for example,
since the mid-1960s, has always accounted for a significant portion o f family incomes
when temperate-zone fruits and vegetables displaced original slash-and-burn
agriculture.
Table 4.3 Income Components of the Indigenous Peoples
Wage
Income
1985 1991
56.52 68.96

Agriculture
Income
1985 1991
21.63 15.52

Family Member
Working Outside
1985
1991
13.44
10.36

Other
Sources
1985 1991
8.41 5.1

Aborigines
in Mountain
20.83
12.12
6.43 5.09
Aborigines 61.17 74.38 11.57 8.41
in Plains
1.10
2.43
3.18
3.59 5.13
Aborigines 92.17 90.59 1.81
in Cities
Source: Calculated from The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in
Remote Areas in 1991, Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government,
1993.

Table 4.4 Percentage o f Agricultural Income as Total Income for
Indigenes in Taiwan ___________
unit: %
1967
1985
1991
1972
Prior 1953
to ca.
I.M. I.P.* I.M. I.P.
I.M. I.P.
1945
26.47 40.61 n.a. 78.37 88.43 84.48 91.59
19.43
0
Non
agriculture
73.53 59.39 n.a. 21.63 11.57 15.52 8.41
Agricultural 100 80.57
Source: Calculated from Chen Hsin-yi (1993 : 15-16) & The Survey on Economic and
Living Qualities in Remote Areas in 1991, Department o f Civil Affairs, Taiwan
Provincial Government, 1993.
* Indigenous Peoples in Mountain # Indigenous Peoples in Plains
The second characteristic o f the economic transformation of mountain areas in
Taiwan is the commercialization o f agricultural activities. Capitalist agriculture is
claiming a growing proportion o f the production resources, including land, labor and
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capital, for both indigenous peoples and Han people. The other transformations
associated with commercialized agriculture have been gradually perceptible, including
the commercialization of agricultural land and changing attitudes toward land, the
increasingly importance of the cash economy and the demands for cash, the alteration
of employment pattern, changing land use patterns, rising land values, and dramatic
changes to the land tenure system. These changes will be discussed in the last section
of this chapter (Huang Ying-kuei 1981; Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992: 92-3).
For more comprehensive studies o f poverty among the indigenous peoples,
several factors need to be taken into account: the land and property rights under the
KMT regime, the roles played by capital and labor in the local market economy, and
education and power relations under Han cultural hegemony (Chen Hsin-yi 1993 :i).
On this small crowded island, land ownership and the wealth resulting from land
speculation, rather than the actual wage incomes, accounts for Taiwan’s enlarging gap
between the haves and the have-nots. The labor market has highly selective controls
over worker characteristics such as ethnicity, race, gender, and age. Changes in the
education level alone have limited capability to change this labor market. In short, the
same level o f education does not guarantee the same job opportunity for different
racial/ ethnic groups. Therefore, education can only be one o f the predictors of income
levels. Taiwan’s reputation as one of the few developing countries with a very evenly
distributed incomes has faded away since the various waves o f land and real estate
speculations beginning in the mid-1980s have increased the “resource gap” between
rich and poor.
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Within the indigenous population, educational levels are, in a very general sense,
related to wage levels and the degree of socialization into the mainstream social
values. Table 4.5 indicates the differences o f education levels between the aborigines
and the Taiwan population as a whole. The percentage of indigenous peoples receiving
at least a senior high school education is significantly lower than for the average
person living in Taiwan. The differences in educational attainment between the
indigenous peoples o f the plains, cities and mountains, are minor, although the
indigenes dwelling in plains seem to receive less education than the other two groups.
Table 4.6 shows that the gap between the average population and the aborigines in the
mountains for attending higher education has increased over the past few decades.
Despite government subsidies, extra scholarships, and selectively lowering the
threshold for college/university entrance, policies aimed at elevating education levels
for the indigenous population have failed to achieve the hoped-for results.
The study of poverty also demonstrates imbalances in the knowledge/ power
relationship between the dominating and the dominated groups. Traditional
conservative approaches, on the one hand, emphasize the direct association of
“capability” with “race” and “gender” (Chen Hsin-yi 1993: 22). The poverty often
associated with minority ethnic groups is attributed to the distinctive “nature” of these
groups, such as laziness, lack of “work ethics,” alcoholism, and dullness (Lee Yi-yun
1992). The lack o f control over the pace o f social change, maladjustment to changes,
and stereotyped images imposed by the dominating group and media, however, are
interpreted as the cultural characteristics o f the minorities. These interpretations
resemble moral criticisms and reveal the underlying character of Han chauvinism in
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Table 4.5 The Differences of Educational Levels between Indigenous and
Total
Total
Indigenes
Taiwan
Population

Indigenes
Indigenes Indigenes
Registered Registered Registered
in Mountain in Plains
in Cities

College/
2.4
1.98
3.04
2.34
10.8
University
Senior High
13.96
14.30
14.23
15.44
22.5
School
Source: Calculated from the 1996 Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book. Ministry
of the Interior. Taipei, Taiwan and The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in
Remote Areas in 1991, Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government,
1993.

Table 4.6 The Differences of Educational Levels between Mountain
Indigenes and Taiwan Average _______ ________________
1991
1978
1985
1969
5.29% 8.74% 9.71% 14.51%
Senior High School
2.05% 4.26% 5.64% 8.5%
College/ University
Source: Chen Hsin-yi (1993: 43) & The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in
Remote Areas in 1991, Department o f Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government,
1993.
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Taiwan’s case (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:25). On the other hand, the more liberal
perspective stresses that “capability” is varied with learning opportunities. Education
is thought to be the way to nurture “cultural capital” for vocational requirement. In this
regard, education has only an instrumental purpose as exclusively for the purpose of
future economic benefits. Ethnic/racial differences are absent from, or neutralized, in
both approaches. Ethnic cultural backgrounds rarely draw attentions in evaluating the
performance of minority students in Taiwan’s standardized educational system, where
cultural differences are completely ignored.
4.1.2 Mountain Policy
Like the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Canada,
Taiwan’s mountain policy and its agency is a “total,” “comprehensive” structure in the
sense that it controls virtually every aspect o f life for the peoples under its charge
(Kariya 1993). However, the purpose and evolution o f the KMT’s mountain policy
must be understood within Taiwan’s historical and geographical context. Taiwan was
restored to Chinese control in 1945 but one result o f the Potsdam Agreement which
served as the “blueprint” for a new postwar world order among the Allies (Pannell and
Ma 1980:264). The international Cold War structure, centered around two
superpowers, enabled the KMT to justify its claim as the legitimate government o f the
whole of China until 1971 when Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations. This
forced the power base of the KMT’s legitimacy to shift from claiming to be the sole
legitimate Chinese government to, most vividly, promoting economic development in
Taiwan (Amsden 1985).
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Geographically, tv/o-thirds o f Taiwan is composed of rugged, steep mountains in
the central and eastern parts. Mountains are now home to the majority o f the
remaining indigenous peoples whose different cultures and languages are still
distinctive today. Taiwan’s location in the east flank o f the Eurasian landmass made it
party to the containment policy promoted by the West, especially the U.S. The
historical conjunction also gave Taiwan a special place to receive and interact with
three major cultures - Japanese, Chinese, and American. All three have their
respective positions in Taiwan in the postwar era.
Administratively, the thirty mountain hsians - sub-county units - were all
established by 1946. The “Mountain Development Association in Taiwan” was
founded in 1948 by the ruling regime to co-opt indigenous intellectuals and the elite
for stabilizing the mountain administrative system and to strengthen the KMT’s
control over the indigenous societies (Chen Tzung-han 1994:116). Civil and military
controls were further consolidated by the enactment o f several executive orders
validated by martial law which was in effect from 1949 to 1987. These orders were
aimed at isolating mountain society from the plains society, and at limiting the
accessibility of the mountain areas and their residents to Han people.
The alternative educational system employed in the mountain area was
incorporated into regular administration and became one part of the standardized
policy o f the Department of Education, of the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1949.
The adopted national language, Mandarin, was made mandatory in schools and, in
turn, once popular Japanese was prohibited. The purpose of this language policy, as
outlined in the act, was to “promote the concept about our country and elevate national
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consciousness” (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:7). Textbooks were standardized in 1958 when all
indigenous children had the same curricula as Han pupils. Even the indigenous
peoples’ names were changed into the names o f Han people, and indigenous peoples
were even compelled to adopt the Chinese way o f naming, i.e. the use o f first names
and family names, which was completely strange to the aborigines. This forced
adoption of Chinese names only ended in 1993 when the new law allowed the
aborigines to restore their traditional names.
It is obvious that the goals o f the national education system and its associated
preconditions were to pave the way for “plainization” and to justify the assimilation
policy. Moreover, even in the late 1980s, some texts in the standardized books
contained apparent discrimination against the aborigines and implicitly promoted the
idea of the superiority o f the Han people. Indigenous peoples were depicted as
headhunting, backward, people whereas the Han were portrayed as civilized. It is
under this kind o f social construction that indigenous peoples suffer what Hsieh Shihchung calls the “stigmatized identity (1986). His definition o f ethnic stigma is as
follows:
“An ethnic group, especially a minority, has a real, Active, or
imaged “feature” which not only makes people who contact with
this group keep them at arm’s length, but is disgusting by the
group itself. ... In addition, this “feature” also always had intimate
relations with poverty, dependence, rejection, and forever
inferiority. In the expressed attitude or behavior, members o f this
group may self-defend themselves a lot, because o f the
uncertainty or insecurity. Furthermore, “cringe” and “making a
deceptive show of power”, or “strong self-slight” and
“exaggerated self-esteem” usually interlock to appear in their
social lives.”
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In the Taiwan Provincial Government’s outline on the governance o f the
mountain area, the mountain administrative system should be in a transitional status to
prepare for the future incorporation into the regular administration. Three major
“movements” were promoted in the mountain hsiam in 1951 —agricultural
cultivation, reforestation, and the “correction” of living style of the mountain people.
Six programs were carried out simultaneously, including the forced adoption o f the
national language, improving and correcting clothes, diet, housing, daily life, and
customs. The influence o f the state policy penetrated thoroughly into the indigenous
private domain and everyday life for the first time. In 1973, the new act for improving
the standard o f living for the mountain people echoed similar themes which stressed
economic development and the necessity to foster “progress” in the mountain regions
for the purpose o f modernization. Changes to cultural and religious practices, through
the disguise o f economic improvement, had profound impacts on indigenous society
and ethnic identity. In 1953, a Taiwan Provincial Government’s program specified
“plainization” as the ultimate goal of the mountain administration (Chen Tzung-han
1994:53). As I will discuss later, “plainization” in fact means modernization (in its
narrow sense) and eventual assimilation.
As a signatory of, and influenced by, the “Convention Concerning the Protection
and Integration o f Indigenous and Other tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries” approved by the International Labor Organization, the KMT
enacted the new mountain policy in 1963. Integration replaced “plainization” as the
ultimate goal of the new policy (Chih Man-ling 1991:33). Under the prerequisite of
military security, and in coordination with the “progress of mountain societies,” the
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development of tourism, and the requirement of exploiting mountain resources, the
new policy allowed the relaxation on earlier laws which previously maintained the
isolation o f mountain areas. This revision signaled the first policy transformation from
protection to a development orientation. In 1966, a revised provision concerning all
aboriginal reservation lands opened the door o f the mountain areas to the capital and
markets o f the plains society. The KMT’s Central Standing Committee also passed a
resolution in the same year aimed to assist aborigines to develop the economy as the
major goal o f the KM T’s mountain policy (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:7).
Extensive construction of an improved transportation network in mountain areas
followed the opening of the Central Cross Island Highway in 1960. This primary
network was completed in 1968. This network system permits accessibility by road for
each of the thirty mountain hsians’ governments. The presence of a highway system in
peripheral areas is always a double-edged sword to the people it is supposed to serve.
One the one hand, it connects different economic systems and subordinates the
subsistence economy to the imperatives o f modem industrializing economy. Thus, the
standard o f living is significantly improved. On the other hand, the dominant cultural
and value systems are superimposed to the peripheral area through the better
“connections.” Highways also served as the path for the outflows o f indigenous youths
and labor forces to the job market in the core area.
The first governmental effort to preserve traditional mountain culture was not
promulgated until 1976 (Chen Tzung-han 1994:127). As the prototype of the KMT’s
cultural policy towards minority groups, the contents o f the policy, such as the training
of traditional songs and dance for tourist consumption, “museumized” aboriginal
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cultures for display, reveal implicitly the Han chauvinist domination. The “top-down”
paternalistic institution decides what is suitable for aboriginal cultural revitalization
and what should be subsidized for the purpose of tourism development. The state
intervention often becomes the origin o f stereotypes about the indigenous groups.
Thus, the displayed cultural activities, such as the yearly harvest ceremony, or folk
dances and music, guided by state’s policy and ideology are manifestations o f the
uneven knowledge/power relations between the dominating and the dominated, or
between the commercialized cultural industry and the culture it aimed to preserve.
The largest public project pertaining to Taiwan’s indigenous culture, the
Aboriginal Cultural Park in Pingtung, was open in 1987 under the protest of several
indigenous groups. This theme park signaled, perhaps, the biggest and latest attempt to
interpret and reproduce the “official edition” o f Taiwan’s indigenous culture by
paternalistic government agencies. The rise o f the indigenous movement in the mid1980s has effectively challenged the authority and the monopolistic interpretations of
indigenous cultural meaning by official agencies.
The indigenous peoples’ movements and other “nativistic” movements in
Taiwan, as the opposition to the Sinicization process imposed by the early KMT
policy, have gained positive responses from some reform-minded politicians. In an
oral instruction given to the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1992, Taiwan’s
President was quoted as saying:
“We should not deal with aboriginal education, living,
employment and other affairs as we deal with general affairs. In
short, aboriginal affairs should be taken care o f with special
attention. Our attention to them should be clearly demonstrated
through our administration in order to make them actually enjoy
our care for them” (AAB, unknown year).
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Two issues stand out in the remarks above. First, the highest level of
administration seems to abandon the early recognition that the mountain policy was
only to serve for a “transitional period” and in time would be replaced by “regular”
administrative measures. A policy orientation that is more sensitive to cultural
differences was adopted as the result of the “nativistic trend” which emerged around
the time when martial law was lifted in 1987 (see Chapter 5). A strong request from
the civil society to pay more attention to the nativistic culture, language, histoiy and
geography has gained substantial political support and forced the ruling KMT elite to
respond to the demand. Geographically, the State confirms the politics o f difference in
the ethnic space in the mountainous area. Policies sensitive to culture and geography
have displaced demands o f homogenous solidarity of the previous military regime
which characterized the old KMT before the eruption of democratic movements in the
mid-1980s.
Second, the paternalistic character in the KMT administration remains clearly
prevalent. Indigenous peoples are peoples who required being “taken care o f’ and
from this perspective they are not even to be significant participants in their own
affairs. Paternalism, in addition to its dominant power over the minorities, implies a
potential integration o f value systems. The norms o f mainstream culture displace
indigenous cultures and social principles as the “standard” system. The loss o f cultural
subjectivity to the Han value system constrains the capability o f the original internal
mechanism in indigenous societies to respond to outside stimuli (Hsia Chun-hsiang
1992: 106-111). Facing the “attacks” rather than “interactions” from outside, the tribal
culture and people are a “dying,” “sunset” nation. To the indigenous nations, culture
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and history at their outset are not simply academic issues, but are critical for the
struggle for cultural and national continuance (Sun Da-chuan 1991:128).
4.1.3 Cultural Representation: Indigenous Peoples in Tourism
The representation of indigenous cultures in Taiwan has been under the oneparty control for more than four decades. Stereotypes have been constructed and
maintained through standardized textbooks, mass media controlled by the State, and
pop culture such as movies, magazines, novels and commercials. In many cases,
indigenous peoples and cultures are presented as objects for tourist consumption. The
wholehearted support o f the “ethnic tourism” by the local government (for example,
the Hualien County) and promotion by the mass media has justified the marketing of
cultural exoticism (Mellinger 1994; van den Berghe and Keyes 1984).
During Taiwan’s martial law era, political dictatorship led to a monolithic, silent
society wherein the homogeneity of the population was stressed for the sake o f
“national security” (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c: note 3). Diversity in any aspect was
considered as a threat to national solidarity. Therefore, information on racial/ ethnic
diversity was virtually absent from the educational system. Ethnic and racial
characteristics were repressed from discussion and display. The insensibility toward
different “others” has led to the distortion o f the social and cultural representations of
these minority groups in Taiwan. Tourism serves as one of the most obvious fields for
the study of the representation o f the “indigenous others.”
MacCannell (1989) suggests that tourists as the new leisure class look for an
“authentic” experience of different lives. However, the development o f tourism, itself
a phenomenon of modernity, has generated a “staged authenticity” for the
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consumption of tourists. Tourism needs to take place in particular space and for a
period o f time. Seeking a diversion from routine life, tourism often occurs in places
where other people live. Ethnic tourism, which often involves minority groups, is the
case in point.
The most significant ethnic tourism in Taiwan takes place in around ten theme
parks, mostly very small and located in eastern Taiwan, which display indigenous
culture (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994b: 68). The largest among them, the publicly-owned
Aboriginal Cultural Park in Pingtung is organized around the “real” life o f the pre
modern indigenous peoples in this tourist space. Unlike other parks which almost
exclusively highlight folkdance and music of the local aborigines, this theme park also
features ancient housing and information on the spatial allocation o f families and
tribes. Presumably, this park restores or preserves some aspects o f indigenous lives
and heritages. However, similar to Laxson’s study of Native Americans (1991), the
questionnaire survey and observation o f tourists’ behaviors conducted by Hsieh Shihchung (1994b) concluded that the perceptions o f indigenous culture reveal more about
tourists’ own cultural stereotypes than the information that they are supposedly to
learn from their visit. Laxson even rejects the idea that traveling can encourage
cultural understanding and suggests that brief touring encounters can only reinforce
ethno-centrism and convince tourists o f the correctness of their own worldviews
(1991).
“Commoditization” is another concern about the development of ethnic tourism.
Local customs, rituals, festival, and ethnic arts are produced and performed for the
tourists’ consumption and thus undermined and changed the meanings o f cultural
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products and human relations in local communities (Greenwood 1977). Moreover,
capitalists can commercialize local cultures without the consent o f the participants,
while the capital/ labor relations allow the local people to be exploited. At the same
time, ethnic artifacts are increasing “ staged” so as to look “authentic.” The force of
capital thus creates an “illusion” of indigenous cultural revitalization. Hsieh Shihchung (1994b: 124-25) has made similar observation for Hualien county located in the
eastern side of Taiwan:
Most aboriginal performers concentrate in a few commercial
institutes owned by the Han entrepreneurs to perform set dances
and songs, which are defined by those enterprises as mountain
culture.... One dance instructor... said that young ladies as well as
kids do not have national (ethnic) consciousness and the mountain
culture is relegated to a money-making instrument.
“Lacking passion toward culture” does not happen to the dancers and performers
alone. Other staff members and even the audience display a similar jaded attitude in
the commercial performing institutes. For the staff, their jobs are viewed only as
profit-making activities. For the audience, the performance is just another kind of
entertainment. Few will make connections between the dance and music, and the
indigenous culture from which it sprung. Together, the staff, the performers, and the
tourists have forged the existence o f a cultural formalism for commercial aims (Hsieh
Shih-chung 1994b: 124-25).
Even though the purpose of the cultural formalism is profit, it is still a process of
cultural display which dynamically defines ethnic identity through the limited
interactions of the indigenous performers and, the mostly, Han audience. The
audience, in this case, does not necessarily seek authentic experience. Rather, a
disruption from regular life may well be their goal so that they can return to “real life”
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with happiness and health, as they believe to be a main function of tourism. Cultural
connections are thus difficult to form, not to mention any effort to induce the desire
for an “authentic experience” which is described by MacCannell (1973) as the modem
embodiment of religious pilgrim. MacCannell’s concept of “authenticity” remains
problematic both in the tourists’ attitudes and in how to “define” such an experience.
Cohen (1988) argues that authenticity cannot be a “objective” quality “out there”
waiting to be discovered. Instead, authenticity is a “socially constructed concept and
its social (as against philosophical) connotation is, therefore, not given, but
‘negotiable’” (original emphasis). Any viable culture must be dynamic and itself a
changing process. Culture in this regard, cannot be only as the pre-modern life prior to
the penetration of modernization, as sought by the early nostalgic ethnographers
(Cohen 1988). Culture in its dynamic process o f development might “absorb and
digest” new elements for its own reproduction. “Fake” culture can one day become
authentic as regarded by both the “experts” and the people themselves.
Greenwood’s concerns about the commoditization (1977) o f local cultures also
need a more delicate analysis. Intrinsic meaning and significance o f cultural products
or religious rituals may be lost in the process o f this commoditization. Cultural brokers
and tourist entrepreneurs from outside may exploit local peoples. However, viewed
from a different angle, new cultural meanings are emerging from the cultural re
presenting process. Religious rituals for the internal public can be transformed to an
expression of self-identity to the external public. The yearly harvest ceremony held by
the urban Amis people in Taiwan may lose some traditional meanings compared to the
one held originally by the tribe, but the urban form o f ceremony functions as the
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display of Amis identity and ethnic consciousness as it exist for better or worse at the
present time (Chen Tzung-han 1994:145).
The development o f tourism in indigenous societies has other implications. First,
it leads to the creation of a certain number of low-paid, low-skilled service jobs in
indigenous communities. The number o f job created varies geographically. Those
jobs, with a finite number, preserve certain labor forces from leaving the tribes. The
second side effect, however, is to increase the dependency on cash and the wider
market economy for aborigines. Third, the increasing state intervention in ethnic
tourism inevitably leads to questions on the contradictory and complex role that a state
can play (Wood 1984). In the politics o f representations, one needs to recognize the
linkages between tourism discourse and the power o f the State to uncover both the
practices and ideologies that structure touristic relations and the representation of the
minorities, and whose interests the touristic industry serve (compared to Mellinger
1994: 776). The resulting changes in power relations are the fourth major influence o f
tourism. It is demonstrated most vividly in the naming of places. As the “only
masters” before the arrival of the Han people, the aborigines once had the sole power
to name the landscapes within their ethnic space. Those names are often related to
tribal myths and ancestral stories. The influx of tourists has altered the indigenous
naming of the landscapes into the “Sinicized” names to accommodate the cultural
background of the Han tourists at the expense of local history and geography (Hsia
Chu-joe and Chen Chi-wu 1988).
For the indigenous peoples living in these areas, tourism can be destructive in
some cases, but empowering in others. The consequences obviously influence the
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whole social and political structures o f a region, as well as the historical and
geographical contexts of the local community. That is, the social and cultural impacts
o f tourism should be submitted to a detailed empirical examination, if possible within
an emic, processual, and comparative framework (Cohen 1988). A geographically
sensitive study is necessary to distinguish the conditions under which cultural
meanings are preserved and newly emerged, from those under which meanings and
societies are destroyed and alienated. The goal of this kind of study is, as pointed out
by Mellinger, to
condemn and disrupt the imperialist structures and colonialist
fantasies that constitute much of tourism culture, and to take up a
discourse o f possibility that provides for the empowerment o f
misrepresented groups and the transformation o f tourist
representations (1994: 776).
A living indigenous people’s culture has ties to the land, not performance stages
or museums. Land rights, therefore, have been repeatedly singled out by worldwide
indigenous leaders as the most important issue (Wilmer 1993 :131). Despite various
definitions about “indigenous peoples,” the close cultural affinity with a particular
area o f land or territory is always central to the concept o f this term (see Kingsbury
1995; Gray 1995). In next section, I will turn my attention to the official government
provisions relevant to the indigenous lands in Taiwan. These documents are important
in that they reflect both attitudes and efforts by the national government to come to
“grip” with these issues.
4.2 The Evolution of the “Provision”
“The Management Provision o f Mountain Reservation Land in Counties o f
Taiwan” was originally promulgated as administrative decree o f the provincial
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government in 1948. Successive revisions came in 1960, 1966,1974, and 1990 and the
name of this Provision was later modified to the “Provision of Development and
Management o f Mountain People's Reservation Land” (the “Provision,” hereafter). In
1995, the term “mountain people” was replaced by the term “indigenous people” in
the Constitution and was henceforth changed in all laws and administrative decrees
generated in response to the calls and pressures from the indigenous movements.
Despite the fact that this is the only “Provision” pertaining to the indigenous
reservation land, its legal status is still as an administrative decree rather than a formal
law or act approved by the legislature. As such the importance of the decree in courts
o f law remains insufficient compared to the formal laws. This creates problems in
dealing with the subsequent land disputes between the Han and indigenous peoples as
will be discussed later.
In power/knowledge relations, naming is one of the most direct ways of
expressing domination and authority. The evolution o f these names and indeed the
naming processes of this single Provision reflects the changing social and political
context, and the changing of policy trends as they may effect indigenous people and
the land tenure system. Two alterations constitute the major theme in the subsequent
name changing process o f the “Provision” in question. First, a mere managementoriented Provision was substituted by one which included both “development and
management” in 1990 which seemed to exemplified the ideological changes in some
government agencies. Hsiao Hsin-huang (1983) illustrated that at the provincial level,
protection was the preferred direction. On the contrary, the central government
promoted a development-oriented agenda and the modification o f the terminology
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reflects these contrasting goals. Nevertheless, the struggles and competitions between
different state apparatus leading to different policy orientations did not necessarily
involve re-evaluations about the preferred condition of either development or
protection for aborigines as a goal o f these minority policies. Rather, the development
and cultivation of marginal slopelands demanded by rapidly expanding capitalist
development in Taiwan’s “economic miracle” were at stake (Chen Tzung-han 1994: 910). The modification of the Provision towards a more capital-friendly direction
demonstrates that continual economic development remains still at the top priority o f
the government policy.
Second, the name-changing process from “Mountain Reservation,” to “Mountain
People’s Reservation,” and to the latest “Indigenous People’s Reservation” in 1995,
not only recognizes ontologically the other “persons” in mountains, but finally confers
upon them the name they have long sought. This “name-correcting” movement has
been one of the three major goals o f Taiwan’s indigenous movements since the mid1980s. The other two goals are the establishment o f clear land rights and clarifications
about autonomous rights (YiChiang BaLuer 1995). Mountains are no longer simply
physical landscapes and meaningless space. Instead, mountains are the living place for
“other” peoples, an “ethnic space” for indigenous peoples.
Protection was the major characteristic o f the early edition of the Provision
which proclaimed its goals as to “stabilized people’s livelihood in the mountains” and
to “develop the mountain economy” in 1948. The goals were changed into
“safeguarding land used by people in the mountains, to promote reasonable use o f
mountain reservation land, to stabilize people’s living in mountains, and to develop

78

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

the mountain economy” in thel966 version. This was modified again to “safeguard
mountain people’s livelihood, and implement mountain people’s administration” in
1990 (Hong Chun-hu 1992:44). Seeking economic development and a more effective,
“soft” surveillance (compared to the Japanese policing system) seem to be the two
major intents throughout the era as a whole. Despite its significant impacts on the
indigenous livelihood, this Provision remained an administrative decree of provincial
government until 1990 when it became an executive order of the central government.
However, it was still an administrative decree, not a law.
In his dissertation, Hong Chun-hu (1992:198-257) made an extensive effort to
collect and organize all official documents to record the detailed process o f revising
the Provision from 1980-1989. However, as a conservative pro-KMT scholar, he did
not offer critical reviews and evaluations on the Provision itself. Though some
contextual information on the entire matter was offered at the very beginning o f his
volume, such as the rise o f civil society after lifting of the martial law in 1987, and the
establishment of opposition parties, critical comments are basically absent from his
work. To evaluate the process o f policy formation, one cannot abstract the Provision
from these concrete sociopolitical contexts or pay attention exclusively to just the
governmental documents.
During the fifty years of Japanese control, despite the fact that they were
conscripted by the colonizers to fight all over Southeastern Asia, the aborigines were
basically protected and isolated from the plains Han society. The KMT inherited the
Japanese policy of reservations that separated indigenous peoples o f the mountains
from the Han people of the plains, both demographically and administratively. A
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developmental perspective was, however, added with the inception of the KM T’s
mountain policy. The goals of the mountain policies embodied by phrases such as
“transitional status” and “regulated capitalist development” characterize the KMT’s
economic, social, and political policies toward the mountain area (Hsiao Hsin-huang
1983). The reservation policy, then, served as both a buffer between a more
“advanced” capitalist mode o f production in the plains and the premodem economy in
the mountains, and also as a political instrument for social control and surveillance.
“Plainization o f mountainous area,” as outlined in a provincial government’s project in
1953 (Outline o f Promoting Administrative Development in the Mountains), was the
ultimate goal o f the KM T’s mountain policy. From the KMT’s perspective, the term
“plainization” not only means changing the economic system, but also re-shaping the
political organizations, social norms, and cultural values. In a word, it reflects the
KMT desires to promote modernization and assimilation. The profound influence of
Taiwan’s “plainization” policy can still be seen even after more than three decades of
implementation of the mountain administration. The “plainization of mountain
economy” was suggested by a provincial official in charge o f reservation land as the
long-term goal o f the mountain policy (see Chang Chen-che 1988). This proposal
reveals not only the oversimplified separation o f economy from other social factors,
but also clearly indicates a developmental ideology, and a critical lack o f perception
toward the current political, social, and cultural crises facing these indigenous peoples.
The establishment of aboriginal reservation lands, as the most decisive policy in
the government’s efforts to effect the transition o f indigenous society, has altered
traditional concepts of land based upon a spiritual, religious, and kinship-oriented
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interpretation, to the establishment o f law-binding private property and personal space,
which was seen as a necessary for the State-defined development.
In the 1966 revision of the Provision, capitalism was officially introduced into
the mountains following the opening o f Central Cross Island Highway in 1960, by
permitting “legal” public or private companies to rent and use reservation land. This
opened the area to a variety o f new problems and new agents o f change. The revision
is commonly considered to be the result o f the concession o f government policy to the
pressure o f imperative economic development (Lin Fang-chi 1984:92; Lee Tsu-min
1991:32). Economic development served as the most important legitimate foundation
for the KMT’s rule over Taiwan in the face of the international crisis (Amsden 1985).
After the Cross Island Highway was opened, the changing concept of land
ownership and control became more apparent. Capital and technology from “plainsbased” investors were able to permeate into the mountain subsistence economy and
fundamentally altered not only the mode o f production, but also traditional social
values. To take advantage o f the higher altitude and the lower temperatures in LiShan, plains-based Han people invested significant capital to make Li-Shan a rare
region for growing temperate-zone crops in tropical/subtropical Taiwan. As a
consequence, extensive areas o f steep slopelands were turned into fruit orchards and
vegetable fields. Agricultural activities on these slopelands, legally or illegally,
brought huge profits to both Han and aboriginal cultivators and at the same time
accelerated the ensuing environmental degradation. The intensive land use in
ecologically sensitive areas causes national concerns on the slopelands conservation
(Chang Chang-yi 1981&1992).
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Despite the Provision’s efforts to prohibit the sale o f reservation land to Han
people, the very significant number of land transactions between aborigines and Han
investors is an “open secret” among the people of the mountain hsian. From 1958 to
1968, an islandwide land ownership and land use survey in the reservations was
conducted to clarify the cadastral records and the utilization of natural resources.
Other, less comprehensive, cadastral surveys were computed in the Li-Shan area in
1958, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1976, and 1985, as land conflicts in the region continued to
be among the most severe in the island (PPRA 1997a: 183-84). The Provision limits
land ownership in the reservation land to only those aborigines who have continuously
used or tilled a plot of land for ten years. This criterion was officially revised to five
years o f tenure in 1990 because o f many complaints. Land titles otherwise remain with
the State, in which case, aborigines possess only usufruct rights, tilling or topsoil
rights. After the revision o f 1966, Han people could lease land from the aborigines
who still own the usufruct rights to any given parcel. Under no conditions can land
title or usufruct rights be transferred to any non-indigenes. Although land transactions
are illegal and so theoretically impossible (since the State is the legal owner) in the
reservation area, complete land sales including the title and the usufruct right passing
from the aborigines to Han people are prevalent in several mountain hsians. Potential
land conflicts were hence embedded in this particular geographical and historical
context since the implementation of the Provision as the land tenure policy. Although
the Provision was the major government document which addressed these issues, its
lack of both strict enforcement and of a broad picture of the minority policy brings
about the current complex problems o f the land disputes.
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Some individual aborigines, who benefited from their early investment in highvalue-added cash crops, were among the first group to realize that land could in fact,
be the target of investment. To take advantage of being aborigines, they started to
purchase plots from other indigenous people who needed urgent cash (Yang Kuo-chu
1996). A small new “land aristocracy” class emerged among indigenous groups from
what was originally a much more egalitarian tribal societies. The gap between rich and
poor indigenous people enlarged as one of the most conspicuous consequences of
capitalist development and land speculation. Plains-based Han people, with ample
capital, advanced technology, and superior management skills, entered the
mountainous area mostly after 1966 when the revised Provision allowed this to occur.
4.3 Land Conflicts in M ountain Hsian
Again, the revision o f the “Provision o f Development and Management o f
Mountain People’s Reservation Land'' in 1966 opened the legal door for the first time
for public and private enterprises and individuals to invest in reservation land.
However, it would be misleading and naive to assume that land conflicts in the
reservation land emerged only after the revision in 1966. Structurally, it is the “profitseeking” nature of the capital from plains investors and the developmental ideology
supported by the KMT which enabled the relaxation of usufruct rights in the
reservation land, and the more intensive use o f these resources.
Fifty years earlier, the Japanese were also active in the region. With the goal of
exploiting camphor resources in Taiwan’s foothills and for other types of logging, the
Japanese tried to incorporate the indigenous peoples into the imperial production
system. At the same time, the Japanese brought Han people into the mountainous areas
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as labor for resource exploitation. During the “power vacuum” when the Japanese
were forced to leave Taiwan, but before the KMT had totally gained control o f
Taiwan, the Han people who either resided in, or had recently penetrated into, the
indigenous territory had started some commercial activities. These Han residents of
mountain areas clearly functioned as cultural brokers before any provision about the
indigenous peoples was enacted (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1991:100). Some long term Han
residents of these areas will argue accordingly that they are also “indigenous” since
they have lived in the mountains since before the KMT took control over Taiwan.
These Han people argue that this long term occupation justified their claims to land
titles within the reservation areas.
Historically, then, land conflicts are not a new event in the mountain area. With
the increasingly flow of Han migrants from southeast China since the seventeenth
century to Taiwan, and considering the space and resources o f Taiwan remained
constant, lands, especially arable lands became a precious resource to both indigenous
peoples and the Han immigrants. Thus, in the history o f Taiwan, land conflicts have
developed culturally along the ethnic/ racial cleavage and geographically, in the
marginal areas of the island. The following section will focus on the land conflicts
which occurred after the KMT established its control over Taiwan, particularly after
capitalism intruded into the mountain subsistence economy.
4.3.1 The Physical Characteristics of the Reservation Land
Uneven distribution in both the thirty mountain hsians and in some plains hsictns
in Taiwan’s eastern coastal plains is the first spatial feature o f the aboriginal
reservation lands. They are spatially discrete and mostly located along both sides of
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upper-middle streams, and often contiguous to national forest lands (Chang Hui-tuan
et a! 1996:212; AAB 1996; see Figure 4.1 for distribution). The second spatial feature
of the reservation lands is that they are found, with few exceptions, in slopelands
across the island. Table 4.7 shows the distribution of the reservation lands in terms o f
altitude. Most o f the reserves are under the altitude of 1,000 meters and in accordance
with traditional tribal locations. The reservation lands located in altitudes higher than
two thousand meters account only for a small proportion o f the entire reserves. The
lands above twenty-five hundred meters have limited economic benefits given their
slopes, their extreme climate conditions and the poor thin soils. Because of
topographical limitations, coupled with the traditional indigenous conception o f lands
where vague boundaries among individuals’ lands were common social practices for
many tribes, some o f the reservation lands did not have clear demarcations in early
days. (In fact, as I will argue in Chapter 7 that the precise boundaries o f private lands
and, by the same token, the territories o f national states, are possible only after the
modern development o f “geography,” i.e. the inventions o f sophisticated instruments
to determine the boundaries.)
The total area o f the reservation lands has changed on a yearly basis, especially
in recent years, as a result o f efforts by the indigenous movements and the plains
peoples’ rights movements. Both will be discussed in the later chapters. In most cases,
new reservation lands are added to the old ones but these “new” lands are
overwhelmingly located in marginal areas.
The laws and relevant government agencies, including the departments of
Environmental Protection, Agriculture and Forestry, and Civil Affairs in Taiwan
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A boriginal R eservation
Lands

M ountain Hsian
Boundaries

Figure 4.1 The Distribution o f the Aboriginal Reservation
Land in Taiwan
Source: AAB 1996: 41
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Provincial Government, classify the aboriginal reservation lands into three basic
categories of agricultural, pastoral, and forestry lands, according to the physical
characteristics and topography. The slope gradient, or the steepness of the slope, is the
single most important factor in deciding the legal allocation of land. Other criteria
include the depth of soil, the degree of soil erosion, and the characteristics of the
parent rock materials (Chang Chang-yi 1992). My fieldwork and interviews suggest,
however, that many o f the attributes are, in fact, arbitrary and inconsistent, and reflect
subjective measures conducted in a careless way by government officials in the early
days. Years later, the precedents established by these first surveys remain in place
regardless o f veracity.
Table 4.7 The Distribution of Aboriginal Reservation Land in Altitudes
Percent (%)
11.65
10.60
20.68
23.22
10.40
7.73
11.27
0.09
0.36
100.00

Area (hectare)
Altitude (meter)
28519.3723
-200
25929.0912
200-400
400-600
50610.7651
56836.1132
600-900
35230.4935
900-1200
18920.1754
1200-1600
27586.8364
1600-2000
2000-3000
219.7182
878.8727
3000244731.4380
Total
Source: Chang, Hui-tuan et al 1996:212.

According to the intensity o f land use patterns, agricultural lands can be used for
forestry and animal husbandry as well as crop production, and the pastoral lands are
also compatible for forestry use. Nevertheless, the forestry land, given steep slopes,
can not accommodate any other land use, such as the growing o f cash crops
(agricultural use), or the raising o f animals (pastoral use). “Illegal” land uses, as
referring to the agricultural or pastoral uses o f forestry lands, or the agricultural use of
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pastoral lands, are termed “exceed the limited use” (chao-hsien-lee-yung) in official
documents.
Table 4.8 provides the areas and percentages of the land use categories in the
reservation land. The universal standards set in the “Statute o f the Use and
Conservation of Slopelands” proscribes that any land with its slope over twenty-eight
degrees has to be categorized as “forestry only” land, regardless o f soil and vegetation
conditions (Chang Chang-yi 1992). Since the pastoral lands account for but a small
proportion o f the reservation land, most illegal land use occurs in the forestry lands
that are used, despite the regulation, for the cultivation o f crops.
Table 4.8 Classification o f Aboriginal Reservation Land in Taiwan
unit: hectare
Animal
Total
Others
Agricultural Forest
Husbandry
Land
Types Land
173368.65 1905.920 11697.278 244731.438
57759.590
Area
0.78
70.84
4.8
100
Percent 23.60
Source: Aboriginal Administration Bureau (AAB), Taiwan Provincial Government.
1996
4.3.2 The Current Conditions in Mountain Hsicms
The early edition of the “Provision of Development and Management of
Mountain People’s Reservation Land” indicates that reserved slopelands were
designated for the indigenous peoples exclusively so that only indigenous people
could lease lands from the State and later obtain clear and free land titles. The
situation only changed after the revision in 1966 which permitted private or public
enterprises to invest in reservation lands and thus introduced more intensive economic
activities such as lumbering, mining, and quarrying into these reserves. While the
KMT’s policy vacillated between “protection” and “development” o f the mountain
area, capitalism and the Han people did not waste their time following the “letter o f
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the law” and began quickly to develop the mountain areas in their own way with little
regulation.
The Provision, from one perspective, seems to be a causal factor in the origin of
land conflicts in the mountain hsian. On the one hand, only aborigines can legally own
the land title in the reserves. Han people can only lease lands from the aborigines who
either own the lands, or have usufruct rights over the lots in question. On the other
hand, under-the-counter land transactions have been pervasive between Han investors
and the indigenous peoples who often needed immediate sources o f cash. Officially all
o f these “mutual agreements” where land is at stake are unlawful according to the
strict limits o f the Provision. In such cases, the hsian government is supposed to
“confiscate” any land which “exceeds the limited use” (illegal use), restore original
forestry, and terminate the legal lease of the land parcel in question. The problem
seems to lie either in the ineffective governmental implementation of the Provision, or
possibly even with imperfections o f the Provision itself.
Table 4.9 shows the official statistical results o f the most current land uses
survey for the reservation lands in 1996. The areas used by aborigines account for
sixty percent of the total reservation lands. Natural forestlands, that is lands without
any human interventions or activities, occupies slightly more than thirty one percent o f
the total. Within the lands used by the aborigines, 53,955.9472 hectares, or about forty
percent out o f the total o f 148,872 hectares are devoted to reforestation by indigenous
peoples over the period from 1976 to 1992, in a different source of data (Aboriginal
Affairs Bureau, AAB 1992:57). The data itself in Table 4.9 does not specify what
institutes are present in the reservation areas. In alternate sources, lands used by the
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government and taken by eminent domain also constitute a significant proportion of
the “lost” reservation land. For example, the Yu-Shan National Park alone has taken
around fifteen hundred hectares o f reservation land (Lee Tsu-min 1991:33).
Table 4.9 Land use Classifications in Reservation Lands in Taiwan, 1996
unit: hectare
Natural Forest Institute & Used by
Total
Used by
Type of
School
Hans
Use
Aborigines Lands
148872
76672.3541
10168
9019.0839 244731.438
Area
31.33
4.15
3.68
100
Percentage 60.83
Source: Aboriginal Administration Bureau (AAB), Taiwan Provincial Government.
1996
The reservation lands used by Han people have become the most direct source of
ethnic/racial land conflicts since the mid-1960s. Herein lies the crux of the matter.
Official documents record less than four percent o f the reservation lands as being used
by Han people (Table 4.9). Although the situations vary from place to place, it is
widely believed that the actual proportion of land used by Han investors or residents is
much higher, given the fact that many transactions are simply kept from official
inspections. Taichung and Nantou Counties are often singled out as the two most
significant cases for Han people using the reservation lands (see PPRA 1997a; Lee
Tsu-min 1991; Lin Fang-chi 1984; Chang Chen-che 1988).
The area o f the reservation lands, some argue, is in fact diminishing even under
the KMT’s control. Lands are not only lost to aggressive Han capitalists, but also to
the state apparatus, including the Taiwan Provincial Government, as well as to
counties, hsians, state-owned enterprises (TaiPower Company, Taiwan Sugar
Company, which is the largest land owner among public institutes), national parks,
experimental forestlands for public universities, veteran farms, and also to the
Ministry of National Defense (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
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Table 4.10 gives a detailed insight into the current circumstances o f the
indigenous peoples’ use of the reservation lands. The indigenous peoples are at best,
the nominal owners of the reservation lands. Only about thirty percent o f the
reservation lands are actually assigned to indigenous ownership. In order to acquire
ownership of reservation land, the aborigines have to first register the transaction with
the local government and then prove their claim to uninterrupted use over the lot in
question for five or ten years, depending on the time o f their registrations o f the lands.
The ten years’ requirement was revised to five years in the “Statute o f the Use and
Conservation of Slopelands” in 1986, which is the source o f the Provision (Lin Chialing 1996:103). The new Provision, however, was not enacted by the Executive Yuan
until 1990. Also 1990 marked the first time that the status o f the Provision was
elevated from an administrative decree of the Taiwan Provincial Government, to one
of the central government. Despite the revision, the percentage o f land officially
assigned the status of indigenous ownership is much lower than the original
expectation. The problem lies, perhaps, either in the lack of access to government
information, or that the concept of registering land for exclusive use remains foreign
to the aborigines. It is no wonder that some elder indigenous peoples have great
difficulties navigating the complex legal process and failed to obtain the official
ownership for many years (Interview C).
The titles o f those lands, which have been set up for either usufruct or tilling
rights, can be transferred from the State to individual aborigines provided they have
continuously been used for five years or for five years into the future. Therefore, by
the year 2000, about ninety percent (29.67+40.48+23.06 in Table 4.10) of the lands
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currently used by the aborigines should be under the title to indigenous peoples.
Compared to the current, low ownership rate, if ninety percent of the land could be
under indigenous ownership (of the total 148,872 hectares lands), this would reflect
great progress.
Table 4.10 Various Rights Acquired by Aborigines in Reservation Land
Out of A Total o f 148,872 Hectares in 1994
Setting Up
Land Title
Setting Up Tilling
Current Condition
Acquired
Usufruct Right
Right
44171
60257
34330
Area (hectare)
29.67
40.48
23.06
Percentage
Use for Free Renting Right for Non-Registered for
Current Condition
Business
Use or Rent
779
9264
71
Area (hectare)
0.05
0.52
6.22
Percentage
Source: DPP (1995).
While land rights constitute a matter of paramount importance to indigenous
peoples in Taiwan, the issue has not gotten much attention in the mainstream press.
The land rights issue only drew public attention in the late 1980s when indigenous
groups held two marches in the name of the “Return Our Lands Movement.” This
movement is by far the most successful indigenous movement in terms of the number
of the people mobilized to participate in the demonstrations. Each o f the two marches
drew around two thousand indigenous peoples from different tribes across Taiwan.
Given that the total indigenous population is estimated to be around thirty-three
thousand, about one out of every one hundred sixty six participated in the two
demonstrations (Lee Tsu-min 1991:1). This successful mobilization not only reflected
the acuteness of the land loss in the mountain hsians, but also drew significant
attention to many related issues. The marches seem to have gotten the attention of the
authorities as well. From 1991 to 1995, mainly in response to the demands and
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pressures of the “Return Our Lands Movement,” the Taiwan Provincial Government
added a total o f 17178.2993 hectares to the original reservation lands (AAB 1996:911, calculated by author).
According to the Aboriginal Administration Bureau (AAB 1996:13-15) of the
provincial government, the additional reservation lands come mainly from public
forestry lands. However, the task did not go smoothly and fell behind the original
schedule. Some new sanctioned reservation lands are contiguous to Han people’s
lands and the boundaries are in disputes. Other new reserves contain lands used by
non-aborigines. These lands have to be excluded from the category o f reservation
lands (AAB 1996:15) as a compromise to reality. In fact, the government’s concession
to the reality that many Han people illegally use reservation lands, and that many more
have “exceed the limited use” problem, is the force behind every revision o f the
Provision.
In a proclaimed democratic society, the rights of both minority groups and
indigenous peoples are inevitably appropriated and incorporated by various political
forces. For the ruling elite, the formal care for the minorities functions to consolidate
the legitimacy of its ruling. For the opposition party, the minorities/aborigines and
their problems serve as a subject which can be co-opted by opposition forces and as
such serve as sources of political gain.
In April 1995, the Executive Yuan held a conference on national territorial
planning, partly in response to the indigenous and environmental groups’ calls for a
comprehensive planning for future development and resource allocation. The
“Planning and Management of Aboriginal Reservation Lands” was among eight topics

93

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

being discussed in the conference. The Democratic Progressive Party, the biggest
opposition party in Taiwan, together with several relevant indigenous groups such as
the Aboriginal Division of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church and the Alliance of
Taiwan Aborigines, cosponsored the first aboriginal land conference in May 1995,
before the opening of the official planning conference. Delegates from the aboriginal
communities, scholars, and government officials attended the DPP’s conference (The
First Land Conference for Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan, 1995).
Still, most of the reservation lands currently under indigenous control are located on
marginal slopelands with only limited economic potentials. Land conflicts between the
indigenous peoples and the Han people occur in specific locations where economic
prospects, either in agriculture or tourism, are notable. As indicated in Table 4.11,
Taichung and Nantou are the two counties with the highest percentage of Han people’s
use of the reservation lands. Considering both legal and illegal uses, Han people use
up to 31% of total reservation lands in Taichung and 11% in Nantou, while the
national average is around 4.6%. However, these figures are all from official
documents. The actual area of the reservation lands used by Han people can be even
greater than the data suggest. The only mountain hsian in Taichung County is Hoping
Hsian, where I conducted my field research. The area of the reservation lands in
Taichung County is second to the last. However, the total area used by Han people in
Taichung County is only second to the Nantou County.
In Table 4.9 and 4.11, the total reservation area used by Han people has a
difference of nearly two thousand hectares (9019.0839 in 1996 vs. 10970.8755 in
1994). It is highly unlikely that within a two-year period, the area used by people of
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Table 4.11 The Use of Aboriginal Reservation Land by Han Peoples in
Taiwan in 1994
unit: hectare
Total Area of
Reservation
Lands (1)
2095.2629
Taipei
14802.6190
Ilan
11675.0704
Taoyuan
18960.8590
Hsinchu
8002.3467
Miaoli
6303.6456
Taichung
30372.1831
Nantou
6992.9969
Chiayi
Kaohsiung 12709.5304
63925.5842
Pingtung
39413.4697
Taitung
24141.3139
Hualien
239395.2629
Total
Source: DP (1995).

County

Legally
Used Area
(2)
6.1440
264.4209
291.5938
16.1845
565.3392
1524.9831
1976.9857
71.8802
189.4520
938.1873
1436.8282
415.3622
7697.3611

Illegally
Used
Area (3)
3.0147
171.1513
0.0000
0.3620
0.0000
428.7464
1373.1090
41.0123
0.0000
647.8807
283.2927
324.9453
3273.5144

(2)+ (3)

% o f Land
Used by the
Han
9.15
0.44
435.5000
2.94
291.5938
2.49
16.5465
0.87
7.06
565.3392
1953.7295
30.99
3350.0947
11.03
112.8925
1.61
189.4520
1.49
1586.0680
2.48
4.36
1720.1209
740.3075
3.07
4.58
10970.8755
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Han extraction has dropped nearly eighteen percent from the official figure calculated
in 1994. A possible interpretation is that the situation is so blurred and/or that illegal
land transactions are so pervasive that each subsequent survey obtains tremendously
different results. Some aborigines and local officials may well be inclined to conceal
the real amount o f land being co-opted to avoid ensuing punishments. This situation
reveals the “dynamic” dimension in the reservation lands: not only has the area o f the
reservation lands in question changed in the past few years, but also the real areas of
different land use patterns have fluctuated. The local contexts, social, political,
historical, and geographical are the key to deciphering this complex, long-standing
problem.
Socially, the mountain hsians have been the mixed space represented by both
aboriginal and Han cultures since the late Japanese period beginning in the 1930s.
This “hybridity” makes the mountain hsians a special place for the majority Han
people. Politically, only aborigines are eligible candidates for the official political
position o f “chief ’ o f the mountain hsians. Han people, even though they outnumber
the aborigines in several mountain hsians, cannot be elected as the chief o f the hsian.
Historically, the educational system in Taiwan emphasized a homogenous civic public
which was intended to transcend all differences in peoples. Only recently has the
educational system started to acknowledge cultural differences in Taiwan. This
reluctance among Taiwan’s people and the educational bureaucratic system has done a
great harm especially to the minorities and their cultures. In this historical context,
being “different” in practical terms means exclusion and discrimination.
Geographically, the economically and politically peripheral locations enable the
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disputes in the mountain hsians to exacerbate to a significant degree before the issue
drew any national attention. The relatively sparse populated marginal areas o f the
mountain hsians also permit abundant space for development of tourism and highaltitude agriculture. Land conflicts, therefore, often occur in which viable tourism or
high value-added agricultural products are at stake.
Complaints from Han people living in mountain hsians are centered around two
land-related issues: the rights to the continuous use of, and rights to the ownership of,
the reservation lands. Han people possess only lease rights in reservation areas. Since
the government does not acknowledge the land transactions between Han and
indigenous peoples, one parcel o f land can thus be sold or leased several times which
often results in civil disputes involving more than two parties. Some Han people allege
that aborigines try to deny those transactions conducted between their parental
generation and Han people and now want the land back ignoring earlier contracts.
Often, new Han investors who were previously unfamiliar with the Provision and its
related clauses, “bought” lands from indigenous landlords and then found that, de jure,
they did not own the land they have already bought and paid for (PPRA 1997a:48).
Certainly most indigenous peoples do not intend to be fraudulent as the Han people
alleged, but similar civil disputes inevitably do damages to the already bleak ethnic
relations and go far in reinforcing existing racial stereotypes in the mountain hsians.
On the other side o f the story, aborigines’ complain about the “cunning” and
“relentless” plain-based capitalists, who buy large areas of the reservation lands by
any means available for the purpose of land speculation or other exploitation. Such
stories are prevalent in my field research and in the reports from the First Land
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Conference for Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan (DPP 1995). The socially structured
disadvantages in aborigines’ economic status, which I discussed earlier in this chapter,
often propels indigenous peoples into land sales, even though they know the
transactions are unlawful.
As a consequence o f economic hardship, many indigenous peoples are forced
into the black market to sell their lands, sometimes at an unfair price, because they
need cash. According to the sixteenth clause o f the Provision, those aborigines who
transfer their usufruct or tilling rights to non-aborigines should be denied their
previous rights over the lands and their reservation lands should be confiscated by the
local government.
YuGan NaFu (1995) lists several possible reasons to interpret the causes o f the
illegal land transactions in the mountain hsians. Indigenous peoples tend to sell their
lands to Han people under the following conditions. First, in locations where the
reservation lands have clear potential value for the tourism industry, the aborigines are
lured by monetary benefit. In other cases, the lands have no potential for tourism but
may have a high economic value (usually in agriculture), however, the aborigines have
no capital to effectively manage them because o f no feasible financial assistance from
the government or the local Farmers’ Association. Land sales can also occur in places
where the lands have neither tourism nor agricultural values, but the aborigines have
no motivation to work on the lands because they simply cannot rely on their efforts to
raise their families. Second, the lack of effective implementation o f the indigenous
land policy by the government results in a prevalence o f illegal transactions. The
inefficiency of enacting land policy in the mountain hsians is arguably due to the lack
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of professionalism within the bureaucracy of the local hsians. Third, the low status o f
the “Provision of Development and Management o f Mountain People’s Reservation
Land” as an administrative decree constrains its capability for effective criminal
charges against illegal uses. Fourth, the numerous “satellite” laws, which refer to any
law related to the Provision and the use and development o f slopelands, reduce the
motivations for crop production. Fifth, by cheating and other fraudulent means, and
capitalizing on the unfamiliarity o f laws by aborigines, plains people can purchase
lands. Sixth, for large-scale resource exploitation, vested interest groups in the
mountain hsians, including politicians, merchants, and some civil servants, have used
their privilege to collaborate with big business groups to purchase lands collectively
from the aborigines who are ignorant of these future plans for development which
would raise the value of their lands in the very immediate future (see DPP 1995).
Based on my own intensive research, I am inclined to agree with the overall
observations made above. The lack of direct proof in the last but definitely not the
least important aspect of the problem, that is, the implicit connections between the
Han people that demand the deregulation of reservation lands and one business
conglomerate renown for land speculation, need further exploration and research.
However, my field research suggests that these allegation are often true and I shall
discuss the relationship between some active Han capitalists in the mountain hsians
and the big business groups in Chapter 6.
In summary, as the “foreign regimes” increase their control of indigenous
peoples over a span of 400 years, the social and economic conditions facing aborigines
are generally deteriorated. In both incomes and education levels, the gap between
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aborigines and Han people is enlarged increasingly. In most cases, the aborigines are
stereotyped and their images are distorted in the consuming process o f the
development of ethno-tourism. The goals of KMT’s mountain policy, thus, can be
described as assimilation and modernization.
The establishment of reservation land system generated profound influences on
indigenous perspectives towards lands, spatial organizations, and social behaviors.
However, the changes of related provisions, i.e. the Provision, were unable to prevent
the loss o f the reservation lands to Han people. Moreover, the revisions of the
Provision reflect the State’s increasing concessions to the demands of capital and the
interests of business groups. Following their deprivation of interpreting rights towards
their own histories and cultures, the indigenous peoples in Taiwan also lose their lands
to the majority Han people rapidly.
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CHAPTER 5. CULTURAL POLITICS AND IDENTITY
POLITICS UNDER THE KMT
Chapter 5 reviews the social constructing process of the KMT’s Chinese
orthodox ideology in Taiwan, and the resulting ethnic tensions among Han people’s
sub-ethnic groups, as well as between Han and indigenous peoples. The development
o f the indigenous movement in Taiwan and its impacts on the new cultural and
identity politics are also critically reviewed.
Taiwan’s transformation from the stringent order o f a military regime predicated
upon authoritarianism to a relatively democratic and pluralistic society is an
impressive success given the remarkably limited violence involved in the transition
(Wachman 1994:xii).
There are numerous debates about the “nature” of the KMT’s rule in Taiwan:
whether the KMT should be considered to be a “foreign colonial” regime, or just an
authoritarian regime with the same culture and national identity as its Taiwanese
“compatriots” (Chen Chao-ying 1995a &b; Chen Fang-ming 1995; Liao Chao-yang
1995; Su Bing 1986, Chap 8). Even the presence of this debate remarks on the new
political era in Taiwan at the present time. The underlying force differentiating these
varied views on the KMT’s aile is reflected in different stances on unification with, or
independence from, China and the possible political paths facing Taiwan in the near
future. This unification/independence conflict was socially and politically constructed
as the single most fundamental force, through a set o f conflicts over the past few
decades, and as such determines virtually every aspect of Taiwan’s society and future.
This state-centered nationalist argument, the Chinese nationalism versus Taiwanese
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nationalism, inherits the blind spots of nation-state ideology, and fails to acknowledge
cultural and identity differences.
In Taiwan, ethnic tensions developed over time as the mainlanders monopolized
both the political and economic arenas since the arrival of the KMT in 1945. In an
early rough vision of Taiwanese nationalism, “exclusion” of the “Chinese”
mainlanders from privileged positions was the main appeal to the majority Holo
population. As a pluralistic system gradually emerged and replaced the original
monotonous value system imposed by the authoritarian regime, nationalist discourse
blossomed and exhibited more sophisticated considerations on issues related to the
meaning of nations, ethnicity, and culture. Discourse o f Taiwanese nationalism is no
longer merely confined to the old bisection of Taiwanese vs. Chinese, but also now
includes the domain o f cultural and political construction of identities. Indigenous
movements and their claims for nationhood exert significant influences on the
construction of Taiwan’s new identity. However, indigenous voices were not heard in
these greater debates prior to the epiphany of the indigenous movement in the mid1980s. In the early formation of Taiwanese nationalism, a dichotomy of Taiwanese
(pen-sheng-ren) vs. mainlanders (wai-sheng-ren) dominated the entire discourse. Any
appreciation of the distinctive characteristics of Taiwan’s indigenous people was
totally absent from the discourse construction in the two major national identities.
Cultural politics concerns the representation o f “otherness” by a dominant group
as a way of control and as a formulation o f stereotypes of all other groups.
Representation in this sense is a manifestation of power relationships among different
social groups, in the same way that race, gender, or class is represented. Identity seems
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to be one of the underlying causes, if not the decisive one, of contemporary cultural
politics. Different identities induce struggles for access to resources and the right of
representing the others. These rights function as reflections of knowledge/power
relations exemplified in naming, classifying, and defining systems in terms of a
modern, pluralistic society’s views towards minority groups.
Regarding the formation of national/ethnic identities, which are the central
concerns of this chapter, two opposite perspectives arose from earlier theory:
primordialism and instrumentalism (Smith 1991: 23-25). Primordialism, or
essentialism, stresses the “natural,” “essential,” “animal instinctual” causes of
national/ethnic identities, nationalism, and patriotism, and therefore the separation of
self and otherness (Ardrey 1966, cited in Jordan et al 1994:139). A common “belief’
in common ancestry, then, is insufficient for the formation o f ethnic/national identity.
Blood relations, the continuity of lineage, and other biological connections (that is, the
same “race” from the point of view of physical anthropology) must also be
emphasized among the members o f primordial ethnic groups (Chao Kang 1996).
This perspective came under severe attack by many more contemporary theories
o f national/ethnic identity (such as Chao Kang 1996; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm
1990; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). However, the primordial perspective still
remains prevalent with the claims and rhetoric of what Chao Kang (1996) called
ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism is often associated with the building o f the
nation-state and often needs an idealized person as the symbol o f collective worship in
the process of consolidating and directing political power to the state apparatus rather
than distributing power among people. In this regard, a primordial interpretation of
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national/ethnic identity is better described as political propaganda rather than the result
of thorough research. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of this primordial
national/ethnic formation precisely mirrors the conspiratorial knowledge/power
relations between the State and the academics. This national/ethnic discourse is
constructed around some biologically-derived conception o f “who does not belong to
us,” rather than some politically-based conception o f “who is one o f us.” On the other
hand, the construction of national/ethnic identities is also considered instrumental as
an intentional manipulation of domestic opinion against “foreign” invasion or for
political gains. Here, “instrumental” is not necessarily used in a derogatory fashion,
rather, I use the term to stress its “artificial” nature. Therefore, language, religion,
customs, collective historical memories, and citizenship are among the most important
aspects o f culture which are used to construct identities. However, the demarcation
between these two categories o f primordialism and instrumentalism can easily blur.
For example, language is often associated with blood relations; and religion with
collective memories.
The constructed nature of national/ethnic identities suggests the possibility o f
shifting boundaries and to some degree, the malleability o f cultural identities, and of
national/ethnic membership, just as the subjective significance of the different cultural
attributes mentioned above waxes and wanes (Smith 1991:23-24). Smith (1991:25)
also suggests that:
Any realistic account of ethnic identity and ethno-genesis must,
therefore, eschew the polar extremes o f the primordialistinstructmentalist debate and its concerns with, on the one hand,
fixity of cultural patterns in nature and, on the other, ‘strategic’
manipulability of ethnic sentiments and continuous cultural
malleability. Instead, we need to reconstitute the notion o f
104

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective and
symbolic terms.
Three layers o f identities appear in my above discussion: national, ethnic, and
cultural. Because o f the richness o f the various meanings for these terms, a consensus
on universally acceptable definitions is difficult to achieve. For very general, but by no
means comprehensive distinctions among these levels, a national identity tends to lead
to a request for independent statehood, while an ethnic identity places less emphasis
on political demands and more on a cultural dimension. However, it is not unusual to
see the term used interchangeably (Chang Mao-kuei 1993, quoted in Chao Kang
1996). The geographical scale o f cultural identity can be international, national, or
sub-national. Cultural identity constitutes an important part o f a sense o f community,
and yet remains important as well in the process o f nation-state building. Changes in
cultural identities, in Smith’s word (1991:25):
refer to the degree to which traumatic developments disturb the
basic patterning o f the cultural elements that make up the sense of
continuity, shared memories and notions o f collective destiny of
given cultural units of population. The question is how far such
developments disrupt or alter the fundamental patterns of myth,
symbol, memory and value that bind successive generations o f
members together while demarcating them from ‘outsiders’ and
around which congeal the lines of cultural differentiation that
serve as ‘cultural markers’ o f boundary regulation.
With the incorporation of myths, memories, and values in any definition o f
cultural identity, it is unavoidable that emotional elements haunt any discussion o f
cultural identity. Knowledge is more often used to reinforce our ideology through
selective absorption of information, than to adjust and prepare us for a changing
world.
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An absolutely objective observer o f such complex issues is difficult to imagine.
My approach might be viewed as a “hermeneutic” one embedded within my specific
intellectual, historical, and geographical contexts, while situated in a certain ethnic
context as well. The following discussion on the “Sinicized” history and geography of
Taiwan reflects not only my “selective absorption” of certain theories about identity
politics, but also my own stance on the issues at hand.
5.1 “ Sinicized” Taiwan: Geography and History
The role o f collective historical memories in the formation o f any given
“national consciousness” is well explored in the broadly defined instructmentalist
approach of nationalism. The development of discourse of geographical knowledge
and its inseparable relationship with strategies of power acquisition and hegemony
played a significant role during the expansion o f European colonialism and in the
“Age o f Empire” (circa 1870-1914) (Driver 1992). In contrast with the association of
geography with specific spatial/territorial claims by modern nation-states, the use of
“imaginative geographical knowledge” in the construction o f nationalism seems to
receive less attention from political geographers. I will use the process o f Taiwan’s
“Sinicization” implemented by the KMT since its arrival in 1945 to illustrate the role
of “imaginative geographies” in the construction of totalitarian “Chineseness” in
Taiwan.
During the important transitional period of the formation o f a new ethnic
identification, Taiwanese were entrapped between their loyalty to their, then, colonial
“mother country” of Japan, and their supposedly ancient cultural and blood ties to
China. At the end of the Second World War, the perceptions of Taiwan’s people
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regarding the final outcome of the war oscillated dramatically between being a
“winner” and “looser,” alternately as “invader” and “victim” as a result o f almost fifty
years of Japanese colonial rule. The dilemma ended soon, with the “help” from the
KMT, and was replaced by the more favorable choice o f superiority as the “winners”
(Chen Tzung-han 1994: 40-41). Taiwanese feelings o f superiority were manifested by
their wholehearted welcome to the “liberating” army from the “father country” of
China. This welcome message sent by many Taiwanese in 1945, along with the
previous Chinese ties existing in some intellectual and political reform circles, were
often interpreted by pro-unification advocates, as proofs of the predominance o f a
“Chinese consciousness” in post-war Taiwan (Chen Chao-ying 1995a &b). In their
semi-primordialist discourse construction, this “China consciousness” was embedded
with rhetoric related to the supposed strong, if ancient blood relations between the
people o f Taiwan and the Chinese o f the mainland. Common culture, language, and
historical memories o f oppression by Western imperialists and the Japanese
strengthened this consciousness. In the same vein, the “Sinicization” o f Taiwan did
not happen precisely because Taiwan has always been, culturally, part o f China (Chen
Chao-ying 1995a ), but rather because the post-war KMT regime chose to focus on
this selective aspect of history.
The story is quite different from the view of contemporary Taiwanese
nationalists. The KMT promoted a form o f orthodox Chinese culture in Taiwan
through restrictive social and political controls on mass media (television, radio
stations, and newspapers), textbooks, school curricula, budget allocation, public
funding, censorship, as well as by limiting access to foreign information from 1945 to
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the late 1980s. From the perspective of Taiwanese nationalists, the tacit intention was
to “re-sinicize” the Taiwanese, who were thought to be “Japanized” after fifty years of
colonial indoctrination. As such, from the KMT perspective, the loyalty o f the people
of Taiwan was suspicious.
The most apparent example of (re)sinicizing people in Taiwan is manifested in
the mandatory universal education system. Although there is considerably more
information about Taiwan’s history and geography publicly available than ever before,
school curricula remain pervasively focused on China as a whole, even at the expense
of Taiwan and the island’s own history. Over the course o f three years o f junior high
school, five volumes of geography textbooks and six on history are issued to each
student. Among them, only two chapters out of each discipline incorporated any
material about Taiwan. A second example is found in the social studies textbooks used
in elementary school where only 30 of approximately 1200 pages of required material
mention Taiwan’s history or geography (Wachman 1994:82-83). As a result, the more
an individual is educated, the more likely he/she tend to identify with China, rather
than Taiwan, as the basis for his/her perceptions regarding nationality. This trend is
more significant particularly within the personnel o f educational system and staff in
public sector (Wang Fu-chang 1993).
In short, an “imaginary geography” o f China was, and still is, being taught to
Taiwan’s students before they enter colleges. The old names o f the mainland’s cities,
provinces, and even names of the main trunk railroad lines used during the KMT’s
Republican Era (1912-1949) are still taught in the islandwide standard textbooks. At
the macroscale, the shape of the Republican Era national boundaries of KMT China
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are still portrayed as an imaginary “begonia leaf’ that includes China proper and
indeed all o f Mongolia! This leaf encompasses a vast territory o f fourteen million
square kilometer to make it the second largest country in the world.
At the microscale level, hundreds o f streets in Taiwan were re-named after the
cities and provinces of China roughly according to their corresponding geographical
locations. The island province o f Taiwan, as the epitome o f China, serves then to
provide an “imaginary geography” for the ruling KMT elite. In essence, the projection
o f a comforting nostalgia possessed by early KMT leaders has become national policy
in the depiction and delineation o f space in Taiwan. Geographical knowledge, then,
becomes instrumental for the political purpose in constructing an “imagined China” on
Taiwan island.
This “epitomized China” in Taiwan illustrates itself best in the structure of
Legislature and National Assembly. Both legislative bodies possessed “permanent”
representatives from every province of ROC who were not subject to re-elections. A
very limited number of these two congressional bodies was open to the contest o f
native Taiwanese so that a “provincial balance” could be maintained. In this way, the
majority o f KMT seats were perpetuated. The first comprehensive popular elections
for seats on the National Assembly and the Legislature were only held in 1991 and
1992 respectively (nearly five decades after the KMT’s arrival), when all the senior,
permanent delegates were forced to “retire” from office (GIO 1997:679).
The orthodox Chinese history constructed by the KMT was embedded with a
conformist Confucianism mentality with the well-known intention to stand in sharp
contrast to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution which emerged in the mainland from
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1966 to 1974. Portraying itself as the authentic representation of Chinese culture
through various diplomatic efforts, the KMT was able to legitimatize its international
status as the sole government of China until 1971 when the People’s Republic of
China replaced Taiwan as the recognized government o f China in the United Nations.
Externally, the Cold War structure enabled the KMT to construct its imaged China as
part of the East Asian containment policy towards global communism. Internally, the
pseudo-presentation o f Chinese history and geography in Taiwan and the promise to
eventually “counterattack” and regain the mainland serves not only to legitimatize the
KMT’s international status, but also to console and consolidate the loyalty o f nearly
two million political refugees and their offspring who first came to Taiwan with the
KMT in 1949.
One of the central axes surrounding intensive debates presented in the Chung
Wei Literature Monthly in 1995 was whether or not the native Taiwanese could be
said to have a “China consciousness” or “Chineseness” under Japanese rule. A follow
up question would be: “Did the KMT sinicize Taiwanese to eliminate their Japanese
characters?” or “Did the KMT “re”-Sinicized Taiwanese to reassert their nature as
Chinese (Liao Hsien-hao 1995; Liao Chao-yang 1995; Chen Chao-ying 1995a&b;
Chen Fang-ming 1995)?” However, if we recognize that shifting cultural and national
identities are not unusual in the process of nation-state building, the early
characteristics of being “Taiwanese,” given that its origins were either Chinese or
Japanese, has little to do with the new constructing process adopted either by the KMT
or by the new social/political movements after the mid-1980s. The undeniable history
is that the process o f Sinicization did take place in Taiwan, and that the KMT
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construction of an imaged geography and distorted history most certainly did play a
significant role in this process. One thing worth noting is that resistance to the
Sinicization policy was not apparent until the rise of discourse regarding Taiwanese
nationalism in the mid-1980s. Early resistance against the KMT was more focused on
demands for democratic reforms and related demands for a greater sharing o f power
for ethnic Taiwanese rather than a cry for independent statehood. I will introduce a
detailed discussion on the history o f ethnic relations under the KMT in the next
section.
The debates mentioned above also raise another controversial question: “Who
are the real victims o f the colonial rule in Taiwan?” Both camps agree that the
indigenous peoples of Taiwan have been the most subordinated subjects under these
successive alien, colonial rules. The rise of indigenous movements and the discourse
the movement represents has posed strong demands to require that the two sides revise
their nationalist discourses. In Chapter 7 , 1 will discuss the influence of recent
indigenous movements on the overall discourse of nationalism not only in Taiwan, but
also in other places.
5.2 Ethnic Relations under the KMT
In contemporary Taiwan, the underlying cause of ethnic tension can reasonably
be credited in part to these different national identities, that is, a so-called “Taiwan
consciousness” versus “China consciousness.” For advocates of Taiwan’s
independence, the “China consciousness” has been deliberately superimposed by the
KMT regime as a means of power consolidation, while Taiwanese consciousness is
viewed as an evolutionary historical product (Chen Fang-ming 1995). The presence o f
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Taiwanese consciousness was first veiled by communal strife between the Holo and
Hakka populations in the early stages o f their migration history. In the Dynastic era,
Taiwanese consciousness then was marginalized by Taiwan’s peripheral location in
the entire Chinese empire. Only in the early 19th century, the construction o f roads
and railroads, and the related intensive colonial development by the Japanese
transformed Taiwan into a politically and culturally cohesive entity. At this time, the
island-wide Taiwanese consciousness transcended the individual ethnicity for the first
time in the migration history of the island (Reitsma and Kleinpenning 1989:369; Sun
Da-chuan 1995b). However, the formation of Taiwanese consciousness during the
colonial era did not necessarily lead to the request for independent statehood. The call
for Taiwan’s independence is a historical and geographical product, as I will argue in
the next section. Ethnic tension is, at the least, one o f the most important factors in the
formation o f “Han” Taiwanese nationalism.
Ethnic conflicts have been the very important political issues in post-war
Taiwan. The tension between the KMT and Taiwan’s society resulted from the “alien”
characteristics o f the KMT regime, and from the historically-overlooked “228 event”
which happened in February 28, 1947. In 1947, small scale civil unrest first erupted in
Taipei City as a result of a conflict between mainlander detectives charged with
stopping the sale of untaxed contraband and a native street vendor selling cigarettes.
The chaos, and street fighting and military resistance which followed, inspired by
deteriorating economic and social conditions quickly spread to every comer o f the
island. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek finally had to send in troops from the mainland
to crush the civil revolts and restore order. The foil picture of the 228 event, which
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cost 8,000 to 20,000 lives (Wang Jenn-hwan 1989), has gradually come to light only
after five decades o f official silence on the matter. The massacre created an almost
invincible barrier between the KMT regime and native Taiwanese, at least for the Han
Taiwanese. It might be unfair to say that the ethnic meaning o f the “228 event” was
superimposed only in the 1970s when the tension between the mainland rulers and
native Taiwanese escalated (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). However, there is no doubt that a
full appreciation of the ethnic implications o f the “228 event” increased significantly
during the political struggles between the two largest ethnic groups in more recent
times.
Basically, three factors can explain the “228 event.” First, in the mid-1940s, the
newly established KMT government confiscated all Japanese properties and
enterprises. Because of the fact that during the late period of colonial occupation, the
Japanese took over most Taiwanese enterprises, the action of the KMT regime actually
resulted in the mass confiscation of a large proportion o f property actually owned by
Taiwanese. Moreover, the military government in Taiwan lacked the capability o f
dealing immediately and decisively with economic affairs on the island and led to
serious inflation. Second, the native Taiwanese were discriminated against by the new
military government in virtually all arenas. Staffs of the central government were
filled almost exclusively with mainlanders. Third, fifty years o f colonial control had
rendered Taiwan a culturally and linguistically distinct region from China. To the
mainlanders, the Taiwanese were more like Japanese, who were their unrelenting
enemies during the war (Wang Jenn-hwan 1989).
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The “alien” characteristic of the KMT, in the context o f Taiwan, is evidenced in
several domains. First, in the breakdown o f the KMT’s membership structure, which
consisted of a majority o f mainlanders rather than native Taiwanese until around 1972,
though the former only constituted 15% o f total population (Wang Jenn-hwan 1989).
Second, with respect to persons filling virtually all high positions in the power
structure of the KMT, most notably, its Central Standing Committee members and
Cabinet ministers, native Taiwanese constituted only 32% o f positions even in 1978
(Wang Jenn-hwan 1989; Wachman 1994:18). Even in earlier years, this proportion
was markedly lower. Third, only after the ROC was expelled from the United Nations
in 1971, was the KMT regime forced to seek support through alliances with the native
Taiwanese, who had long been excluded from the KMT’s most powerful echelons.
The process o f the KMT’s co-optation o f native Taiwanese through both local
political factions and economic interests, is dubbed the “Taiwanization” or
“indigenization” (pen-tu-hua) policy (Arrigo 1994). The KMT realized that it had to
turn “inside” to seek legitimacy among the ruled Taiwanese, rather than relying
exclusively on the fading international Cold War structure and American promises of
support as it had in the past. The process of the KMT’s Taiwanization policy
accelerated after 1988 when the first native Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, was sworn in as
President following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of the Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. Pragmatically, perhaps, Lee as the handpicked successor of Chiang
Ching-kuo, pushed the Taiwanization policy within the KMT, and as a result, induced
discontent among party hard-liners. Thus, the KMT was split into the Lee Teng-huiled “mainstream,” the “Taiwanese KMT” and the hard-liners’ “non-mainstream,”
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“Chinese KMT.” It is worth noting that the KMT’s internal split was roughly along
ethnic lines. Mainlanders and their second generation constitute the majority o f the
non-mainstream members. The (Chinese) New Party was established in 1993 with
core members who were original KMT legislators. Virtually all o f them came from the
second generation o f mainlanders.
5.2.1 Ethnic Tensions among Han People
In the early period o f Han Chinese immigration to Taiwan, ethnic conflicts
erupted between principally the Holo (Minan people), who mostly came from Fukien
province, and the Hakka people, mainly from Kuangtung province. The conflicts
usually took the form of communal strife between these two major groups. Sometimes
the conflicts occurred within the largest migrant group, the Holo people. Competition
for lands and water resources intensified frictions, which plagued almost all o f the
Han-populated areas settled during the Ching dynasty (Hsu Wen-hsiung 1980). This
communal strife, couple with competition for scarce resources, and a general lack of
interactions between these groups prohibited the formation of an entire Taiwan-based
consciousness. Not until the collective resistance against colonial rule, and the
completion o f the island-wide transportation system that connected various locations
and conveyed island-related information during the Japanese occupation, did Taiwan
consciousness actually begin to take shape (Chen Fang-ming. 1995; Sun Da-chuan
1995b).
Still, in contemporary Taiwan, ethnic tensions have mostly arisen between the
two largest groups, native Taiwanese (primarily Holo and Hakka) and the mainlanders
who came to Taiwan after 1949 (Chang Mao-kuei et al 1993; Chao Kang 1996; Shih
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Cheng-fong ed. 1994). In mainstream discourse, ethnic backgrounds are usually
referred to based on a person’s province of origin, as dictated by paternal lineage (lao
jia, or “old home”). Mainlanders on Taiwan are known as wai-sheng-ren, which
literally means people from outside the province. Native Taiwanese, including both
Holo and Hakka, with no distinction, are calledpen-sheng-ren, which means people
from this (Taiwan) province (Wachman 1994:17). These two ethnic categories were
codified during the KMT’s early war-time policy when representing whole China was
an important means of legitimizing authority. People, and more importantly Congress
members from every province of China, had to remain visible at the central
government level, while the number of Taiwanese in public sector was curbed (Wang
Jenn-hwan 1989). Thus, native Taiwanese were forced to give up political careers
which had evolved under the Japanese, and transfer their energy to economic
activities, at a time when the KMT sought to deepen connections to both domestic and
international capital which was needed for economic development which further
served to legitimatize KMT rule (Amsden 1985; Liao Ping-hui 1994). The overall
trend, then, is that the native Taiwanese have tended to concentrate their efforts in
primary and manufacturing sectors, and the mainlanders in the service sector; and
native Taiwanese in the private sector and mainlanders in public sector. This inequity
is especially true for education where fluent Mandarin was a necessary requirement
for academic success or even to be a teacher in the highly standardized education
system (Lin Chung-cheng and Lin He-ling 1993).
Still, in a general sense, political party affiliations and voting behaviors also
reflects, in an important way, ethnic differences. The KMT has greater amounts o f
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support among the people originating from the mainland while the opposition party,
the DPP, gamers most of its votes from native Taiwanese (Wang Fu-Chang 1993). As
the KMT has been forced to “Taiwanized” to maintain a majority o f seats in Congress,
its hard-liners removed themselves from the party and established the Chinese New
Party (CNP) in 1993. The CNP is now considered by most observers to be the party
most closely associated with the “mainlanders.” It effectively partitions the KMT’s
traditional mainland supporters as the KMT becomes more and more “Taiwanized.”
Ethnic differences are also reflected in the issue o f national identity. Under the
current sociopolitical context, Taiwan and China are two polar opposites with no
“gray” in between. More than half (54%) o f the mainlander population reports they
view themselves as having a “Chinese” identity, while only 19.8% o f the native
population has this same perspective. Only 7.3% of mainlanders identify themselves
with Taiwan, while 29.1% of native Taiwanese claim a “Taiwanese identity.” The rest
of population who responded to this question answered that it “doesn’t matter” (Wang
Fu-chang 1993). Clearly, Taiwan’s different ethnic markers are rooted in differences
of provincial origins, which lead to different perspectives on national identity. This
situation is popularly known as the “provincial complex” (sheng-chi-ching-chieh).
Many factors contribute to the current ethnic tensions and identity crisis in
current Taiwan. The longstanding concept of the Chinese “central kingdom,” which
reflects the longstanding assumption of supremacy over peripheral peoples and nations
renders the concept o f multi-ethnic state foreign to the ideology o f the KMT (Hsieh
Shih-chung 1994c).Early on, the KMT’s claim to be the sole government of all o f
China prevented it from achieving full integration with local Taiwanese elites.
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Moreover, the KMT had to limit the role and visibility of native Taiwanese in the state
bureaucracy, especially in the higher positions, to justify its claim as the sole
legitimate government of all o f China. On the other hand, the Japanese characteristics
and cultural prints which are a part of Taiwan’s people and landscapes reminded the
mainlanders of their wars against Japan. From the perspective of some early KMT
leaders, the Taiwanese were “contaminated” by Japanese culture and so required a
period of reindoctrination to become authentic Chinese. To the Taiwanese, the
colonial legacy represents the loss o f their own “subjectivity,” which is constructed
within, and through, discourses (Pratt 1994). The two opposite discourses forcibly
imposed upon Taiwan by two different regimes within a span o f fifty years have had a
dramatic influence on the formation of the post-colonial Taiwanese identity.
In any analysis o f ethnicity discourse, two points embedded in the discursive
construction are self-evident, though they are often intentionally ignored. First, ethnic
boundaries are not generated under isolated conditions. Rather, ethnic awareness is a
product of interactions among peoples, time and space. The existence of the “other” is
crucial to the formation of the ethnic self. Therefore, ethnicity and national identity as
well, are dynamic processes, contingent instead o f absolute, and partially inventive
instead of totally traditional. Second, ethnic groups are by no means internally
homogenous, although all ethnic discourses work to maximize inter-ethnic difference
and to minimize the intra-ethnic variance. There are, of course, gender, class, power,
knowledge, religious, and ideological differences within the people of every ethnic
group.
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5.2.2 Ethnic Relations between Han and Indigenous Peoples
In Taiwan, indigenous peoples are virtually absent from the current construction
of the mainstream ethnic discourse because even in total they are too small in number;
and taken one by one, the groups are too heterogeneous with respect to culture. Even
within the “progressive” camp, in its construction of the discourse o f Taiwanese
nationalism, most intellectuals devote one or two paragraphs to describe the
“uniqueness” (if they mention the issue at all) of what they consider as a
“homogeneous” group of indigenous peoples. The many different aboriginal groups of
Taiwan are treated for convenience as “one” of the ethnic groups that constitutes
modern multi-ethnic Taiwanese society (Young Pi-chuan 1994; Huang Chao-tang
1994). Indigenous calls for a “national” status is basically overlooked.
While the Japanese discriminated against the indigenous peoples living in the
mountains, and refused to confer Japanese nationality upon them (Lin Chia-ling
1996:49-51), the KMT regime recognized their full citizenship and called them
“mountain compatriots.” However, the term continues to imply a Sino-central
chauvinism that regards aborigines not as different peoples, but as only one o f the
constituents of the KMT’s nationalist imagination “C hung-H w a-M in-Tzuthe
Chinese nation. The authoritarian military regime sought through its policies to absorb
the indigenous peoples into Han social, economic and political systems and to
transcend and eliminate group differences (Chen Tzung-han 1994:52). As the direct
heir of the totalitarianism of its colonial predecessor (AT A, I Chiang, and Lava Kau
1995), the KMT opted to fashion a civil society of solidity, sameness and universality
which subjugated the politics of difference during the entire martial law era.

119

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission.

Taiwan’s aborigines currently consider every regime from 1624 to the present,
which established itself in either part of or all of Taiwan, as colonial regimes (ATA, I
Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995). Different regimes exerted different degrees of control
over indigenous territory depending on the level o f statecraft and the extent of
dominion over Taiwan’s mountain areas. Indigenous peoples’ struggles for ethnic
survival are caught between an environment where competitors differ in political
ideology but share the same Han ethnicity (ATA, I Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995).
There was, and perhaps still is, a fear among the mainland population that once
Taiwan becomes independent, all mainlanders will be “ousted” by native Taiwanese in
the ensuing era. A parallel, if oversimplified, political rhetoric can also be found
among some Han people who oppose indigenous calls for ethnic autonomy precisely
because they fear being expelled from the island (see PPRA 1997a and 1997b).
Nevertheless, considering the very limited political clout of the indigenous movements
within the current Han-dominated power structure, this rhetoric is so exaggerated that
few Han people can even take it seriously. This kind o f outrageous political
rhetoric is easier to understand as simply a ruse to counteract fears regarding the
potential growth of the indigenous movement.
At the present time, the KMT continues to assign “protective quotas” to
aborigines in terms of political participation to ensure their minimum representation.
A few symbolic seats in Taiwan’s legislative bodies, at all levels from local positions
to those within the central government, are reserved for indigenous peoples. However,
the KMT’s interventions in areas with predominantly indigenous populations are
thorough and highly organized, and the results of elections at all levels always
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conform to the party’s will (Walis YuGan 1994a; AT A, I Chiang, and Lava Kau
1995). Successful indigenous candidates tend to be either the KMT’s official nominee
or else they are funded by wealthy Han people and so their stance on indigenous
struggles must be questioned. Indigenous politicians may be receptive to voting and
implementing policies in a particular way in return for Han capitalists’ assistance in
political campaigns, most notably on local issues such as the deregulation o f
reservation lands and support for the local patronage system. This system either
elevates Han people to the important posts in the hsian government after the
aborigines are elected, or provides Han contractors with extra businesses, or steers
government contracts towards the relevant political machine.
Pro-resistance elites, who are mostly members o f the Alliance of Taiwan’s
Aborigines, have suffered severe setbacks in almost every election. The frustrations
associated with supposedly “democratic” elections not only led to recent re
adjustments of political strategies and campaign rhetoric, but also resulted in the
decline of the ATA’s influence and popularity (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). These
resistant elites have been forced to accept the reality that the seemingly significant
concessions they received after negotiation from the government turned out to result
in, at best, only superficial reforms (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
As noted earlier, according to a provincial executive order titled, “Identification
Standards for the Aborigines of the Taiwan Province,” the KMT classified indigenous
peoples only by their current geographical residence. In a strict legal sense, there are
only distinctions of “aborigines of the mountainous areas” and “aborigines o f the
plains” in the Constitution (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:9). The former refers to those who
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were registered in the mountain areas during the Japanese rule, while the latter were
registered in the plains in the Japanese era. The KMT informally inherited the
Japanese anthropologists’ way o f categorizing Taiwan’s aborigines which is now
almost 100 years old and no longer is appropriate. The large influx o f the indigenous
peoples onto cities over the past few decades makes the category “urban aborigines,” a
purely location based classification rather than ethnicity-based category, reasonable
and appropriate.
Upon marriage with a Han man, an indigenous woman loses her legal ethnic
status automatically. On the other hand, a Han woman who marries to an aborigine
still maintains her Han status (ATA, I Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995). Thus, by this sort
of nomenclatural bias, Taiwan’s indigenous population failed to grow at an islandwide rate. Of course, another side effect is that those people who intermarry are unable
to select their own ethnic classification and develop their own self-chosen identity.
In 1945, immediately after the KMT took Taiwan from the Japanese, an order
was issued to restore ancestral Han names and to discard the superimposed Japanese
names. Thus, the family names of all Han people living in Taiwan were recovered and
the family lineages, which are essential to the continuous operation of the Han
patriarchal system, were maintained. In sharp contrast, indigenous peoples were not
only unable to reclaim their traditional names, but further were forced to adopt Han
names in order to register for citizenship (ATA, I Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995).
Cultural discrimination is among the most severe encroachments upon
aboriginal self-confidence. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, the standardized textbooks
for elementary and middle schools edited by the government are devoid o f any

122

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

materials on different cultures, ethnic groups, and historical experience. Officially
sponsored ethnic tourism manifest in the form o f several aboriginal cultural parks is
just another form o f touristic consumption.
Since the previous regime in China (the Ching Dynasty) was founded by nonHan people (Manchus), both the KMT’s Republic of China (ROC) and Chinese
Communist Party’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) worked to formulate ethnic
policies which hold the multi-ethnic state in unity and keep order on the frontiers. The
origins o f the KMT’s ethnic policy can be traced to its two “founding fathers”—Sun
Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, especially as evidenced by Sun’s Three Principles o f
People, which although vague, became the dogma within the KMT. Sun’s theory was
that the five major nations within China: Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan
form a single nation. This greater Chinese Nation existed by default through centuries
of integration and assimilation (SunDa-chuan 1995b; Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
Chiang directed Sun’s theory to a more conservative turn and even denied the
potential independence of each “nation.” In his thought, all members o f the Chinese
Nation came from the same origin (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). Therefore, there can
only be one nation in China. Chiang’s philosophy obviously results in a Han-oriented
ethnocentrism. However, as the two most important ideological figures in the KMT,
Sun and Chiang’s theories were not only reflected in the design o f the Constitution,
but also in turn were adopted in the standardized school textbooks in Taiwan. The
result is
Chinese, without the experience o f recognition o f multi-ethnic
context in a state, always accuse people who show any ethnic
consciousness, other than that o f the Chinese nation, of betraying
ancestors or being traitors (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
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Within the framework of “traditional,” the “Chinese” KMT’s ideology (in
contrast to the “Taiwanized” KMT), Taiwan’s aborigines are only different racial
groups in the frontier regions. Two articles of the Constitution justify the
implementation of the paternalist administration o f the KMT regime to the aborigines.
Article 168. The State shall accord to the various racial groups in
the frontier regions legal protection of their status and shall give
them special assistance in their local self-government
undertakings.
Article 169. The State shall, in a positive manner, undertake and
foster the development of education, culture, communications,
water conservancy, public health and other economic and social
enterprises of the various racial groups in the frontier regions...
(GIO 1997: 699).
It is these articles that justified the creation in 1929 of the Cabinet-level
“Mongolian & Tibetan Affairs Commission” that surprisingly remains in charge of
minority groups in the ROC, despite the obvious fact that very few Mongolians and
Tibetans reside in Taiwan. Indeed few even come to visit. The status of the indigenous
peoples in Taiwan is, by the KMT’s definition, as a frontier minority group. The state
policy of modernization and assimilation truthfully reflects the KMT’s interpretation
of the two articles in Constitution. Han-ethnocentrism, that is, the concept of the
“Middle Kingdom,” considers that Chinese culture is, and has always been, superior to
all others in proximity and because of this superiority all other groups encountering
Chinese culture should be Sinicized (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
Before the establishment of the Council o f Aboriginal Affairs in December of
1996, in both the central and provincial governments, only a low-level administrative
section within the provincial government was in charge of indigenous affairs. Again,
the existence of the Mongolian & Tibetan Affairs Commission is a product o f the
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KMT’s vision of a single Chinese Nation, and stands as a symbol of the KMT’s
longstanding territorial claims to all o f China and Mongolia. On the other hand, the
creation of Council o f Aboriginal Affairs is the product o f numerous street
demonstrations and political reforms (see Section 5.3), but yet is also the result of the
“indigenization” o f the KMT regime.
From the above discussion, two separate justifications for ethnic nationalism can
be identified in Taiwan. The KMT’s line of reasoning is antiquated as it was based
upon expelling the Manchus out o f China proper (advocated by Sun Yat-sen, Han
people’s ethnocentrism) so that the Han majority would mobilize to found the ROC
(state of multinationals), which occurred in 1911. Later, the established ROC could no
longer rely exclusively on ethnic appeal to consolidate its legitimacy and thus, led to
the creation of the Chinese Nation (a state of single nation). The course of
development of Taiwanese nationalism as “mainlanders should go back to China”
(expel those foreigners), uses an ethnic appeal for mobilizing the majority Holo
people. Then the slogan shifted to “Taiwan belongs to native Taiwanese only,
especially the largest Holo group” (nationalism o f a single ethnic group). In the latest
development when a narrow ethnic appeal no longer justifies political legitimacy, and
when progressive forces also criticized this Holo ethno-nationalism, then, and only
then, the new Taiwan Nation concept has been constructed. The new discourse is that
the “four major groups, Holo, Hakka, mainlander, and aborigine, constitute a
multiethnic nation-state” (after Sun Da-chuan 1995b). Even in this latest development
of discursive construction, there is still tension between mainstream Taiwanese
nationalism and this call for indigenous sovereignty. The similarity in reasoning in
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these two national discourses is striking. “Different” peoples remain the first target of
exclusion in the building of ethno-nationalism.
Any challenge to the myth of the fundamental homogenous nature of the KMT’s
Chinese Nation was a major taboo during Taiwan’s martial law era. Han Taiwanese
nationalists promote the concept of Taiwanese Nation in contradistinction to the
KM T’s “alien” Chinese Nation, while indigenous peoples advocated various re
positionings o f the indigenous nations within the larger political spectrum ranging
from a moderate request for autonomy to radical rejections of the Han people’s rights
to majority rule (BaShang 1998). It may be true that the KMT-constructed national
discourse and its associated perspective o f cultural hegemony are in decline and
disintegration, however, a new, overwhelmingly acceptable national discourse has not
yet emerged (Wong and Sun 1998). The injection of indigenous requests into the
construction is, however, totally new, not only for Taiwanese nationalism, but also
within the broader theoretical concepts o f the modem nation-state. I will discuss this
issue further in Chapter 7.
5.3 Indigenous Movements and the Formation of New Identity
The rise and development of the indigenous peoples’ movement, and in fact,
almost every social movement in Taiwan, cannot be separated from greater socio
political and historical circumstances. I identify three major factors that shape post
war development of Taiwan, which in turn create the greater context for all social
movements in Taiwan. First, there is the chronic external military threat represented
by the PRC. Second, we must consider the so far “successful” economic development

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

policies o f the KMT which transformed Taiwan in the post-war era. And thirdly, the
recent political transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is also important.
The Chinese military threat enables and justifies the KMT’s oppressive control
of Taiwan’s economy and society. Despite the constant threat o f invasion from across
the Taiwan Strait, however, Taiwan has experienced successful economic
development, though at a great expense to certain social and environmental conditions.
It must be recognized, however, that economic success provided a material base for
later political reform. The relatively smooth and non-violent political transition had
opened a space for the emergence o f various social movements since the mid-1980s.
The indigenous peoples’ movement was among 13 other movements identified by
Hsiao Hsin-huang (1989) as newly emerging social movements in Taiwan in the
1980s. Each movement demands a range of reforms which must be implemented by
the KMT regime in the fundamental nature of state-society relations and usually also
includes requests for greater autonomy within the new, fragile, civil society which has
recently emerged in Taiwan (Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992).
It would be misleading to identify a single factor or socio-political movement
that “forces” this increasing tolerance of Taiwan’s authoritarian state towards civil
protests which began in the 1980s. Even the most visible and popular political protest
movements, mainly led by the Democratic Progressive Party and its predecessors,
cannot alone be credited with this reversal. It was a combination o f factors such as the
successful economic transition, international pressures for reform, and the ROC’s
increasing international diplomatic isolation that forced the KMT to seek internal
support, which all contributed to the transformation from “hard” to “soft”
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authoritarianism in Taiwan (Winckler 1984). Nevertheless, these newly emerging
social movements have played a critical role in accelerating the transition process
(Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992). In this sense, there is an on-going synergy between political
reform and the greater political participation represented by all o f these various
movements.
5.3.1 The History of the Indigenous Peoples’ Movement in Taiwan
Different perspectives from different people have divided the indigenous
peoples’ history into different periods (TaiBong SaSaLe 1993; Hsieh Shih-chung
1994c). The points which are found to be in common to all of these different views
include the decline o f aboriginal “master” status and the increasingly dominance o f the
“alien” powers. In the earliest era, aborigines were forced to either give up fertile
plains areas to Han farmers, or else were relocated to other places which lacked
ancestral connections. After this initial period, the Japanese isolation policy and the
KMT’s protectionist policy also effectively delimited the boundaries between the
majority (Han) and the minority (indigenous population). The lack o f interactions
between these two societies had the effects of both limiting the impacts of capitalism
on the mountain subsistence economy, and deferring the modernizing process
(TaBong SaSaLe 1993). Beginning around the late 1950s and early 1960s, many
indigenous peoples, “pushed” by declining conditions within the mountain economy
and “pulled” by the promise of better job opportunities in the plains, moved to urban
areas. This was a “reverse flow of population migration” and resulted in a significant
exodus to the cities (Chiu Yen-liang 1994; TaBong SaSaLe 1993).
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The origin o f the recent indigenous peoples’ movement can be traced back to
1983 when the first underground magazine High Mountains Are Green was published
by a group of indigenous college students living in Taipei (Chiu Yen-liang 1994;
YiChiang BaLuer 1994; TaiBong SaSaLe 1993; Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992). The
“Committee o f Minorities” of the “Conference o f Editing among Non-KMT Writers”
was founded in April 1984. It claimed that the principle o f the organization was to
unite all people, aboriginal or Han, who were concerned about the rights of minority
groups. This emphasis on uniting Han and aboriginal people with the same ideas has
had deep and lasting impacts on the framework o f later developments related to the
indigenous movement (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987:63). It also signaled that the
burgeoning indigenous movement was gaining support among, and from, political
opposition forces, that is, the anti-KMT forces (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b). In
December 1984, the most important organization in Taiwan’s indigenous movement,
at the time, the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA), was established with 24
founding members. Eight months later, membership had grown to 53 members,
including 14 Han people and 39 aborigines (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). The ATA’s
members came largely from the people associated with the High Mountains Are Green
magazine, but also included members of the “Committee o f Minorities,” clergy o f the
Taiwan Presbyterian Church, students from seminaries founded by the Presbyterian
Church, and some urban indigenous workers (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
The ATA and its members continue to be the major initiators o f virtually all the
important events in the indigenous movement. Although from the vantage point o f the
late 1990s, the ATA’s political clout has declined significantly, its members and
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supporters still play considerable roles in awakening indigenous cultural and political
consciousness. As a “protesting” organization, mainly against the KMT regime and its
myths and dominant ideology, the ATA‘s “historical mission” has almost come to an
end (Interview E). Taiwan’s population is no longer considered to be a portion of the
single Chinese Nation. Taiwan is now recognized by most to be the multiethnic and
multicultural state. That it is this idea has been gradually appreciated even in
mainstream ethnic discourse. For example, many traditional tribal ceremonies are
undergoing a renaissance as part of a wider cultural revival and as a re-assertion o f
ethnic confidence and sovereignty, though there are still many problems left unsolved.
Land conflicts were one o f the central concerns o f the early ATA, which accused
Han people and their regimes o f invading aboriginal lands. For the ATA members, the
absence of land with clear title meant no security, no distinct identity, and as a
consequence, threatened cultural survival. The ATA in its early stage could only
simply respond to problems with complaints and protests, rather than proposing a
more integrated analytical framework for the indigenous land rights disputes. The goal
to establish indigenous peoples’ autonomous zones and the radical idea o f “natural
sovereignty” (see Chapter 6) developed later.
The ATA, basing their opinion on past conditions, claimed that the KMT state
could, for the purpose of public use or the vague definition o f “national security,”
reclaim reservation lands, the titles o f which belong mostly to the State. Thus the
reservation land policy was viewed as the main element in the process o f destroying
indigenous peoples through the steady acquisition o f their territories and in turn, their
identity (DuoAo 1985, sited in Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). In 1987, the ATA declared a
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“Manifesto of Taiwan Aborigines.” Six out o f the seventeen articles related to the land
rights of indigenous peoples (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c; Hong Chun-hu 1992: 91):
1. The aborigines have rights of basic protection for their lives (including rights of/to
survival, work, land, property and education), autonomous rights, and a right to
self-cultural identity (Article 2).
2. The traditional aboriginal territories must be able to practice local autonomy
(Article 3)
3. The state must recognize the populations, regions, and social organizations of
aborigines (Article 7)
4. The aborigines must have titles to lands and resources. Lands that were acquired by
illegal measures in the past must be returned to the aborigines (Article 8).
5. The land rights must include surface, subsoil, and marine rights (Article 9).
6. Aborigines have the rights to take advantage of their resources for satisfying their
needs (Article 10).
Central to the belief o f the resistant elites in the ATA is the “truism of
aborigines” (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987). That is, “the consciousness on territorial rights
is based on the ATA’s interpretation o f what rights the aborigines should naturally
have” (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). On the one hand, the “natural sovereignty” o f the
indigenous people is favored by indigenous activists in their struggles to re-acquire
ethnic pride. On the other hand, modem nation-states and their legal systems can
seldom, in reality, bear the challenge to sovereignty waged by their “citizens.” Thus,
the issue of “natural sovereignty” is more a political one than a cultural one. It is
raised because two different political systems, based on two different social and
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cultural behaviors have interest conflicts over the same space and each has evidenced
claims for sovereignty over this space.
The furor regarding requests for indigenous land rights climaxed in three large
demonstrations of the “Return Our Lands” movement from 1988 to 1993. The last
march in 1993, which was also the International Year for the World’s Indigenous
Peoples as declared by the United Nations, broadened its appeals to include the right
o f indigenous peoples’ survival. This appeal formally connected the land to the very
survival of indigenous peoples and cultures and spearheaded the formation of
indigenous peoples’ demands for “natural sovereignty.”
Studies in the successful mobilization o f indigenous peoples in the “Return Our
Lands” movements indicate several causes. First, the improper reservation lands
policies led to the loss of land acquired due to the power and influence o f capital
coming from the plains investors. Second, the aborigines registered in plains areas,
mainly concentrated in Taitung and Hualien Counties, have no rights to the reserves
and are often accused of “occupying” public lands once they make use o f traditional
tribal territories, despite longstanding unofficial recognition o f their tenure in these
places. Third, the churches in mountain hsians have to pay significant rents to the
State no matter where they locate, whether on public lands or on private lands owned
by church members (Lee Tsu-min 1991:31; YiChiang BaLuer 1994). It is the last
point that ties the leaders o f “foreign” religions directly to Taiwan’s indigenous
movement.
Unlike in the U.S. where some native Americans in certain areas were forced to
convert to Christianity before 1930, the presence of Western religions neither implies
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an aggressive invasion of a colonial power, nor represented a spearhead o f imperial
conquest to Taiwan’s indigenous population (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b). In the former
case of the American Indians, the State’s actions sometimes led to nativistic cultural
revitalizations, the selective renaissance of traditional religion, and the conferment o f
symbolic values to the selected cultural elements (Linton 1943). In Taiwan’s case, the
Western religions provided a new spiritual support for seventy percent o f the
indigenous population in Taiwan at a time when traditional religions were rapidly
fading (The Voice o f Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, TVTEP 1997, Hsieh Shih-chung
1987b; Table 5.1). Buddhism and Taoism are the principal religions of Han people and
remain relatively unimportant within indigenous communities. Christianity, however,
became a symbol of solidarity for aborigines from different tribes and a weapon for
the resistance of the ongoing powerful assimilation trend. In brief, many Christian
beliefs have been “internalized” into aboriginal culture (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b).
Given the situation in Taiwan, where aboriginal traditional beliefs have long been
disconnected from the daily lives and collective memory o f the tribal members, though
to some extent, cultural revitalization has occurred, no elements o f traditional religions
are involved in the cultural renaissance (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b).
Possibly, the extinction of traditional religions offered a new “spiritual space”
for the new beliefs to “anchor.” Among all Christian religions, the Presbyterian
Church and the Roman Catholic Church are the two most popular denominations
within the people of the mountain hsian. The common Christian symbols - God, Jesus
Christ, the Cross, and the Bible - blended with Taiwan’s indigenous peoples’ beliefs
and helped form a new indigenous identity. The development of the pan-aboriginal
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identity and the burgeoning religious identity have added to the motivation and growth
of the indigenous movements in Taiwan (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a: 85).
Table 5.1 Self-Reported Religious Affiliations among Indigenous Peoples
unit: percentage
Buddhism
Catholic
Taoism
Protestant
No Religious
Belief

27.75
2.06
0.33
56.19
13.67
Indigenes in
Mountain
32.67
36.71
9.66
9.51
11.45
Indigenes in
Plains
47.09
26.95
10.58
2.49
12.88
Indigenes in
Cities
Source: The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in Remote Areas in 1991,
Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1993.
The history o f Christian missionaries in Taiwan is long, reaching back to the
1600s when the Dutch occupied southern Taiwan, but the influences on the indigenous
peoples’ movement are much more recent. The Taiwan Presbyterian Church set up its
first seminary in 1949 intending to recruit indigenous students and clergy as future
missionaries in tribal areas. The “localization” policy o f the international Presbyterian
Church won the trust o f many o f Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. To the indigenous
peoples, church-related activities are more trustworthy than the state-sponsored
mountain policies (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a:85-6). Moreover, the Presbyterian Church
not only encouraged its recruited indigenous clergy to preach in their own native
tongue, which apparently violated the KMT’s official language policy, but also
collaborated with political oppositional forces to push for national socio-political
reforms. This further endeared the missionaries to the leaders of the indigenous
movements. Because of these activities, the Presbyterian Church has remained at odds
with the KMT regime for a number of years.
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These local Christian clergy represent a new segment of the newly emerging
indigenous elites distinct from those intellectuals who receive higher education in Han
society. The foundation of the ATA gained support quickly from the church’s
“religious elites.” In fact, some studies show that the church system provided the most
extensive mobilization network for the spatially scattered indigenous settlements and
that once the ATA initiated the “Return Our Lands” movement, they relied heavily on
the church’s momentum and connections (Chung Ching-po 1990:68-77; Lee Tsu-min
1991: 49-53; Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a:83-7). This suggests indirectly that the personal
connections established by the churches have effectively replaced, to some significant
extent, traditional indigenous social and political organizations.
The close cooperation between the indigenous movement and the Christian
churches in promoting the social movement does not suggest that there is no tension
regarding other issues. Although the Taiwan Presbyterian Church possesses “relative
progressiveness” (Chen Ying-chen, cited in Chung Ching-po 1990:99), compared to
other overly apolitical and conservative denominations, there are doubts about what
positions some of the Christian ministers will take regarding the indigenous
movements if hard choices must be made. Some ministers may not participate in the
“Return Our Lands” movement for the sake o f the pending extinction of Taiwan’s
indigenous nations. Nor do the Christian clergy always conform to the indigenous
movement’s contentions that “land is life” and “land is identity.” What is clearly
central to the mission of these clergy is to “deepen” the relationship between the
church and the indigenous peoples (Chung Ching-po 1990:77). The resistant
indigenous elites who are not converted have complicated feelings about the role of
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Western religions in Taiwan’s indigenous movements. This is especially true for the
leftwing-oriented intellectuals who are active and relatively important in policy
formation for these movements (Interview E).
One of my informants told me that he has still some doubts about the foreign
religions (Interview E). Christianity, the churches themselves, and their priests and
reverends have altered the spatial relationship of tribal members and their living space.
Ancient sacred places are displaced by the churches. Some ancestor worship and other
traditional ceremonies are forbidden or discouraged or simplified by the local religious
elites and clergy (Interview E). From the perspective of one of my informants, the
church is the medium of social cooperation. It is necessary to get along with the
church clergy since many tribal activities are led by the church (Interview E). From his
point of view, the church has to transform itself to become “indigenized” (see Chapter
5.2) as well, and change its “alien” characteristic to fit into the indigenous cultures
(Interview E). However, only very limited “indigenization” actually occurs in
churches and its extent also varies geographically. As an active promoter o f nativistic
culture, my informant did not conceal his dissatisfaction with the Western churches
and some priests, though he himself is also a Christian (Interview E).
YiChiang BaLuer (1994) wishes to refute previous studies which emphasize the
importance of using the mobilizing networks of the church and proposes a “mutual
and reciprocal” linking of the ATA and the Christian church systems. Lee Tsu-min
(1991:49) and Hsieh Shih-chung (1992 and 1994c) call the resistant indigenous elites
“elites without people” given the fact that the initial ATA-led protests did not attain
significant attention from the aboriginal communities all over Taiwan, and that in
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reality the successful mobilization of the “Return Our Lands” movement relied mostly
on church-based connections. YiChiang argues that although the branches o f the
Taiwan Presbyterian Church in the plains areas are relatively liberal, the churches in
the mountain areas are still very conservative and in fact, remain under severe KMT
party-state control (1994). The Presbyterian Church mainly provided the platform for
mobilization and financial support, but the ATA was the actual group whose member
carried out plans and promoted grassroots mobilization. For some, then, this is a
complementary relationship. To argue that the ATA leaders have no tribal mass
foundation and connections is incorrect, since many ATA caucus members are
themselves clergy of the church and stay in constant contact with the grassroots
organizations (YiChiang BaLuer 1994). However, the relations between Western
religions and their proponents and these new indigenous movements should be
situated and studied in broader cultural and historical contexts. Thus, to generate
ethnic pride by challenging the existing Han hegemonic illusions and to reclaim the
right of self-naming are additional goals of the current indigenous movement.
From the above discussion, it is obvious that indigenous movements involve not
merely political mobilization and ideological conversion, but also struggles in cultural
representation. The right of naming, as one of the most fundamental manifestation of
cultural autonomy in the politics of multiculturalism, however, cannot be taken for
granted by indigenous peoples, who still need to fight for this basic right o f naming,
their homeland, and landscapes for themselves.
One of the most significant breakthroughs in cultural politics is the dissolution
o f the myth o f Wu-fang, who was said to be respected by the tribal members because
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he sacrificed himself to teach the savage headhunting/a /75 to stop the killing of
humans. The “official legend” was adopted in the standard curricula o f all elementary
schools and constituted one of the major origins o f the “stigmatized identity” designed
to the aborigines. A hsian and a temple in Chiayi County were both named after Wufang. His statue was erected in front of the Chiayi City train station. The textbook,
name, temple and statue could be considered as the embodiment of a Han hegemonic
project (Chu Yen-liang 1994) and became major targets o f protests. In 1988, Wu-fang
hsian was renamed as A-Li-Shan hsian with all Han delegates voting against and all
indigenous delegates voting for the proposal to change the name (YiChiang BaLuer
1994). Wu-fang’s statue was tumbled in 1988 with iron chains by the collective
“illegal” efforts of a group of indigenous youths. Because of these efforts, Wu-fang no
longer appears in the elementary school textbook as a hero who “tamed” the
“savagery” of mountain people. The dissolution of such a state-sponsored myth
signals the partial achievement o f the “Name Correcting Movement” (see next section)
at the local level.
The acquisition by Taiwan’s indigenous population of a proper name to replace
the official government names o f “mountain people,” “mountain compatriots”
(shanpao), “mountain people in mountain areas” (shandi shanpao) and “mountain
people in plains areas” (pingdi shanpao) reflects another prolonged struggle in the
field o f cultural politics. In 1984, the ATA promoted the use o f Yuanzhumin, which
literally means original inhabitants and was perhaps inspired by the English use o f
“aborigines,” to replace other traditional “stigmatized” names (YiChiang BaLuer 1994
and 1995). In North America, the existence o f the indigenous peoples who had lived in
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America for thousands of years before the arrival o f white settlers is commonly
recognized. In contrast, Taiwan’s school curricula under the control of the KMT
regime did not provide similar information. Conversely, the standard textbooks
propagandized Han settlers’ efforts to open the “wildness” of the frontier island. A
“positive” recognition o f the existence of non-Han peoples in Taiwan was not
available through official channels. Therefore, the new name Yuanzhumin was, in fact,
totally strange to the majority Han people in Taiwan (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b).
However, the use of new name quickly became widespread among some liberal mass
media outlets, academics, non-KMT forces, and various religious groups. Even this
level of adoption was beyond the imagination of the ATA leaders (YiChiang BaLuer
1994). Both the newly founded Democratic Progressive Party in 1987 and the Taiwan
Presbyterian Church in 1989 declared their official support of the new name
(YiChiang BaLuer 1994 and 1995). The support from the Presbyterian Church and the
largest opposition party has far-reaching influence on the attitudes o f indigenous
political elites. Even the KMT’s indigenous elites who often opposed the ATA
proposed reforms showed unprecedented support for the adoption o f the new
collective name for indigenous peoples (YiChiang BaLuer 1994 and 1995). It seems
that the only serious opposition to the change came from the KMT’s most rigid
ideologies (YiChiang BaLuer 1995).
In the 1992 National Assembly Conference for Constitutional Revision, the
KMT insisted on the use of “mountain people registered in mountain areas” (shandi
shanpao) and “mountain people registered in plains areas” (pingdi shanpao) as the
official Constitutional names for Taiwan’s aborigines. Officially, the ATA strongly
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disagreed with the KMT’s proposal for the following reasons (YiChiang BaLuer
1993):
1. The uses of “mountain people registered in mountain areas” and “mountain
people registered in plains areas” not only represents vestiges of the Japanese
colonial legacy but also negates both ethnic symbolic marks and indigenous
peoples’ “national” status.
2. The character, pao, in Chinese means siblings or people with the same origin.
To usepao as the official name for aborigines fairly demonstrates the KMT’s
ethno-centrism and assimilation policy.
3. The dichotomy o f indigenous population into “people registering in the
mountains” and “people registering in the plains,” is associated with different
administrative measures used to deal with these two groups and was
disruptive to the solidarity of aboriginal pan-ethnic identity.
4. “Mountain people” {shanpao) is considered to be a discriminatory and
obsolete name. Aborigines have their own many cultures, histories,
ancestries and races. Their living space spreads over a broad territory and
many aborigines currently live in the cities. Shanpao is then, in fact, a term
which is itself the result of a distorted history and is not correct even with
respect to the location o f these people.
Academics, including anthropologists and sociologists, supported the new name.
They claimed that the ruling party, aborigines, or other citizens should not expect the
academy to provide a “correct” or “best” name because the best name for minority
groups was the name chosen by themselves (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping; Chen
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Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993). The principle seemed especially true for
the indigenous populations of Taiwan. The academics also disputed the KMT’s
interpretation that the name Yuamhiimin would be used to protest against the Chinese
Nation and would eventually lead to separatism (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping; Chen
Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993). Conversely, the deeply Sinicized
aborigines express their active participation in politics that is overwhelmingly
structured within the framework of Han culture.
Han people expressed concern that the recognition of the “shanpao” as the “first
masters” who were “indigenous” to the island would lead to the re-establishment of
aboriginal “traditional” land tenure system. However, this was over-romanticized and
was clearly an exaggeration of the power of a name as a symbol (Huang Ying-kuei;
Chiang Ping; Chen Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993) given the current ethnic
power relations in Taiwan. A name change, o f course, will in no way guarantee
associated political and economic benefits, which depended mostly upon political
reality. Moreover, even the restoration o f the traditional land tenure system will not
actually benefit all members of the indigenous population because the firmly
established and on-going capitalist development o f the mountain areas has
significantly eroded any basis for the reestablishment o f traditional livelihoods. Thus,
the leaders of a responsible, sincere, indigenous movement will have to take the real
world situation into serious account in their designs for a traditional cultural
renaissance or, indeed, in the establishment of any form of aboriginal autonomous
areas.
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The name-correcting movement had partially achieved its original goals as o f
1994. The name o f shanpao (mountain people) was changed into Yuanzhumin
(indigenous people), but not as originally expected Yuanzhumintzu (indigenous
peoples or indigenous nations). The latter term placed greater emphasis on indigenous
“national” status, while the former term only recognized “indigenous” status without
regarding aborigines as another people or nation apart from the KMT’s central belief
of “Chung-Hwa-Min-Tzu, ” the Chinese Nation. However, by way o f compromise, the
dominant KMT delegates in the 1994 Constitutional reforms still dichotomized
aborigines into “aborigines in mountain areas” and “aborigines in plains areas” despite
tremendous ongoing pressures from indigenous organizations and massive social
sympathy towards the aborigines.
The prolonged indigenous movements and radical sociopolitical changes in
recent years have resulted in some changes o f the attitudes of the pro-KMT indigenous
elites. Aboriginal representatives are not as quiet and submissive as before. They have
started to criticize unreasonable government policies and have come to question the
distorted history and past discriminatory policies levied against the aborigines (Hsieh
Shih-chung 1994c). However, those pro-KMT elites only played a passive role in all
aboriginal struggles. At the initial stage of the indigenous movements, these
indigenous KMT delegates often waged a counteraction or provided intimidating
information to offset grassroots mobilization (Lee Tsu-min 1991:22; YiChiang BaLuer
1994). To some extent, these KMT indigenous elites did reap interests and benefited
from the indigenous resistant movements.
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Hsieh Shih-chung’s observations (1994c) that the pro-KMT elites (in his term,
party elites) support the traditional ideology o f the unification of China and oppose
ATA-initiated movements no longer applies to all party elites. That the ATA
emphasizes identification as “indigenous nations” and tries to integrate all aboriginal
groups under the common banner of a pan-indigenous identity remains true. However,
to say that party elites emphasize identification with the Chinese Nation is
problematic. Although the party elites still endeavor to maintain the current condition
of cooperation with the KMT regime, they may no longer uphold the idea of the
Chinese Nation. My interview with the chief of Hoping hsian indicated that even this
indigenous politician, quite successful at the local level would first identify himself as
Taiwanese, rather than Chinese (Interview B). The combined effects o f rapid socio
political changes in Taiwan and the relative decline o f the KMT’s authoritarianism
also encouraged party elites to be more outspoken so as to gamer support from the
newly emerging and gradually less manipulatable indigenous elites. Opinions and
requests raised by the party elites in some aspects are identical to those in the ATA’s
earlier proposal.
The indigenous resistant groups grew to as many as fifteen during the period
from 1984 to 1990 (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). This period is also considered to be the
“golden period” o f Taiwan’s various new social movements. It was also the time when
the nearly four-decade long martial law was going to be lifted and the forces within
the more mature civil society were ready to erupt against the prolonged authoritarian
control. A division of labor within these social movements groups gradually appeared.
The extent of topics o f concern broadened to cover other social and environmental

143

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

problems facing the indigenous population. Among them, saving indigenous child
prostitutes and protesting the nuclear waste site in Lanyu Island where the Dawu
people (originally called Yami) live, were the two major events which also drew
significant attentions from Taiwan’s society and the KMT regime. Other isolated,
sporadic demonstrations occurred through the late 1980s and early 1990s (TaBong
SaSaLe 1993).
The most recent indigenous peoples’ movements have developed around two
broad issues. First, there is a call for establishing a Cabinet-level government agency
to unify the dispersed authority dealing with the aboriginal affairs. Second, there is the
demand for an addition to the “Aboriginal Articles” to the Constitution to protect
aboriginal rights to autonomy, to veto (the aborigine-related legislation), and to
provide for a greater say in issues related to development, culture, education, and land
(National Assembly 1997).
The longstanding, if mis-named, Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission
also became the target of protests during the struggling for the establishment of a
central government agency in charge o f aboriginal affairs (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
The Commission was considered as a concrete representation o f the KMT’s Chinese
bias in that the ROC State would rather disguise its symbolic claim over China’s
“frontier” territory than sincerely face issues related to aboriginal sufferings in
Taiwan. The ATA led a demonstration in 1991 to demand the abolishment of the
symbolic agency o f the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and to promote
the establishment of a new Cabinet-level agency for minorities and indigenous
peoples. In December 1996, the Council of Aboriginal Affairs under the Executive
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Yuan was founded during the government fiscal year. The immediate results of this
poor timing included insufficient financial resources and an under-staffed institute
since neither money nor personnel could be devoted within a fiscal year.
The passage of the bylaws o f the Council o f Aboriginal Affairs in November
1996, however, did not draw wide applause from the indigenous peoples because of
the compromise made during the process of legislation. The plains Han people
effectively lobbied the lawmakers (see Chapter 6) to add an additional resolution
concerning the reservation lands used by non-indigenous people. The amended
resolution requires that surveys on the lands leased to Han people by either the state or
the aborigines, and investigations regarding the land transactions between Han and
aborigines, be immediately conducted. When legal discrepancies are identified, they
demand that sound and fair decisions be made. The additional resolution is interpreted
by the resistant elites as an ominous prelude to the deregulation of aboriginal
reservation land. In short, it was seen as a capitulation o f the KMT administration to
the demands of both Han hegemonic culture and more pragmatically to large Han
business groups which are renown for their land speculation all over Taiwan’s cities
(Chapter 6).
The new indigenous movement, after the achievements of partial restoration of
traditional cultural dignity and the founding of Council o f Aboriginal Affairs, has
turned its attention to land rights and associated issues.
For the first anniversary o f the creation of the Council o f Aboriginal Affairs, a
public hearing was held to examine the actual accomplishments of the new agency in
the first year of existence. The chairperson was a former KMT indigenous legislator.
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Various indigenous organizations and officials from different ministries were invited
to the meeting. Overall, the performance o f the Council was not found to be
satisfactory, especially for the resistant elites. Severe criticisms were raised by the
aboriginal resistant elites on the following issues (Interview C):
1. The Executive Yuan is contemptuous o f the Council and not willing to
allocate a significant budget which is required for accomplishing the stated
goals o f the Council.
2. The personnel and decision-makers of the Council were actually the KMT members
who used to oppose the goals of indigenous movements. The Council must
determine if such persons are suitable for the positions they now hold.
3. The Council lacks autonomy and relies heavily on the mercy o f other ministries
even for aborigine-related issues.
4. The Council can neither protect the reservation lands from the invasion of
business corporations, nor does it have the capability o f presenting sound
vocational training and employment policies to improve aboriginal economic
conditions and job opportunities.
5. The severe shortages of medical infrastructure and facilities in the mountain
hsians have resulted in many avoidable tragedies.
6. Native tongues and traditional cultures are still rapidly disappearing. The
indigenous music and dances promoted by the government only reinforce
stereotypes of the aborigines.
7. The Council remains reluctant to speak about issues related to aboriginal human
rights. The issues include child prostitutes, nuclear waste sites in Lanyu Island, and
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most recently the forced relocation of indigenous peoples for the construction of the
new reservoir in Pingtung County.
8. The KMT regime defers, or even destroys, the efforts of nongovernmental
organizations to bring Taiwan back to the international stage under the name of
Taiwan, rather than the government-preferred ROC. Thus, in the 1997 meeting o f the
United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Taiwan’s indigenous
representatives were forced to remove “Taiwan” from their organizational name
because o f protests from mainland China. The diplomatic policy o f the Council in the
international indigenous community concentrates on little more than orchestrated
displays o f Taiwan’s aboriginal music and dance, while largely concealing the many
problems currently facing the indigenous population.
9. The Council lacks the legal capacity and insights to design future relations
between the central government and the future aboriginal autonomous areas.
Because many superficial programs dominated the Council’s agenda in its first
year, the resistant indigenous elites repeatedly referred to the Council and the new
government policy as a whole as a form of “educational colonialism” and “welfare
colonialism” (Interview C).
The Constitutional “Aboriginal Articles” movement is another major ongoing
indigenous peoples’ movement. Following the partial success o f the “namecorrecting” movement that established the term o f Yuamhumin in the Constitution, the
“Aboriginal Articles” movement also aims at Constitutional reforms. The central
concern of this movement entails the establishment o f codified fundamental rights of
the indigenous nations in a modern nation-state. Full recognition o f these rights, such
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as self-government, rights to the use of fisheries and other natural resources, education
and language policies, rights to cultural intellectual property, and some forms o f veto
power over legislation and development plans related to indigenous land and territory,
will signal a revolutionary change in the current conceptualization and ideology o f the
traditional nation-state.
Although the new Constitution conferred a seemingly suitable term, Yuanzhumin
(indigenous persons) to the aborigines to replace the old expression shanpao
(mountain compatriot) in July 1994, guideline regarding aborigines-state relations
remains poorly specified in the Constitution. In the new additional articles which was
added to the Constitution in 1994, the general right to political participation is firmly
confirmed. This aboriginal article is as follow:
The state shall accord to the aborigines in the free area [i.e. the
Taiwan area] legal protection o f their status and right to political
participation. It shall also provide assistance and encouragement
for their education, cultural preservation, social welfare, and
business undertakings. The same protection and assistance shall
be given to the people o f the Kinmen and Matsu areas (GIO 1997,
brackets added by the author).
The original proposal by the aboriginal representatives, which demanded a
minimum quota in congressional seats and further asked that the representatives be
elected from each indigenous group (according to the principle o f “ethnic group
justice”), however, did not pass (National Assembly 1997). The much-needed right to
traditionally held lands, autonomy, and a right to veto for relevant laws proposed
mainly by the indigenous representatives and the Democratic Progressive Party, were
also turned down during the National Assembly meeting in 1997. Moreover, these
proposals were considered as dividing political spoils o f Constitutional reforms among
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major political forces in that “Aboriginal Articles” were simply issues which might
best be described as trading interest for votes (Interview G).
To “dilute” the already symbolic and grudgingly awarded “national” status of
the indigenous peoples, the aboriginal article actually passed by the National
Assembly in 1994 was written in such a way as to intentionally include the people of
the islands of Kinmen and Matsu (National Assembly 1997), which are considered to
be “border regions in ROC’s free areas” under the KMT’s current political ideology.
Like other minority people in ROC’s border area such as Mongolia, Tibet and
Sinkiang (Xinjiang), the new document asserts that Taiwan’s indigenous people are
also part o f the great Chinese Nation, not a different “nation” or “people.” Ironically,
perhaps, Taiwan’s aborigines are now associated with the “border areas” o f the current
territory effectively controlled by the KMT state. The association o f minority groups
with the border, the frontier or “geographically peripheral” areas also suggests a Hancentrism embodied in the mainstream hegemonic culture. This “frontier colonialism”
(in Mercer’s term, 1997) and the patemalistically assimilationist policy was simply
converted to a less obvious form in the new Constitution. Colonialism has altered
indigenous peoples and their territory from sovereignty independence to protectorates
as mere third parties (Kariya 1993) in negotiation between dominating political forces
or even perhaps between private developers and government in terms o f resource
exploitations.
The ATA’s resistant elites participated actively in various elections from the
early stage of the burgeoning indigenous peoples’ movement. Less than one year from
the establishment o f the ATA, one member participated in an election o f the
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representative to the Provincial Council in the category of “mountain people registered
in the mountain area” in 1985 but failed. Others participated in County Council,
Provincial Council, and Legislative elections in 1986, 1989, and 1991. They all lost!
In retrospect, the resistant elites with no local faction affiliations, still crucial to
Taiwan’s local elections (Kao Te-yi 1996), expected unrealistically that their efforts in
awakening the indigenous peoples would lead to subsequent electoral victories.
Moreover, the KMT state’s compromises to the ATA’s demands apparently have not
loosened the party’s firm control over the indigenous society (Hsieh Shih-chung
1994c).
YiChiang’s review of the indigenous movements provides several insights
(YiChiang BaLuer 1994). First, the loose grassroots organization deters the
development o f the ATA. It is not because the ATA’s members are all urban elites
without any tribal base and connections, but because the ATA’s members lack the
requisite organizing skills. Thus, most o f the ATA’s local chapters could not operate
actively in the tribes and so had little influence on actual elections.
Second, there is a lack o f cohesive forces among different pro-resistance
organizations. Because o f the lack of effective communication and cooperation,
mutual trust rapidly eroded away and the result was internal rifts. The geographically
scattered indigenous tribes with different cultural backgrounds and different local
contexts and issues underscore the difficulty o f waging island-wide resistant
movements.
Third, the presence o f the pro-KMT indigenous political elites counteracts the
progressive indigenous movement. The current political elites are nominated by the
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KMT first and then elected by their constituents later. Indeed, under this system, it
would appear that no independent could win elections without KMT affiliation.
Therefore, the indigenous political elites in the KMT establishment always stood in
opposition to the pro-resistance elites and so offset the effect of the aboriginal
movement’s progressive policies and candidates. This tension was somewhat
alleviated by recent developments. However, when goals o f the indigenous movement
are contradictory to the KMT’s policies, the political elites still tended to side with the
ruling party and failed to form a united front for the common interests of all o f the
indigenous nations.
Fourth, there is a lack of political resources which limit what the movement can
do. The growth and development o f Taiwan’s indigenous movements occurred earlier
than subsequent political democratization and the growth o f party politics in Taiwan.
Social resources are often largely absorbed by party politics and in general there is
insufficient attention paid to aboriginal affairs.
Finally, there might have been premature participation in the elections. Elections
were considered to be one strategy which could be used to arouse indigenous
consciousness and to disseminate the ATA’s ideas to the grassroots in more effective
ways. However, the tribal members may consider that the ATA’s efforts merely
resulted in competition with strong KMT nominees for same positions. Failure in early
elections may have cast doubts on the “legitimacy” and “truism” o f the indigenous
movements. Even at present, the “game” of electoral politics designed by the Han state
is incompatible with the direction of the aboriginal movement. Premature participation
in election politics may have siphoned off considerable resources in the movements
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while actually effecting little change. Understanding of this problem in hindsight has
come to be viewed as a critical problem (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
5.3.2 New Indigenous Peoples’ Identity
Taiwan is on the verge of identity schizophrenia. On the one hand, the
“Sinicizing” process imposed by the early authoritarian state had “misplaced” the
identity of Taiwan’s people to that o f an “imaged country”- the ROC. On the other
hand, the “Taiwanized” KMT regime, represented by the current president Lee Tenghui, and the native opposition party, the DPP, have jointly advocated a policy of
“Taiwan-prioritism” (Wong and Sun 1998) which affirms the priority o f recognizing a
Taiwanese identity. As a result, Taiwan people’s national identities are characterized
by confusion and ambivalence because of these conflicting national discourses (Wong
and Sun 1998). As an added distinctive characteristic o f Taiwanese nationalism,
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have been given a symbolic place in the construction of
new Taiwanese nationalism. However, this does not guarantee, or even deny,
indigenous peoples’ “national” status within this emerging new nationalist discourse.
From the aboriginal perspective, the subjectivity of indigenous peoples has been
gradually lost to the encroachment o f foreign colonizers in the past four hundred
years. The various degrees of interactions with the Western powers, the Chinese
Empire, the Japanese during occupation, and the KMT constitute unique historical
contexts within which the identities o f the various aboriginal groups were formed,
transferred, interrupted, and consolidated.
Prior to 1895, only some points and areas of Taiwan were under the effective
control of these various regimes. Even the settlers and local elites during the Ching
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Empire had limited knowledge about the more remote areas o f the Central Mountain
Range and the East Coast of Taiwan (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). Han settlers distinguished
aborigines unilaterally according to their degrees of Sinicization and assimilation. To
the aborigines, their identity and geographical imagination were bound by their own
“tribe” and their accessible hunting fields (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). No regular
organization was set up for inter-tribal communication even within different tribes of
the same indigenous group. Tribes formed the basic unit o f the subsistence economy
as well as the organizations comprising the social and political structures (TaBong
SaSaLe 1993). Separated by rough terrain and new settlers, tribes in many ways
represented the boundaries of the indigenous social and political identities.
The first extensive field survey on the peoples and land o f Taiwan led by
anthropologists and biologists was conducted by the Japanese colonial regime in its
early stage of control. The statecraft o f the colonial regime was to apply western
scientific and rational methodologies to the study of ethnology for the foundation of
the colonial rule. The utmost purpose of these researches was to stabilize the order of
the “East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” for the expanding Japanese war machine (Chen
Chao-ru 1992). According to languages and customs, the aborigines were divided into
six, seven, eight or nine groups (tzu) depending on different criteria (Pan Ying 1995;
Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
The classifications had certain functions in terms of colonial statecraft.
However, they also extended the aboriginal identity beyond the boundary o f individual
tribes, collapsing geographically, linguistically, and customarily similar neighboring
tribes into the same group {tzu). Regardless o f internal differences, for Taiwan’s
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indigenous populations, nuances of cultures were transcended and group
consciousness was formed for the first time as the result of the Japanese classifications
(Sun Da-chuan 1995b). The name o f each tzu, creating another “layer,” provided new
distinctions that separated “we” and “the other” in addition to the geographical
differences (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
In the later period of occupation, the Japanese imperial military aggressively
recruited Taiwanese youths during World War II to supplement the inadequate supply
of domestic youth for the war machine. The Japanese systematically enlisted
indigenous youths because of their relatively high degree o f loyalty to the Japanese
Emperor and their reputation for enduring hardship. The successful implementation o f
“Japanization” policy in aboriginal societies also brought a new experience to the
aborigines - the creation of a national identity beyond the tribe (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
The effective mobilization of aborigines allowing the construction of loyalty towards
the Emperor was the ideological base o f enlisting young men and forging their
identification with Japan. It was the first time the indigenous peoples developed a
consciousness o f the modem state, well beyond the boundary o f their own tribes (Sun
Da-chuan 1995a and 1995b).
The “honor” of identification with the Emperor did not come with the elevation
o f aboriginal status in the imperial division o f labor. The primordial trans-tribal, trans
ethnic aboriginal consciousness constructed by the Japanese Empire remained
completely with a backward, stigmatized stereotype. The naming by colonizers, field
work by anthropologists, and the presumably misguided identification with the
Japanese Emperor mainly constructed by the imperial military together marked the
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beginning of the structural collapse o f Taiwan’s indigenous cultures, their selfconfidence, and ultimately their ethnic pride (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). Even before the
arrival o f the KMT regime, Taiwan’s aborigines experienced the indoctrination of the
modern state apparatus (and had made considerable sacrifice for its sake), and seemed
to be tame and not “dangerous” to another colonial foreign regime, the KMT.
The Japanese extended state surveillance to Taiwan’s indigenous societies to an
extent which the Ching Empire had never achieved. The KMT regime, based on the
Japanese policies, furthered this “control and assimilation” policy in the mountain
areas. Since 1970s, the state-imposed conversion o f traditional names into Han names,
the loss o f native tongues, the abolishment o f tribal ceremonies, the resultant amnesia
of culture and customs, the collapse o f social and political structures, and the intrusion
of foreign religions have replaced virtually all the clues and symbols for the formation
of indigenous identities. Independent answers to the age-old question “Who Am I?”
have become the most anxious concern for the aborigines in the 1980s (Sun Da-chuan
1995b).
The emergence o f the indigenous movement in the mid-1980s was not an
isolated event. The eruption of this movement was closely related to the ethnic power
struggles among Han people, new conceptions of society stemming from the liberation
of civil society versus the authoritarian state, and the concurrent nativistic cultural
renaissance o f the native Han Taiwanese, as the opposite o f the “alien” Chinese
mainlanders. Ironically, some o f the KMT’s assimilation policies have inadvertently
had the side effect of uniting aborigines from different groups and cultural
backgrounds on the basis of speaking and writing the same language - Chinese.
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Essentially, almost all the resistant elites can speak fluent Mandarin and can
manipulate the codes o f communication - the Han characters. Perhaps, the
superimposed national language policy has backfired after four decades of
implementation. The same language and communication codes which were introduced
for the promotion of assimilationist policies provided the primordial foundation for the
pan-indigenous movement (Lee Tsu-min 1991:43; Sun Da-chuan 1995b). The process
o f modernization, on the other hand, provides similar cultural background and
collective memories for aborigines o f different tribes (Chen Tzung-han 1994:115).
However, the number o f resistant elites is small and under a system where seniority is
still an important factor, they are too young to have great influence within their tribes.
Although democratically elected officials have replaced the traditional political leaders
and the inherited aristocracy, the elders still remain more influential in many tribes
than the youths. Because of these limits, the mobilization o f people for the indigenous
movement in the early stage had to rely on the support of non-KMT organizations or
progressive Han intellectuals, as well as the networks o f church members also an
external ally (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
The major cohesive forces o f the early, urban-based ATA were largely
recognition of the collective sufferings and stigmatized stereotypes associated with
aborigines, and the anxiety over cultural extinctions (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a;
TaBong SaSaLe 1993). Pan-indigenous identity and the significance of ethnic politics
were not the major concerns of these early resistant elites in the movement. Finding
solutions to individual cases and problems were the main functions of the ATA, whose
relationship with the urban aboriginal working class was built upon this sort of
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“service in crisis” rather than upon similar political beliefs. An ATA member’s
reflection points out that the service relationship was, on the one hand, to alleviate the
responsibility of the KMT regime for the aboriginal sufferings; on the other hand, this
relation and pragmatic approach did little to facilitate the awakening of aboriginal
consciousness and further political resistance efforts (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
The promotion of the proposed new name for Taiwan’s aborigines, Yuanzhumin,
has had an unprecedented influence on indigenous elites, both those who are proresistance, and pro-KMT. The new name provides a new ethnic mark and represents a
solid foundation for the formation of a new collective identity as Taiwanese
indigenous people. That is, the name characterizes a pan-indigenous identity which
transcends individual differences. Unlike Kazemzadeh’s definition o f the so-called
pan-movement, which is “dedicated to the unification o f a geographic area, linguistic
group, nation, race, or religion” (cited in Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c), Taiwan’s various
indigenous peoples are separated by different languages, customs, socio-political
organizations, and further are scattered throughout a vast geographical area. The
prerequisites for forming a pan-movement are limited. Contrary to the observation of
Lee Tsu-min (1991), even the KMT’s standard educational system and national
language policy offers some function towards overcoming different cultural
backgrounds (Hsieh Shih-chung 1992). The promotion o f new name Yuanzhumin has
contributed to the final formation of Taiwan’s aboriginal movement and has proved to
be a rally point for the growing “united front” o f indigenous elites, both the KMT and
non-KMT members (Hsieh Shih-chung 1992). However, the merely symbolic value of
a new code could not possibly provide sufficient impetus and material base for a
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movement to grow. The differences between Han and Austronesian peoples, the
changing socio-political environment in Taiwan, and the structural disintegration of
ethnic cultures and prides are, perhaps, the fundamental reasons for the rise of
indigenous movements.
An opposite trend has developed after the collective name for aborigines
Yuanzhumin has been accepted by the majority o f population. The collective
bargaining position emerging from the name-correcting movement had partially
achieved this goal. However, a more subtle differentiation between these two terms,
Yuanzhumin and Yuanzhumintzu, was necessary to demolish some deep-rooted
stereotypes. While Yuanzhumin (indigenous people) refers to only individual
aborigines, Yuanzhumintzu (indigenous nations) brings up the concept that each
individual indigenous group is in fact a unique people, or a nation. Taiwanese are in
fact constituted by, neither a single nation, nor four ethnic groups as I mentioned in
Chapter 1 (not to mention the traditional KMT-promoted Chinese Nation). From
aborigines’ perspective, Taiwanese are constituted by ethnic Han people and a diverse
Austronesian people that contains many nations, and each indigenous group is
qualified to be called a nation. This is a radical deviation from the orthodox, one
dimensional Chinese nationalist discourse and totally beyond the historical context
that the old KMT and its hard-liners’ (the New Party) can comprehend (Chen Chao-ru
1992).
Despite the fact that Taiwan’s aborigines belong to some vague Austronesian
macro-group, the origin o f which is believed by many scholars to be in Taiwan,
indigenous peoples do not choose to call themselves as “Taiwan Austronesian” or
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simply Austronesian. During the process of establishing and strengthening their ethnic
identity, the aboriginal leaders have not looked abroad toward the geographical South
or East of the Pacific Realm where other Austronesian peoples live. Instead, they insist
that they are “indigenous” to the island of Taiwan (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping;
Chen Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993). This phenomenon reveals the
indigenous elites’ identity with Taiwan, a quasi-nation state, rather than with other
Austronesian peoples living in different countries. This difference of “inward looking”
versus “outward looking” consciousness could be attributed to the geographical
boundaries o f nation states that confines the aborigines’ social and political
imaginations. However, this “inward looking” orientation may also be interpreted as a
careful evaluation o f potential political leverage within Taiwan. In Taiwan’s settlers’
society, “indigenous” to this land embeds different meaning to other latecomers, and
an associated “true” identity with this land. Therefore, the aboriginal leaders believe
that the product o f the “inward looking” name Yuanzhumin can serve to re-establish
ethnic dignity and consolidate the ethnic interests (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping;
Chen Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993).
The demarcation of geographical areas into different administrative regions
reflects the operation of power and ideology over time and space (Sun Da-chuan
1995a). New national territorial planning and the subsequent re-designing o f
administrative units will involve socio-political contests over ideological and material
interests. The final resolution of the indigenous peoples’ requests will inevitably
encompass and incorporate this complicated spatial politics, which involves not
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merely visible economic, political, and ethnic interests, but also invisible emotional
affinities of place and identity.
In brief, this chapter provides a critical view on the KMT’s construction o f
Chinese consciousness in Taiwan to replace the Japanese colonial legacy. The KMT
used an “imagined geography” to legitimize its authoritarian rule over Taiwan. The
democratic movement roughly beginning in the 1970s not only loosed the KMT’s
controls, but also inspired the development of the discourse o f Taiwanese nationalism,
to counteract the official infusion of Chinese nationalism. The rise of the indigenous
movement in the mid-1980s, on the other hand, offers a critical re-examination on the
discourse construction of Taiwanese nationalism.
The major goals of the indigenous movement in Taiwan are reviewed under the
frameworks of political economy and cultural politics: the “Return Our Lands”
movement, the “Name Correcting” movement (from the term “mountain people” to
the term Yuanzhumin), and the “Constitutional Revision” movement. I also examine
the always crucial but at the same time, controversial, role of Christian religion and its
clergy in Taiwan’s indigenous movement. Finally, I argue that the development of
indigenous movement has forged a new identity not only among the various aboriginal
groups/tribes, but also posed important challenges on the dominant national and
cultural discourse.
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CHAPTER 6. LAND RIGHTS CONFLICTS, ETHNIC RELATIONS,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN THE FIELD RESEARCH
AREA OF LI-SHAN, TAICHUNG COUNTY, TAIWAN
The Li-Shan area is located in the upper stream of the Da-Chia River ranging in
altitude from fifteen to twenty two hundred meters. The whole Li-Shan area is within
the watershed area of the Te-Chi Reservoir which was built between 1969 and 1974
(Chang Chang-yi 1981; Figure 6.1). A brief introduction on the history and resources
of the Li-Shan area and its relationship with Taiwan as a whole are essential to
understand contemporary ethnic conflicts and local politics. The official four ethnic
categories: Holo, Hakka, mainlander, and aborigines are all present in Hoping Hsian.
However, from aborigines’ perspective, the first three groups can be generalized as
Han people. The differences among these three groups are relatively minor compared
to those between the Han people and the aborigines. Conflicts over land rights are
concentrated on reservation lands where only aborigines can possess titles. In these
instances, Han people can only hold lease rights transferred from aboriginal landlords,
or in some cases from the State. Because of the reservation lands policy, land conflicts
develop along this split of ethnic groups. In the case o f the mountain hsian, ethnic
divisions almost parallel the class division o f rich and poor.
The extent of slopeland development in Li-Shan for temperate-zone agriculture
extends beyond the boundaries of the reservation lands. Beginning in the 1970s,
agricultural development was extended into national forest lands and created a serious
environmental problem when the Te-Chi Reservoir was affected by rapid siltation
which halved the projected life o f the dam (Chang Chang-yi 1992). The problem was
so severe that the government was forced to take actions to defer or halt the rate of
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deterioration. A provincial-level agency, the Li-Shan Administration Office, was set
up in 1967, but in turn, was relegated to a township agency under the jurisdiction of
Hoping Hsian in 1979. The “behind the scenes reasons” for this move were complex
and ambiguous, but it was generally believed that the Office was unable to effectively
coordinate local forces to perform its designated duty for planning and overseeing the
developmental process in the whole area (Chang Chang-yi 1992).
Despite earlier efforts to promote apple production in the region, a disincentive
for apple cultivation in the upper basin developed later. The KMT government
liberalized its trade sanction on apples to import the fruit from, mainly, the U.S. in
1979. By the summer of 1980, the retail price for apples had plunged fifty percent and
the income of fruit farmers fell to less than half the previous level (Chang Chang-yi
1992). In response to a new state policy, farmers became interested in the production
of other fruits, such as pears, peaches, and varieties o f “luxury” apples in order to once
again minimize market risks.
Working to prolonging the life o f the Te-Chi reservoir and to ensure the safety
of downstream residents, the government endeavored to eliminate cultivation on all
lands with a slope greater than 28 degrees. That is, all fruit trees on such slopes would
be cut down. Given the fact that the average estimated cultivation slope is 30- to 35degrees in the Li-Shan area (in some areas this even reaches 60-degrees) (Chang
Chang-yi 1981), the government’s response to ameliorate the environmental crisis
encountered tremendous resistance from local groups. The deadline for eliminating all
unlawful cultivation was postponed from 1979 to 1989, and then to a currently
undecided date due to effective lobbying and more importantly, severe public
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resistance. Several arsons that resulted in the burning o f some hundreds of hectares of
forest were reported between 1983 and 1984 after the official announcement that the
fruit trees in extreme slope areas would be cut (Chang Chang-yi 1992). Local farmers
turned the mountain hsian into a “site o f resistance” against the State policies.
The above discussion demonstrates that there are great profits to be made
through the development of the reservation lands in the Li-Shan area, particularly for
the cultivation of fruit trees. The economic potential o f the region entangled with the
ensuing environmental degradation has made the Li-Shan area a political “hot spot.”
Land rights conflicts in Li-Shan have thus become charged not only in the arena o f
ethnic rights, but also for economic and environmental reasons.
6.1 Ethnic Tensions and the Rise of PPRA
In most cases, lands within the reservations are not actually owned by the
occupants, either aborigines or Han people, but by the State, specifically the Taiwan
Provincial Government. However, current state policy holds that ownership of
reservation land can be conferred to indigenous people if they can establish proof of
continuous use for five years. Still, reservation land cannot be pledged directly as
security for mortgages and loans even though ownership has been conferred to some
aborigine, partly because the land title can only be transferred among indigenous
peoples. This lack of “real” ownership, arguably, restricts access to improvement
capital and limits the motivation for the aborigines to improve their lands and intensify
production. This “semi-public” ownership system contributes, at least partly, to the
financial problems which are common among aborigines under the current profitseeking banking system. While there are clear problems associated with land

164

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

ownership by indigenous peoples at the present time, those rights which are conferred
due to ethnic status do not extend to Han people living in the area.
6.1.1 The Emergence of the PPRA in Hoping Hsian
In early 1993, a group mobilized mainly through an appeal to Han residents in
the area was founded in several mountain hsians, the Association o f Promotion Rights
for Plains People Living in Mountain Hsian (hereafter, Plains People’s Right
Association, or PPRA). The PPRA is growing most rapidly in Li-Shan o f Hoping
Hsian, Taichung County. Within four years, the organization has become a powerful
local political organization and pro-growth coalition which quickly absorbed
numerous several other small social groups in the Li-Shan area. The PPRA has three
major goals: first, to strive for the deregulation o f aboriginal reservation land; second,
to lobby for the right of Han people to be eligible for candidacy for the political
position o f chief o f mountain hsian, the head of a subcounty unit; and third, to request
the government to change the current term, “indigenous peoples,” back to the original
legal term “mountain compatriots.”
The establishment of this organization was stimulated in response to the panindigenous movement which climaxed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Three major
demands of the aborigines were perceived by the organizers of the PPRA as major
threats which endangered their positions in the current establishment. First, the
“Return Our Land” movement which requested the State to return or restore
reservation lands that were either illegally utilized by the non-indigenes or taken by
eminent domain, back to aboriginal control. Second, the “Name-correcting
Movement” discussed earlier which called for the right to self-naming and demanded
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an official name change from “mountain compatriots” to “indigenous peoples.”
Finally, the “Constitutional Revision Movement” which demanded for an “indigenous
provision” in the Additional Articles o f the Constitution to the guarantee o f rights to
development, self-determination, education, and cultural autonomy o f the indigenous
peoples. All these concerns and the PPRA’s political mobilization are justified by the
principle o f equal treatment of all ethnic groups in the Article 7 o f the Constitution:
All citizens o f the Republic o f China, irrespective o f sex, religion, race, class, or party
affiliation, shall be equal before the law (PPRA 1997a: 81).
At the present time, PPRA leaders request the complete deregulation o f
reservation land and support the sale o f such land on the free market. This would
return these lands to the jurisdiction o f normal laws pertaining to land, instead o f
incorporating such land under the Provision. The official data shows that the area of
the reservation land leased out to the plains people is slightly larger than the area
actually used by the aborigines in Hoping (Table 6.1). Even these figures may be
inaccurate. The actual area utilized by Han people, estimated by local residents and the
PPRA members, is believed to be much larger (PPRA 1997a:60; Lin Fang-chi
1984:112).
Under current regulations, only indigenous people can legally own title in the
above land categories. On the other hand, private companies are almost all owned by
the plains people, including hotels, restaurants, pharmacies stores, or supermarkets.
Topsoil and tilling rights are ideally possessed exclusively by the aborigines. The
vaguely defined “miscellaneous” category in reality constitutes a large proportion of
the reservation land in Hoping hsian. This apparent conflict was only clarified after
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my interview with the chief o f Hoping Hsian, Mr. Lin. The land assigned to the
miscellaneous category refers to the private land transactions between indigenous
people and Han people, but little proof of such transactions is available (Interview B).
Table 6.1 The Use of the Aboriginal Reservation Land in Hoping Hsian
Area in Hectares
Percentage (%)
Item
100.00
6323.92
Total Area
179.02

2.83

Forest Land
Construction Land

10.13
2.10

0.16
0.03

State or School

98.46

1.56

9.35

0.15

Total

86.53
3133.88

1.37
49.56

Aborigine

1319.61

20.87

Han People

1726.69

27.30

Tilling Rights
Topsoil
Rights
Uses Without
Fees

Aborigine

Ownership

Leasing
Rights

87.59
1.39
Private Company
2805.47
44.36
Miscellaneous
Source: Hoping Hsian Government, 1997. % Calculated by the author.
The State is also a highly visible player in the reservation lands controversy in
Hoping Hsian. The state-owned Taiwan Power Company, the Ministry o f National
Defense, Forest Bureau of Provincial Government, and the public veteran farms run
by the Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired Servicemen are actually among
the biggest users o f reservation land. In these cases, at various times, the State
exercised its right of eminent domain to take the lands and then excluded these lands
from the classification as aboriginal reservation land. From the perspective o f a Han
sovereign state that seldom takes into consideration problems related to human-land
relationships, there is no difference between the state-owned lands and the aboriginal
reservation lands. They both belong to the State, regardless o f the appearance of laws
promulgated to permit exclusive use o f reservation land by indigenous peoples. In
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other words, aborigines have essentially lost their sovereignty over their ancestral
territory to the modem State.
The PPRA also requested another change in longstanding regulations. The
PPRA demanded that the government opens the hsian chief candidacy to both Han
people and aborigines to more democratically reflect the current population
composition. At present, Han people outnumber aborigines by seven to three in
Hoping hsian (Interview D). If the elected officials could be Han, they probably would
be Han. The aborigines would have little chance to win any official posts given
population and economic disparities. Aborigines under current laws are guaranteed to
have at least one seat on the County Council and further hold exclusive rights for the
position o f chief for all of the thirty mountain hsians in Taiwan. This manifestation of
Taiwan’s “Affirmative Action” has increasingly encountered resistance from
mainstream Han society which requests equal treatment o f all peoples. I shall discuss
the “myth” of equality among the people o f Taiwan in Chapter 7. The PPRA also find
the use of the term “indigenous people” which was approved by the National
Assembly in 1994 to be objectionable. There is more to this debate than just words.
Given the current situation, the use of the term “indigenous people” reflects
recognition of the long term occupation of Taiwan by these indigenous peoples which
in turn at least holds a promise for access to land and land ownership. Once the Han
people are seen as “non-indigenous people,” the PPRA argues, they will loss various
rights in the mountain hsians (Interview D). In internal newsletters and petition letters
to a variety of government agencies and representative bodies, the PPRA constructs an
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interpretation which aims to deny the indigenous status of the aborigines while
strengthening their own position under the rubric o f social equity (see next, section).
Many new political organizations have emerged in the post-martial law era in
Taiwan. What makes the PPRA special is the party’s strategy to present itself as a
marginalized, oppressed group of victims persecuted under current laws which, in its
view, are overwhelmingly preferential to the aborigines. The organization’s broad
political affiliations span three major parties and include abundant financial resource
(as evidenced by the costly mailing of thousands o f petition letters) (Interview D). The
influence of the PPRA is most evident in Hoping Hsian but certainly also reaches the
central government in Taipei where the PPRA mobilizes tremendous resources to
lobby lawmakers and so successfully block or alter the directions o f relevant
legislation. Such gerrymandering includes stopping the revision o f the “Provision o f
Development and Management o f Mountain People’s Reservation L a n d ’ in the
Executive Yuan (Election flyers, see interview H). The PPRA is both the product and
consequence o f the development o f Hoping Hsian's locally specific history and
geography. A comprehensive analysis o f the PPRA in terms o f political, economic,
social, and cultural aspects is essential to understand the ethnic tension in the Li-Shan
area.
The emphases on social justice, and the protection and promotion of the rights of
underprivileged indigenous groups were conceived as intimidation by some plains
people living within the mountain hsian o f Taiwan because their own lives have
dramatically different social and historical contexts from those o f the indigenous
peoples. Cultural difference and, of course, economic interests also contribute to the
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formation o f the different views of these two ethnic groups. With the rise o f the PPRA,
racial discrimination seems to play an implicit role in the views of at least, some core
members.
Locally, PPRA’s demands include the request that land patents be conferred to
the non-indigenous people who either lease or buy reservation lands from aborigines
despite the fact that such transfers are currently illegal. Further, then, they request that
all lands be subject to the rules o f the free market for pledging and as securities for
loans. Non-aborigines should also be entitled to continue to control other state-owned
lands that were leased out to them, and again, these lands should be subject to the
principles o f the free market.
Nationally, the PPRA opposes the term, “indigenous peoples,” and suggests a
return to the previous term o f “mountain compatriots” or the politically neutral,
academic name o f Austronesian. In fact, however, core members of the PPRA deny
the existence of indigenous peoples in Taiwan all together (PPRA 1997b). By denying
the indigenous status o f the aborigines, the PPRA suggests that the aborigines’
demands represented by issues such as the “Return Our Land” campaign, request for
official change in names, and self-autonomy will lose ground. With potentially
tremendous support from some financial syndicate giants (tsai-tuan) which are renown
for their real estate business and land speculations (Interview G), and well-connected
political and social networks, the upsurge o f the PPRA organization in several
mountain hsians appears not only much easier, but also more effective in terms of
achieving political gains than those o f its indigenous counterpart, the Alliance of
Taiwan Aborigines in urban areas. Starting from local small organizations in Nantou
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and Taichung Counties, the PPRA has made itself a nationwide organization within
four years, but the organization’s base, and indeed most o f the PPRA’s pragmatic
concerns, remain centered in Hoping Hsian.
The foremost political affinity o f the PPRA is based upon the power of many
KMT’s delegates within the central government, including many legislators and
representatives of the National Assembly. However, the PPRA’s political connections
extend well beyond the KMT. The group also has sought support from the largest
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and also from the smaller
New Party, which spun off the KMT in 1993 and is considered as more conservative
in the political spectrum. What makes the group so powerful is that grassroots
supporters o f the PPRA encompass local partisans from all three parties, though
generally the DPP is considered friendlier toward the aborigines and their concerns.
Nevertheless, the KMT-inclined force is central to the goals o f the PPRA because only
the KMT is able to exercise its influence over the mountain society through its
institutionalized connections and local control over a variety of important agencies.
These include the Farmers’ Association found in nearly every hsian, many board
members o f local temples, the police, the head o f the hsian Council, and the secretary
o f hsian government (Ku Yu-chen and Chang Yu-fen 1997). Through the mediation of
these local leaders, a well organized mobilizing structure, and a highly efficient
political lobby, the PPRA is able to stir the blood of a massive number o f Han
supporters, who previously were politically less important, such as fruit and vegetable
farmers, small business people, retired servicemen and policemen, and hotel owners.
The ubiquitous request for ownership of land with titles characterizes most of the
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PPRA potential and current supporters in mountain hsian. However, instead of
directing criticism to the decision-makers of the ruling KMT, indignation and
antagonism are directed toward the indigenous peoples in order to realize the PPRA’s
political goal.
6.1.2 Ethnic Discourse and Tension in the Mountains
The emergence and growth of the PPRA clearly indicates that the current
reservation land policy and its enforcement neither satisfies the requirements of the
indigenous movement for greater autonomy, nor those of the land-starved new Han
settlers. An examination of the PPRA’s ethnic discourse that has mobilized Han
people living in aboriginal areas is essential to provide insights into the ethnic tension
in central Taiwan. The selected English name for “Plain People Right Association” is
the “Chinese Rights Association” which, hardly reflects actual interests, issues, and
political reality o f its members in the mountain hsian. It does serve undeniably well to
delimit the boundary between “we” and “the other” by appealing to racial/ ethnic
differences, and implies that aborigines are not “we,” the Chinese. Such a name also
demonstrates that the social cleavage in mountain society cuts through racial/ethnic
boundaries which are frequently mobilized by politicians. In order to produce an
effective political mobilization along ethnic lines, the constructed discourse must
incorporate an impending threat, be emotional, and easy to follow. The following
discourse appears widely in the PPRA’s newsletters, propaganda, petitions to the
government, and was restated in my interview with the organization’s president, Mr.
Wu. The PPRA argues that to enshrine aboriginal rights is a “racist threat” and
therefore is a violation of basic human and property rights for any other ethnic groups
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living in those areas. Further, once the indigenes acquire land titles and possibly
establish an autonomous zone in the future, the plains people will be forced to give up
their properties and land and will quickly be ousted by their “mountain compatriots”
of the mountain hsian. To go even further, these distinctions parallel the contrasts used
by the mainstream, KMT-promoted, national identity to discriminate between the
“Chung-Hwa-Min-Tzu” (Chinese Nation) and the “Nan-Tao-Min-Tzu” (Austronesian).
These distinctions, local and national, emphasize the differences between “we” and
“the other.” From the PPRA perspectives, the aboriginal intention to elevate the legal
status of the Provision from administrative decree to law, regardless the objection of
the Han people in the mountain hsians, will “racialize” national territory and result
into genocide (PPRA 1997b). Also the organization argues that a protectionist
orientation for reservation land policy will create the prerequisites for the future
establishment of an indigenous autonomous zone, which will inevitably lead to a
dangerous split of national territory (PPRA 1997b).
There are also racist overtones to this dogma. Many members believe the
“mountain people” possess different blood lineage and ideology, and so, think
differently from the Han people (Interview D). However, an unexpected side effect of
this PPRA discourse is to provide a catalyst to elevate the indigenous peoples’
movement to a “nation-to-nation” level. I will discuss the concept of indigenous
peoples as nations in Chapter 7.
National identity is a highly controversial and not-yet-resolved issue in
contemporary Taiwan. The raising of this identity issue not only shows the dominance
of “Chinese identity” discourse in Taiwan, as I discussed in Chapter 5, but is also a
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reflection of the political predilection of the PPRA. Indigenous peoples in Taiwan
have been accused by the PPRA o f not identifying with the “Chinese Nation.” Despite
considerable academic proof to the contrary, the PPRA holds that the aborigines’
actual time of arrival in Taiwan was only four hundred years ago when the Dutch and
the Spanish brought them to Taiwan as “hunting” slaves from Southeast Asia. In the
same argument, they maintain that the “slave-needing” Western powers also relocated
the Hakka people from Kuangtung to Taiwan as agricultural slaves (Interview D). In
the PPRA’s petition letter, even the specific sources o f the indigenous peoples are
identified without any ethnographic support. Paiwan, Rukai, Yami (Dawu), Amis, and
Puyuma are said to come from the Philippines. The Atayal and Bunun are said to
come from Indonesia, and the Saisiat, incredibly from distant Nepal (PPRA 1997b).
When I asked for the sources upon which these spurious arguments were based, Mr.
Wu replied that these must be kept secret for future use in debates with the members
of the indigenous movement (Interview D). Using this argument, therefore, the PPRA
maintains that the “so-called” indigenous people of Taiwan should be renamed as
minority groups or mountain people, and maintains they are not “indigenous” at all.
They argue that the real indigenous people in Taiwan are only the Pin Pu Tzu (the
“cooked” fa n or plains aborigines as they were referred to in the Ching Dynasty), who
were assimilated by the greater Han population and so are nearly indistinguishable
from the plains Han people. In short, they argue that, Taiwan is not the origin o f
human kind, and hence every ethnic/racial group migrated to Taiwan (PPRA 1997a:
108), so by this argument, there are no indigenous people. According to the PPRA
dogma, the only difference between the groups which now people Taiwan is their
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arrival time. Thus, the PPRA’s ideological conclusion is that as there are no
indigenous peoples in Taiwan, the aborigines’ claim for ancestral lands and prior land
rights should be rejected (PPRA 1997b).
It is not only the strategy, which might be called “if we go back time far enough,
there would be no indigenous peoples anywhere”, that the PPRA adopts, which is
objectionable. In fact, according to the hard-line PPRA position, there are no
indigenous peoples in Taiwan since all of these groups are now assimilated into the
KMT-promoted Chinese Nation, or else they are simply extinct (PPRA 1997a: 98).
The PPRA’s political strategy is clear. Fatuous arguments that the virtually
extinct peoples, the Pin Pu Tzu, are the real indigenous peoples in Taiwan are a
transparent attempt to negate the debate. From this distorted perspective, there are no
existing peoples that are “indigenous” to Taiwan, so the current residents in the
mountain hsians, both Han and indigenous people, have no legitimate position which
can be used to claim prior land rights. In the end, the consequence of such unfounded
opinions seems to be apparent as Han people with much more abundant capital will
quickly buy out the reservation lands from aborigines. If these indigenous peoples lose
their land, their identity may well be lost as well.
The PPRA also objects to the name o f the Provision concerning the reservation
lands. They officially suggest a return to the original name used in 1948, the
“mountain area” reservation lands, be considered. Neither “mountain compatriots’
reservation lands” nor “aboriginal reservation lands” are acceptable terms to the PPRA
because under either designation there is no space for Han people living in the
mountain hsian (PPRA 1997b). Only those lands owned by indigenous peoples can be
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called “aboriginal reservation lands” . PPRA officials argue that government-owned
reservation lands should be correctly named as “mountain area” reservation lands to
ensure the Han people’s share in the reserves (PPRA 1997b).
In addressing the land rights conflict, the PPRA offers its own solution, which to
a large extent reflects their stereotypes of what the aborigines should be like.
Following the model of publicly owned veteran farms near the Li-Shan area, the
PPRA recommends the establishment o f similar farms which could be collectively
owned and run by tribes. Individual aborigines would then lease lands from the
regional indigenous farms so that illegal land transactions can be stopped or limited. In
advocating this policy, the PPRA argues that with such an approach the tribal culture
and way o f life can be preserved while the economy can be developed through a
special production/marketing program (PPRA 1997b). This proposed solution is
certainly predicated upon Han people’s cultural images of the aborigines and
represents the unilateral desire of a dominant group to shape and reconstruct the way
of life of minority groups with less political and economic power.
Complicating things further is the fact that the PPRA even has some aboriginal
members who share similar views with respect to the resolution of reservation land
disputes. As prominent players in local politics, it is necessary for the PPRA to co-opt
aborigines to buttress its claim that the organization represents a multiplicity o f ethnic
groups and so dilute the effects which racial bias, embedded in its core members, has
on new prospective members. Even an important figure from the early “Return Our
Land” movement and the Alliance o f Taiwan Aborigines is on the board of one
organization, the Association of Promoting Land Resource Use, which is dominated

176

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

by the PPRA but also incorporates some aborigines as symbolic showcases. Although
this organization does not seem to fulfill its functions as a lubricator o f inter-racial
tensions, and as the indicator o f major aboriginal agreements regarding the relaxation
of the restrictions on the reservation land ownership, it does demonstrate that the
PPRA is aware o f its own racial bias and is trying to minimize the negative publicity
associated with racist sentiments.
6.2 Land Rights, Local Politics, and the PPRA
Despite the PPRA’s claim that it wishes to focus its campaign on the central
government and congress, mainly the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly
(Interview D), the PPRA is still deeply involved in many local level elections. The
January 1998 election for the position o f chief of Hoping Hsian was the first election
in which the PPRA ever declared formal support for a certain candidate. Since the
KMT is the only political party among the three major parties to extend its influence to
the mountain hsian (Interview F; Ku and Chang 1997), it is not surprise to find that the
incumbent who was the officially sanctioned KMT candidate, had to run against three
other opponents who were also all KMT members. The PPRA’s president revealed
that one of the four candidates was alleged to be “bought out” o f the election by a
donation of NT$500,000 (about US$ 16,000) to quit further campaigning (Interview
H). Among the three “real” candidates, one’s political credibility was severely eroded
by the widespread allegation about his withdrawing from the election and hence
resulted in a loss o f many potential votes. Only two candidates stayed in the election
as legitimate competitors for the post o f hsian chief. Political strategies, such as pre
election negotiations, trade-offs, bribes, the use o f negative allegations, and rumors are
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not unusual in local elections. What make Hoping special are these most severe land
right conflicts and their association with ethnic cleavages in the hsian.
The only opponent who was wholeheartedly endorsed by the PPRA and
affiliated organizations, however, posed a sharp challenge to the incumbent. Neither
side ignored the issues that the PPRA brought to the table in the past few years
regarding the deregulation o f the reservation land. The candidates’ party affiliation in
this level o f election is not considered as important as in the legislators’ or county
chiefs’ elections. Often, however, candidates o f the opposition parties with their
limited resources are unable to effectively participate and mobilize supporters. At this
local level election, more typical is infighting within the KMT’s different local
factions for administrative control over the resources and the ensuing profits, than
party-to-party challenges representing opposite ideologies or political parties. While
other parties have made inroads in national elections, in rural area, the KMT remains
dominant.
The incumbent complained that the KMT does not provide any material
assistance to him and that he must continue to campaign using almost exclusively, his
own resources (Interview H). Just six months ago, in my first interview with him, he
still claimed that he maintained a good relationship with the core members o f the
PPRA and reckoned that the PPRA’s proposition regarding the opening o f land titles
to the Han was a reasonable request (Interview B). However, this election destroyed
his close relations with the PPRA, which was not satisfied with his moderate position
on the deregulation of the reservation lands. Local progressive indigenous leaders,
including the reverends of the local Presbyterian Churches, tended to support the
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incumbent to counteract the influence of the PPRA’s more extreme candidate.
Surprisingly, the head of the local chapter o f the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines
(ATA), in contrast to common political expectations, endorsed the PPRA’s candidate.
Local leaders o f the Li-Shan Presbyterian Church use this as the proof o f the betrayal
of founding principles of the ATA and indicate that it is the evidence of local ATA’s
collaboration with the PPRA. The decline of the ATA in terms of political clout as an
island wide indigenous organization, as I discussed in Chapter 5, exposed its local
chapter to the manipulation of other better-organized and well-funded, possibly hostile
Han groups. Thus in the Li-Shan area, the PPRA achieved its goal of a superficial
integration of ethnic groups and was able to disguise its ongoing demand for land
deregulation as representing a consensus of both Han and indigenous peoples.
In response to these manipulations, the local progressive indigenous leaders
created two election flyers which implied that a powerful business group (tsai-tuan),
renown for its land and real estate speculations in central Taiwan, stands behind the
PPRA as a major source o f financial support. To counter, the PPRA also produced
several flyers appealing mainly to Han people which touted the PPRA’s
accomplishments including the blocking of the Provision to become formal law,
influencing legislation associated with the bylaws o f the Cabinet-level o f Council of
Aboriginal Affairs, and fighting for Han people’s ownership o f both reservation lands
and state-owned slopelands. The two sides both vowed to get permission to confer
land titles for aborigines for the lands in question, and at the same time, promised to
protect the continuation o f leasing rights for the Han people. In a word, the main
themes o f this election are encircled around land rights and ethnic space conflicts
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between the dominant Han and the minority indigenous peoples. What distinguish
these two candidates are not their political promise or ideology, but their individual
supporting forces behind the scene. The contested and politicized space in the
mountain hsian shapes local social and economic development and on some
occasions, sparks discussions related to the creation o f indigenous autonomous zones
and national territorial planning.
Still, it was not the winning candidate’s persuasive political agenda or even party
affiliation that was decisive to the election results, since all candidates were KMT
members. In the end, it was local connections, kinship relations, and the effective use
o f greater financial resources that matter. The incumbent beat the challenger by less
than a hundred votes but the newly elected official clearly will not resolve the issues.
Table 6.2 demonstrates the inadequacy, and incorrectness, o f using a simple
dichotomy to equate the PPRA with the KMT, reactionary forces, business interests,
and a Han-exclusive organization. In turn, it is also incorrect to associate all aborigines
with progressive, anti-KMT, and pro-indigenous peoples’ legislation and policies.
Neither the PPRA nor the indigenous movements are internally homogenous. Most
Han people and organizations involved in the indigenous movements can be
appropriately portrayed as progressive. In fact, aborigines participate in the
movements selectively, according to their personal interpretations o f the issues at
stake. The “Return Our Lands” movement drew a considerable amount o f support
from the aborigines while other movements attracted far fewer supporters. As we can
see from Table 6.2 and from previous discussions, many aborigines are in fact KMT
members, if perhaps not as staunch as their Han counterparts. The KMT still garnered
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Table 6.2 The Three-layer Structure of the PPRA and Indigenous Movement
PPRA
Business people (perhaps with
higher connections),
Retired servicemen,
Heads of local chapter of
Farmers’ Association
Mid-level Local politicians from KMT,
Members DPP & NP,
Small businesses operators,
Heads of small, local
farmers’ organizations,
Some “co-opted” indigenes
Grassroots Han farmers (without
Supporters specific party inclination),
mostly less educated, rely
heavily on agriculture as major
income source

Core
Members

Indigenous Movement
Urban-based indigenous elite, ProDPP (or Pan-indigenous
identity),
Taiwan Presbyterian Church,
Progressive Han people
Indigenous local opinion leaders,
Local Presbyterian Rev.& their
local connections,
Few support from public sector

Few! (with rising “indigenous
consciousness”?)
Better educated than the average
Some farmers
Many o f them KMT members
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the majority of votes from the indigenous people who voted in almost every election
(Walis YuGan 1994a).
At the same time, the core and grassroots members o f the PPRA also often have
dramatically different political and economic “characters.” Core members tend to be
relatively wealthy and engaged in non-farming activities. The head o f the PPRA is the
president of a construction company based in Taichung City. Many powerful business
groups, the tsai-iuan, with their close relations to government officials, invest in
construction companies for both real estate and land speculation activities in Taiwan.
These core members, then, possess effective political strategies to bring the requests of
the PPRA to the media and further can establish broad connections with members of
the Congress and the various local Councils across three major parties because o f their
prosperity. Again, aborigines seem to occupy only symbolic positions in the PPRA.
Some enthusiastic local farmers, usually heads o f farmers’ organizations, are among
people that the PPRA eagerly seeks to absorb. The highest level o f PPRA supporters
are generally from farmers who have worked on orchards or vegetable farms for
decades without earning land titles. My interview with a group o f Han farmers enabled
me to realize the heterogeneous characteristics which separate the core and the
grassroots supporters of the PPRA’s. From the perspective o f the Han farmers, their
demands for land titles are, to a large extent, reasonable and relate quite simply to
individual gain.
A situation which might be termed the “Paradox o f Democracy” emerges in this
case. Without the recent democratization trends in Taiwan, there would be no PPRA, a
group that is now able to challenge the official KMT’s candidate in local elections.
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With the recent democratic reforms in Taiwan, given the fact that in many mountain
hsian, Han people outnumber the aborigines both numerically and economically, if the
outcome is based simply on majority vote, indigenous people will probably no longer
benefit from the protectionist reservation land policies established by the KMT. In all
probability, any deregulation of the reservation lands will lead to the concentration of
lands in the hands of a few, most possibly by the tsai-iuan (giant business group).
Such an outcome would force even more aborigines to leave their homelands, seeking
jobs in cities for their livelihoods. If the tension between the indigenous movement
and the PPRA is considered as just another contest among interest groups for limited
resources, that is, if we have to solve the problem of land rights in the context of
interest-group pluralism as in many democratic countries, the paradox o f democracy
will work in favor of the majority or the more powerful. In fact, treatment of the
indigenous movements as simply new requests by a newly emerging interest group is
exactly the way the conservative scholars portray these indigenous movements (for
example, see Hong Chun-hu 1992:87). I shall discuss more about this paradox o f
democracy and the effects of recent democratic reform in Taiwan on the indigenous
peoples’ movement in the next chapter.
6.3 Responses to Han Dominance by Indigenous Peoples
In response to the macro-socioeconomic conditions facing the aborigines,
various reactions ranging from political struggle to efforts centering on cultural
restoration for the tribes have emerged. Still, this is more complicated as the issue also
affects the development of mountain lands and natural resources and the call for
autonomous zones by various indigenous groups with different ideologies and political
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stances. Walis YuGan identifies two types o f pro-KMT indigenous elites. First, under
the cultivation o f the KMT’s party-state apparatus, those elites favored by the KMT’s
central authority are provided with power and resources which enable them to stay in
the high positions associated with the current KMT power structure (1994a). Such
people include the heads of the local party organizations, legislators, or officials in
aborigine-related departments in the provincial or central government. Thus, they are
socialized into the KMT’s cultural and political structures and maintain certain “haloes
around their heads” to win respect from their respective tribes. At the same time, they
inevitably alienate common members o f their tribes by being unable to stay in
residence long enough to build significant local relationships and tribal connections.
The second group, those elites who stay in the mountain area with their tribes
members (Walis YuGan 1994a). By acquiring posts in local sub-county government,
and because of factors such as relative higher levels o f education, party-state support,
personal wealth, and clan and religious connections, they are able to mobilize more
resources than average tribal members. Internal colonialism, discussed in Chapter 2,
constrains the opportunities of members o f minority groups to move upward on social
ladders. The higher the minority members move up, the greater confinement they
reportedly experience (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994a). Limited by their minority status,
discriminated by the majority population, and awaked by the reality that the Han elites
occupy better positions than aborigines do, these indigenous elites are forced to stay in
their mountain hsian to rely on more familiar local political and economic resources.
These resources, in turn, support these local indigenous elites as they participate in
local elections and help them build legitimacy and influence. In order to be successful
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at this “bottom-up” strategy, elites must collaborate closely with the establishment and
tend to engage in conservative or alternately reactionary activities to defend their
personal political resources (Walis YuGan 1994a). This association, almost without
exception, makes them conservative and pro-KMT (Walis YuGan 1994a). This
process of conservative socialization and the financial and administrative benefits
which pro-KMT organizations devote to co-opt indigenous elites, as in the case for the
Mountain Development Association in Taiwan, enable the KMT to maintain its
dominance in the mountains and indigenous societies.
I will next discuss other kinds of indigenous elites: those engaged in anti-KMT,
culturally conscious indigenous movements. Such persons can also be divided into
two “locational” types: those who live and work in urban areas, or those who went
back to their tribes in the mountains after the climax o f the beginnings o f the “urban”
indigenous peoples’ movement. The sites of resistance change, but the enthusiasm of
these people for awaking the indigenous national consciousness remains the same. The
early stage of the indigenous rights movement in Taiwan, as pointed out by Hsieh
Shih-chung (1992), was initiated by indigenous urban elites who received higher
education and were more familiar with the working o f the Han-dominated political
system. Nevertheless, the fact that these resistant elites did not actually live in tribal
areas limited the capability o f these urban indigenous elites to engage in grassroots
cultural revitalization and reflection. Basically, their effectiveness was minimized
precisely because they lacked the necessary influence in their respective tribes. The
urban indigenous elites are, in short, elites alienated from the masses (Hsieh Shihchung 1992).

185

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

The second type o f progressive indigenous intellectuals chose to go back to their
tribes, and turn peripheral mountain areas from space of oppression into sites of
resistance (Keith and Pile 1993). These “grassroots indigenous intellectuals”
developed different political strategies and faced different struggles from their urban
counterparts. This is true at the present time as well as in the past. “Tribalism” is
conceptualized as an embodying social, cultural and indigenous movement which
emphasizes bottom-up, democratic participation, grassroots organization, local
resistance, and cultural consciousness. It is an evolving concept and embodies a new
set of guidelines for the grassroots indigenous movement (TaiBong SaSaLe 1993;
Interview E). Such “tribalism movement groups” often must confront local vested
interests also represented by tribal members. The grassroots, place-specific, nature of
“tribalism” enables the development of both a positioned knowledge, and “alternative
cultural politics” (Chiu Yen-liang 1994), which are situated in local social and
historical contexts. Despite the fact that “tribalism” has mostly developed in southern
Taiwan, the direct confrontation between the indigenous peoples and the PPRA in the
Li-Shan area has become part o f collective anti-colonial struggles to foster a panindigenous consciousness in Taiwan. In this sense, these local land conflicts are not
only a major concern o f the Atayal people in Li-Shan, but also o f importance to all
indigenous nations around the island.
The several revisions of the Provision in the past five decades reflect the
dilemma that the KMT has faced as they seek some intermediate position between
“protectionist” and “developmentalist” policies. From the beginning, the KMT,
maintaining the earlier Japanese policy, designated the resources in the mountains and

186

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

forests as state-owned property. To avoid allegations that the KMT was appropriating
aboriginal lands and resources, the State promulgated the Provision in the name of the
protection and the promotion of indigenous interests. Nevertheless, capitalism always
produces core and periphery in the formation o f regional uneven development and
accumulation. The peripheralization of the indigenous mountain economy, the
reservation land policy alone clearly has failed to guarantee aboriginal land interests.
Capital from plains investors utilizes loopholes in the Provision to penetrate into the
mountain subsistence economy and over time has altered the whole production
system. This has been going on since the KMT controlled Taiwan, and so is virtually
impossible to reverse at the present time.
In 1985, another executive order, the Provision for Enhancing the Management
and Promoting the Exploitation and Development o f the Reservation Lands, forced the
mountain administration to admit the reality that the leasing of reservation lands to
Han people from the plains was common (Walis YuGan 1994b). The mountain
administration faced an even more severe problem ten years later, whether to permit
Han farmers to officially hold title to the reservation lands that they had previously
cultivated illegally (Walis YuGan 1994b). In the administration’s efforts to elevate the
Provision to law status, similar problems reoccurred: “Should the new law be
protection- or development-oriented?” and “Should the illegal use o f reservation lands
be legalized, even though non-indigenous people are currently using a considerable
amount of land without legal environmental constraints?” .
The position of the mountain areas in the national territorial plan is at the core of
conflicts regarding reservation land rights. What is at stake is not only the issue of
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management of the natural resources in mountain areas, but also the cultural politics
which incorporates the attitudes o f the mainstream towards the claims for “national”
status by indigenous peoples. Thus, the territorial plan has always been in large part an
ideological struggle for reaching a compromise among various interests and satisfies
different ideological requests.
The PPRA’s demands for the deregulation o f both reservation lands and the
candidacy o f hsian chief, and the PPRA’s seemingly plausible denial o f aborigines’
“indigenous” status have had dramatic impacts on the direction and strategies of the
indigenous movement. Despite their various platforms on topics such as culture,
education, health reform and land reform, the targets o f the early indigenous
movements have always been the state apparatus and the ideology which it promotes.
The emergence of the PPRA in recent years has forced the major architects of the
indigenous movement to re-direct their orientation towards resistance to the
involvement of the gigantic business corporations, which, through their surrogates in
the mountain hsians, speculate on reservation lands as prime real estate for the
construction of high value mansions and similar types of developments.
As always, land is at the center o f the definition of the indigenous nations in
Taiwan. From the aboriginal perspective, the aggressive annexation o f reservation
lands by Han capitalists accelerated the emergence o f demands for “natural
sovereignty” (BaShang 1998; Interview G). Natural sovereignty refers to the collective
ownership of Taiwan by various indigenous peoples based on traditional tribal
territorial claims which existed before the establishment of any quasi-state or nationalstate organizations. That is, before the arrival o f the currently dominant Han group and
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the consolidation o f ruling power in the form o f a State, Taiwan’s indigenous nations
had, historically, sovereignty over this island. The long-term goals are to restore the
traditional territory o f each indigenous nation and regain the right of autonomy. The
current reservation lands are the basis for future autonomous areas and therefore, need
to be protected against further Han capitalist takeovers (BaShang 1998). The PPRA’s
denial of aborigines’ “indigenous” or “primordial” status seems too fatuous to defend.
The indigenous movement has chosen to move forward rather than to engage in
debates with the PPRA over such baseless historical constructions. Still, these
blatantly false claims catch on with many Han people living in the region for political,
economic, and social reasons.
According to BaShang, an indigenous activist, the new version of the Provision
needs no basis in law, unlike the preceding ones that were based on the law o f
Conservation and Use o f Slopelands (BaShang 1998). Legal procedures and
mechanisms o f democratic negotiation in delimiting the boundaries o f the reservation
lands must now be established. To protect the Constitutional right to development,
which was approved by the National Assembly in 1997, a restriction on the transfer of
titles of the reservation lands whereby only aborigines can hold such titles is necessary
for any sustainable existence of the indigenous nations (BaShang 1998). A supreme
land court composed o f Taiwan’s aborigines should be set up to deal with the
contradictions resulting from differences in provisions between common land laws
and the future edition o f the Provision. The aborigines must have the authority to
review the land use applications filed by non-indigenes, and to circumscribe land use
within a certain area, to maintain a relative majority o f aborigines living within any
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given political unit (BaShang 1998). This raises an interesting gerrymandering
question in manipulating the demarcation o f electoral districts. Democracy, besides its
majority rule, has an implicit geographical dimension.
These proposals and goals discussed above are radical but they represent the
ideal situation. Their feasibility is obviously questionable, given the fact that Taiwan
has the one of the highest population densities in the world and further that there is
already a spatial mix of ethnic groups which has lived in these areas for around fifty
years since late Japanese era. However, these ideas do highlight the “national” status
desired by the indigenous peoples and also reflect the social, cultural and political
imaginations o f a radical indigenous, democratic state. Cultural pluralism, which
emphasizes the co-existence of different cultures, advances to alternative cultural
politics, which in turn, not only stresses the co-existence, but also the empowerment,
of minority groups in every aspect.
My interview with the current Hoping chief, Mr. Lin, represents, to a large
degree, the perspectives of pro-KMT, conservative, indigenous elites on these issues.
Lin is a typical KMT-cultivated local indigenous politician with a good education, a
wealthy family, and possessing the skills required to manipulate the spoken and
written codes of the dominant language. While he is an aborigine, Lin believes that
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples were driven by land-hungry Han settlers into
mountainous areas, a very popular mistake that is held widely in Taiwan.
Anthropological evidence shows that Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have resided in the
mountains since time immemorial (Shepherd 1993:2). During my interview, he
insisted that the plains areas of Taiwan are the “real home” of aborigines and that
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mental obsession with ancestral lands and traditional culture will restrict the pace of
modernization in mountain areas (Interview B). From Lin’s perspective, indigenous
peoples are bound to their lands in the mountains and by such a “binding” lose
economic and educational opportunities which are crucial for successful competition
with the plains Han people. To focus on the land rights issue, from his perspective, is
to exacerbate the ethnic problems in the mountain hsian and ultimately, he believes,
provides no way out for the aborigines. In Lin’s view, the real issues at stake are
improving the standards of living, increasing job opportunities, and providing better
access to higher education. In a word, modernization is the only direction to go. The
“Return Our Lands” movement alone cannot solve the problems facing the indigenes
(Interview B).
Lin’s perspective on the “Return Our Lands” movement is NOT to get back
lands which have already fallen into the hands of Han people who have been using
these plots for decades, but rather to demand NEW reservation areas which could
come from the existing stock o f state-owned lands - mostly state forest lands. In my
opinion, this is exactly how a local politician in the Li-Shan area would respond to the
PPRA’s request, whose members are also within his constituency. By taking such a
position, he will not offend Han people by stripping them o f the rights of using the
reservation lands already acquired, legally or illegally. Moreover, he can partially
fulfill indigenous demands by arguing for the expansion o f the area o f the reservation
lands. In short, by diverting the conflict from locals, either indigenous or Han, to the
state, Lin would hope to gamer local votes from both ethnic groups.
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From my extensive interviews with Mr. Lin and observation o f the overall
political trends, it is obvious that the pro-KMT indigenous elites tend to adopt an
assimilationist position and emphasize the development o f the mountain economy,
including capital investment represented by the construction o f infrastructure and big
public buildings. For such pragmatists, there is no need for an inquiry into the colonial
relations between the State and the aborigines. The legitimacy of the KMT-state is
“water under the bridge” and as such is not questioned. Loyalty to the Han-state is
beyond doubt. In TaiBong SaSaLe’s words, this kind o f developmental trend is
“development of the KMT’s style” (Interview E). Little attention is paid to the
formation or cultivation of an indigenous consciousness or the urgency of cultural
survival, which are, indeed, the central concerns of the tribalism and radical
indigenous movements. Local indigenous politicians do participate in the traditional
harvest ceremony and some other cultural displays which are designed to appeal to
tourists. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the relations between tourism development and
indigenous cultural preservation are dynamic and dialectical rather than one
dimensional. Whether this tourism supports the “positive” development of minority
cultures depends on the social, cultural and political forces that promote such
activities. We hardly see any progressive plan from local indigenous politicians in
their promotion o f indigenous culture and ethno-tourism.
The critiques o f the PPRA by indigenous groups seem unanimous. All the
people I interviewed tended to treat the PPRA as a homogenous group with an openly
racist ideology. The reluctance of resistant elites to consider the internal differences of
the PPRA probably results from the hostile antagonism o f the PPRA’s leaders towards
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the goals and aspirations of the indigenous peoples’ movement. As a matter of fact,
many of the grassroots PPRA’s supporters in Li-Shan are industrious fruit growers
who have made their livings in contested ethnic space from as early as the 1960s under
the auspices or the acquiesce o f the State. These farmers, some of them “re-settled”
mainlander veterans, make their living from lands on which, for decades, they have
spent considerable capital and labor. The policy to develop slopelands and grow
temperate-zone vegetables and fruits was in fact, developed and encouraged by the
government in the 1960s. These Han residents who are also long-term residents
repeatedly complained that the government did not offer any substantial assistance in
either production or marketing because their leases on lands were illegal. This is the
dilemma from the perspective o f the KMT government. Providing governmental
assistance would be tantamount to recognize the legitimacy o f the many illegal leases
acquired by these Han farmers. In fact, these farmers may actually contact the PPRA
only when land disputes arise, but otherwise are not interested in the debates
(Interview F). The Han farmers’ long term use o f these lands represents a great
challenge to any attempt to establish an indigenous autonomous zone in such
ethnically contested space. It is not just an issue of compensation, in crowded Taiwan,
it is also about livelihood and tradition for these people as well.
6.4 Land Use and Environmental Conservation in Li-Shan
The relationship between land use and environmental conservation was the main
concern of the early geographers working in the Li-Shan area (Chang Chang-yi et al
1982; Chang Chang-yi 1989; 1992). Slopeland use, water resource utilization, and an
assessment o f environmental impacts of land use change were particularly stressed in
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these early researches. Cultural differences, reflections on relevant laws, discourse on
ethnic space, evaluations on the effects of the intrusion o f capitalism, and the
subsequent changes to the production system by new residents have not been covered
by previous geographical studies. However, the environmentally oriented geographical
studies associated with estimates of “carrying capacity” in the Li-Shan area and the
direct threats to environmental safety related to the usable lifetime of the Te-Chi
Reservoir were important in awakening early environmental consciousness in
contemporary Taiwan. These environmental concerns are not only important in their
own right, but also because they brought a wide range o f issues, including ethnicity in
the Li-Shan region, to a wide audience in Taiwan.
6.4.1 Agriculture and Environmental Degradation
Soil erosion due to the cultivation of steep slopes in the Li-Shan area was so
serious that seventeen check dams in the upper reaches o f the Da-Chia River built
between 1976-80 in an effort to protect the reservoir had all silted up by 1980 (Chang
Chang-yi 1992). Monitoring siltation of the reservoir was started as soon as the dam
was completed in 1974. The annual average silt deposition was far greater than
originally anticipated (1.16 million cubic meters between 1974-76, and 1.67 million
cubic meters between 1976-78) (Chang Chang-yi 1989:66). As in many such cases
around the world, there is little agreement on the major causes of the soil erosion in
Li-Shan which resulted in accelerated sedimentation in the reservoir. The slopelands
are prone to both high rates of natural erosion and landslides during the typhoon
season. Road construction (the major cross-island highway, and the roads for the
maintenance and management of the reservoir) are also responsible for some of the
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problem. The problem, however, has clearly been aggravated by widespread intensive
cultivation on slopelands. Some suggest that through even the most cursory
observation, it is clear that improper slopeland cultivation is probably the main cause,
although it is very difficult to quantify this contribution because o f the presence of
intervening natural possibilities (Chang Chang-yi 1989:65-66). Certainly, these
problems have intensified as more and more slopeland is brought under cultivation.
Many factors contributed to the essentially unconstrained slopeland development
in the Li-Shan area. The placing of economic gains over environmental concerns in
the past few decades within both private and public sectors is an important reason.
Shortsighted policies encouraged the pursuit o f short-term profits at the expense of
environmental deterioration. Chang Chang-yi identified another dimension, ineffective
government actions due to the lack o f a centralized authority in the Li-Shan area. He
called for the establishment o f clear-cut authority among o f the many government
agencies in the Te-Chi watershed area (Chang Chang-yi 1992).
The irony o f history can be clearly seen thirty years later at the same
geographical site. In the early years o f the 1960s when the KMT needed to settle an
enormous number of the retired servicemen who came to Taiwan with the KMT in
1949, the regime sought every possible way to promote development and the
exploitation of natural resources in Taiwan. The first cross-island highway was
constructed mostly by those veterans. In this sense, the cross-island highway
represented a WPA (Works Progress Administration)-style effort for job allocation.
The other goals associated with the opening o f the highway were population dispersal,
transportation network improvement, and the more effective use o f water resources.
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However, these goals, according to Chang Chang-yi, have still not been fulfilled. Even
if some o f these goals were achieved, the extensive degradation o f the physical and
socio-economic environments which resulted from cultivation on the steep slopes
throughout the region virtually offsets any associated benefits (Chang Chang-yi
1989:ix). Environmental protection, indigenous cultural survival and ethnic space
preservation were not priorities o f the KMT’s decision-makers in this early period. In
1957 and 1963 respectively, two large public farms, Fu-Shou-Shan and Wii-Lin were
set up near Li-Shan to accommodate the retired military personnel. Large-scale
orchards and vegetable farms were developed in these steep slopelands to grow
temperate products because the altitude o f these slopes permitted such a use.
The situation changed in the late 1980s when those veterans, once praised as
heroes who opened the “internal frontier” in the mountains, were blamed together with
the Atayal indigenous peoples and other Han farmers for the environmental
degradation in Li-Shan area and the many environmental problems associated with
shortening life of the Te-Chi reservoir.
6.4.2 Soil Erosion and Land Use as the Socioeconomic Results
Soil erosion, although in some cases is resulted from natural process, is often
exacerbated by human activities. In turn, it becomes a social and political issue when
the “problem” is manipulated by people who can affect public opinions, and further
when the State decides on a particular course of action which invariably leads to
conflicts of interests (Blaikie 1985, Chapter 1). The conflict o f interests may explicitly
be confined to soil erosion and environmental conservation issues, or more
complicated but related political aspects, such as the struggle for control o f territory or
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for the appropriation of surpluses generated by lands in question may become a central
aspects of the problem (Blaikie 1985: 2).
Once the relations between land use and soil erosion were recognized in the
study area, they became politicized issues to be debated and discussed in a supposedly
neutral and scientific manner. Intervention by state institutions, which inevitably had
to take a side on the issue in order to engage in an “effective” action, quickly
followed. Intervention, o f course, affects the livelihood o f the land users in eroded
areas and sometimes has profound influences in other areas. The interventions may
take the form of changes in the laws, the land tenure system, or even result in a new
Constitutional provision related to the national territorial plan. These changes can also
alter price/market mechanisms and credit/loan availabilities, and the foreign earnings
capability o f the State (Blaikie 1985:2). Foreign advisors and experts, usually from
First World countries, are often invited to such affected areas to conduct more detailed
and “convincing” research and to provide a more feasible and “objective” solutions.
Not surprisingly, all of these measures were done in Li-Shan as discussed in Chapter
4.
Following the advice of American advisors, a special agency, the Mountain
Agricultural Resources Development Bureau, was established in 1961 (Chang Changyi 1989:88). Ironically, the word “development” was still in the name of the bureau.
The bureau’s main responsibilities were to plan development and manage the
exploitation of slopeland, regulate development funds, promote ecologically and
economically sound agricultural practices by farmers on the slopelands, and conduct
field surveys and laboratory soil experimentation (Chang Chang-yi 1989:88-89).
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Following the line o f reasoning reflected in the bureau’s major functions and
responsibilities suggests that land use patterns were considered to be the sole cause of
soil erosion. Solutions for halting or restricting soil erosion were limited to just this
technical dimension. In this manner, problem o f soil erosion, and hence the siltation of
the Te-Chi reservoir, was detached from all social, cultural and political contexts.
Eventually, the bureau failed to perform its proper role, perhaps in part because these
other dimensions were not considered.
As soil erosion continued and natural fertility declined, farmers have to apply
more and more fertilizers. The intensive growth of fruit in large area makes the use of
fungicides and insecticides necessary. Agricultural chemicals were, in turn, washed by
the rain into the river and the reservoir, resulting in eutrophication that threatened
water quality in the down stream urban areas. The two large public veteran farms and
the numerous fruits and vegetables growers, Han and indigenous alike, soon became
the objects o f public condemnation. The environmental stress forced the government
to take actions against widespread if “illegal” cultivation of the slopes. However, due
to fierce local resistance, the forced felling o f illegal fruits trees and the ensuing
reforesting policy were not able to proceed (Chang Chang-yi 1992; Interview F).
To say that it was only the selfishness of the local vested interest groups
resisting the implementation of the new environmental preservation policy is to
oversimplify the multidimensional historical and geographical contexts of the
problem. The historical role of the State in creating the problems is completely
ignored. In fact, the State is among the biggest users of the slopeland in Li-Shan. The
highway network, the hydroelectricity facilities in the Te-Chi reservoir, the army base,
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the two veteran farms, and the national forestlands are all State’s properties and
projects. Further, the State initiated the “agriculture up to the mountains” policy to
encourage the production o f temperate zone fruits. Geographically, the inequalities o f
economic and power relationships between the urban areas and the mountain areas are
both the results and causes of upstream land use patterns.
The people in the economically-marginal mountain areas have few choices to
make a living other than exploiting natural resources. Also, people in mountain areas
have less political clout to mobilize necessary supports and buttress persuasive
discourses to defend their own actions and interests. The rapid growth o f the PPRA
among the Han farmers can partly be attributed to its familiarity with political
operations in the core, urban area and its effective national Congress lobby. However,
given the relatively common business orientation of PPRA core members, as widely
recognized by the indigenous movement organizations and local leaders o f the
Presbyterian Church, the rise of the PPRA may eventually widen the gap between the
core and peripheral areas.
There is at least one thing in common, if not more, between the Han and the
aboriginal farmers. They all emphasize their efforts in preserving the soil from erosion
and in cooperating with the government in promoting and instituting environmental
protection. Han farmers stress that farmers will logically protect their fields from soil
erosion because the land and soil are the material basis upon which they depend to
make a living (Interview F). The indigenous minister o f the local Presbyterian Church
claims that the eutrophication occurring in the Te-Chi reservoir should not be blamed
on the farmers’ use o f fertilizers and pesticides. Instead, he thought the abundant
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amount o f trees that were submerged by the completion o f the Te-Chi dam were to
blame for the water quality problem (Interview G). Indigenous fruit-growers also
assert that local farmers cherish their land resources and do every possible thing to
prevent erosion from happening. They suggest that the sources of silt comes from
natural processes, road construction, and the reforestation program which, ironically
perhaps, cut down the old trees in order to plant the new ones (Interview G).
As I mentioned above, it is not an easy task to distinguish between natural
erosion and the accelerated erosion caused by human actions. The local farmers in LiShan, regardless of their ethnicity, utilize their specific local knowledge in defending
and preserving their livelihood from being disrupted by State intervention.
In the process o f this resistance, various organizations were bom. The
organizations reflect the ethnic boundaries found in Li-Shan. For example, the Li-Shan
Farmers’ Rights Committee was an indigenous group led by a former local
Presbyterian minister. The Han farmers also formed a variety of organizations.
However, these organizations were all short-lived and dissolved after the agreement to
postpone the cutting down of fruit trees was achieved. Some o f the Han people’s
organizations were absorbed by the PPRA subsequently (Interview F). However, it is
the PPRA’s ethnic-charged discourse that shifts the Han farmers’ frustrations
originally aimed at the State, to a more divisive ethnic hostility towards the aborigines.
Local land use patterns deeply reflect the social, cultural, political and economic
structures o f a certain community as well as the natural potential o f the land. They
cannot be changed overnight by the experts’ calls for conservation. Conservation is a
physical process as much as a social one. Its success depends mostly, not on the
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technical (improved seeds, agricultural engineering, laboratory experiment on
preservation, etc.), but on the social dimension (Blaikie 1985:50). In other case studies
around the world, it is striking “how indigenous rights movements, conservation
politics, food security, the emphasis on local knowledges and calls for access to, and
control over, local resources crosscut the environment-poverty axis” (Peet and Watts
1996:35). The land degradation problem in Li-Shan proves that the application of
merely technical solutions alone cannot be successful. Possible solutions may well be
derived from the ecological wisdom of indigenous peoples around the world. The
long-term sustainability o f their way of life has not only been recognized but also
highly appreciated in facing the global environmental challenge. The land itself
possesses cultural and spiritual values for many indigenous peoples, in addition to
economic value. However, any romanticization o f the indigenous cultures and their
way of life as ecologically sound are not only unrealistic but also misleading for a true
understanding o f the current situations. I will further discuss these environmental
issues in Chapter 7.
In this chapter, I present a critical review on the rapid development o f a Han
people’s organization “Plains People’s Rights Association” (PPRA) in the Li-Shan
area, a counterpart of “Alliance of Taiwan’s Aborigines” (ATA) in series land
disputes. The PPRA has relatively abundant financial resources and political
connections that enable its rapid growth in national and local political arena. The
PPRA denies the “indigenous” status of Taiwan’s aborigines, argues that there are no
indigenous people in current Taiwan, and accuses the indigenous activists of being
separatists, who do not identify with the concept of Chinese Nation. The PPRA
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demands the deregulation o f reservation lands, open the candidacy o f the heads o f
mountain hsiam to Han people, and revise the Constitution to call the aborigines as
“mountain people.”
On the other hand, the virtually unlimited development o f slopelands in Li-Shan
has resulted in serious environmental problems. The rapid siltation from the upstream
agricultural cultivations threatens the safety o f the Te Chi reservoir. I introduce a
socio-political perspective into this seemingly “pure” scientific environmental
problem, and argue that the problem cannot be fully comprehended without
considering the “situated” local social, political, and historical contexts.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACTS OF THE
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT ON TAIWAN’S SOCIETY
Based on the above discussion, the chapter provides three major conclusions,
which are all rooted in the land issues, as answers to the central question o f this
dissertation: the impacts o f the indigenous movement, which is centered around land
conflicts, on Taiwan’s society (including the indigenous societies, o f course).
Among geographers, or more generally, practitioners of social science, many
notions that were taken-for-granted by academic community have now been exposed
to reexamination and renewed scrutiny in new social and political contexts. In Taiwan
particularly, the transition from an authoritarian, one-dimensional regime to a more
democratic and diversified society releases unprecedented forces and energy which
radiates from the civil society and, in time, impacts the State. The rigid military
regime has relaxed and the gigantic bureaucracy and its policymaking process have
gradually opened up to the public domain. Different social movements have
contributed different insights to reform both the society and the State, and as a
consequence the value system as well has been transformed. However, the farreaching influence and implication brought about by the new social movements are
different from the dubbed interest-group pluralism which is prevailing in welfare
capitalist societies.
Iris Young forcefully argues that the welfare society depoliticizes public life by
restricting discussion and debate to simply distributive dimensions in a context of
interest-group pluralism where each group competes for its share o f public resources
(1990:Chap 3). In such a social and political context, public support is not the
necessary condition for victory, but rather successful negotiations with other interest
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groups and the formation of political alliances are crucial to victory. Such “strategic”
politics fosters political cynicism: “those who make claims o f right or justice are only
saying what they want in clever rhetoric. This cynical system often forces movements
claiming justice ... to identify themselves as merely another interest group” (Young
1990:72). Two major defects are embedded in such an evolution to interest-group
pluralism. First, the privatized form of representation and decision-making that the
interest-group pluralism encourages does not require the expression o f group-interest
to appeal to basic principles of social justice. Second, the inequality o f resources,
organizations, and power allows some groups to dominate the public forum while
other voices are muted (Young 1990:92). Thus, the “paradox of democracy” refers to
the phenomena that the materially and politically more privileged groups are more
likely, not only to promote their perceived interests, but also to successfully achieve
goals than those less privileged minority groups.
Young suggests possible solutions to this paradox (see Young 1990:92-95). An
extensive redistribution of wealth and restructuring o f the control mechanisms for
capital and resources are necessary conditions to link democracy and justice. A
challenge to the given structures and procedures for making distributive decisions is
essential to advance the material equality necessary to faster more equitable political
participation. A greater democratic system, rather than limiting democratic decision
making to certain aspects is another way out for the paradox. Democracy in one
institution will reinforce democracy in another institution. Thus, group members are
able to develop the capacities for thinking about one's own needs in relation to the
needs of others. Finally, the paradox cannot be eliminated as long as any group is
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being stereotyped, silenced, or marginalized by virtue of the group’s essential
differences embedded in its cultural and physical characters. Only when the oppressed
groups are able to express their interests and needs in the public forum on an equal
basis with other groups can the paradox be terminated.
If Young represents the construction of social justice in a framework of
postmodern “celebration of differences,” Harvey, then, will be the upholder of modem
“Enlightenment project” in his pursuit of universal justice. Since relationships between
individuals get mediated through market functions and state powers, Harvey insists
that we have to “define conceptions of justice capable of operating across and through
these multiple mediations” (Harvey 1996: 349).
“Only through critical re-engagement with political-economy,
with our situatedness in relation to capital accumulation, can we
hope to re-establish a conception of social justice as something to
be fought for as a key value within an ethics o f political solidarity
built across different places” . .. Struggles to bring a particular
kind of discourse about justice into a hegemonic position have
then to be seen as part of a broader struggle over ideological
hegemony between conflicting groups in society. (Harvey 1996:
360-361).
In Taiwan’s case, the juxtaposition of the dominating and the dominated groups
is manifested in the two groups which I have introduced as the PPRA and the AT A.
Despite their internal heterogeneity (see Chapter 6), the “characteristics” presented by
their core members reflect important contrasts. The PPRA portrays itself as the victim
of the KMT’s mountain policies. However, in its petition letters to the government and
the propaganda it produces for the average audience, PPRA positions often blatantly
reflect Han people’s cultural hegemony as well as stereotypes about the different
“other,” the aborigines. For example, the PPRA proposes to establish indigenous
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collective farms, following the model of veteran farms, to accommodate aboriginal
land right claims and ethnic cultures (Section 6.1.2.). By such a measure, the “land”
factor and its connection to indigenous culture are carelessly wiped out. The ATA, on
the other hand, lacked financial resources and further, was a novice in the Handominated political arena. The indigenous movement was considered by most as
simply another movement among many other social protests movements which
emerged at the same time (Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992). In other words, only the political
and economic aspects of the indigenous movement were emphasized, while cultural
policy and territorial planning were not only neglected by the academics, but also by
the indigenous elites themselves.
Overlapping and shared progressive ideas among many o f these new social
movements made it difficult to distinguish the particular indigenous movement
impacts on world politics, or even more specifically, its influence on Taiwan’s state
and society. However, it is undoubted that the development of the indigenous
movement in Taiwan touches points which characterize the nature o f the growing
worldwide indigenous movement and further provides retrospection on the island’s
history extending far beyond the four-hundred-year Han settlement. First, culturally, it
challenges the Sino-centralism that has been promoted through the mainstream media
and the Chinese nationalist ideology o f the KMT as well as the various oppressions of
colonialism on these minority groups. Second, politically, it contributes to the
reexamination of the concept of the nation-state, not only in Taiwan, but also at the
world scale. Third, environmentally, the traditional ecological wisdom manifested by
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these indigenous groups is now being given attention while the ideology o f “almighty
modern technology” is simultaneously coming under scrutiny.
7.1 C ultural Hegemony, Colonialism, and Multiculturalism
Most commentators agree that hegemony is the key concept in Gramsci’s Prison
Notebooks and his major contribution to the development o f Marxism (Sassoon 1991).
In his early writings, he used the term to refer to the system of alliances which the
working class must forge to overthrow the bourgeois state and to serve as the social
base of the new workers’ state (Sassoon 1991). In his prison writings, the term was
applied in the way that the bourgeoisie establishes and maintains its rule (Sassoon
1991). The domination of ruling class over other classes relies not only on material
and economic forces, but also on the conversion o f the ruled to accept the belief
system o f the ruling class, its social, cultural, political and moral values, with
involvement o f less violence (Joll 1983). However, hegemony is not a static presence,
but a “moving equilibrium,” dynamic and evolving process which is created and re
created in a web o f institutions, social relations, and ideology (Lay 1994; Sassoon
1991). Later, the concept of hegemony goes beyond the class dominant relations to
other social relations, such as racism and patriarchy (Lay 1994). In my research, I refer
to hegemony as the presence of uneven ethnic power relationship in which Han State
superimposes its value system to the “other” peoples, the indigenous peoples in
Taiwan, through delicate social and cultural relations and institutes embodied in the
KMT’s mountain policies.
Cultural hegemony not only serves to project values which are fundamentally
alien to one group from a dominant group, but also in the process erodes dignity and
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ethnic confidence that are supposed to be basic human rights. One o f common features
of indigenous peoples around the world is their suffering which results from this
cultural hegemony. Hegemony deepens and solidifies inferiority by negating ethnic
dignity and imposing a stigmatized identity. Moreover, hegemony incorporates more
than the ideology o f a dominant group. It also includes the embodiment o f this
ideology, the values and beliefs in everyday practices and socio-political institutional
arrangements (Ley 1994). Under such socio-political circumstances, economically
disadvantaged indigenous peoples are even more vulnerable to assimilation policies
instituted by the dominant group.
Influenced by the aboriginal struggles and the advocates o f multiculturalism
within some First World countries, the earlier International Labor Organization (ILO)
convention which stressed the integration and assimilation of indigenous population
has been replaced by a new version of the convention written in 1989, which states:
Considering that the developments which have taken place in
international law since 1957, as well as developments in the
situation o f indigenous and tribal peoples in all regions o f the
world, have made it appropriate to adopt new international
standards on the subject with a view to removing the
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards.... (ILO
Convention no. 169, 1989; cited in Wilmer 1993: 179.)
The new convention urges governments to respect the integrity o f indigenous
cultures. This basic right is correspondent with the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights o f Indigenous Peoples. However, this convention is not a document which is
actually capable o f protecting indigenous peoples from infringements on their basic
rights by States. It is merely a report which prescribes a normative regulation that
should be embraced by participatory States regarding indigenous affairs (TIVB 1994).
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The State, of course, still keeps the rights of legislature and administration. In this
aspect, it is different from the U.N. Universal Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous
Peoples, which states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, in
accordance with international law. By virtue o f this right, they
freely determine their relationship with the States in which they
live, in a spirit o f co-existence with other citizens, and freely
pursue their economic, social, cultural and spiritual development
in conditions of freedom and dignity....(U.N. Document
E/CN.4/Sub .2/1991/36)
Under the articles o f the Declaration, the sovereign authority of the modem
nation-state is curbed by the relative autonomy o f the indigenous nations. Only by
empowering these indigenous nations can they be free from both state-imposed
assimilation policies and reified stereotypes which are reinforced by mainstream mass
media and other information distributors. This empowerment apparently does not exist
yet in most parts of the world. As Kariya (1993) points out, in the current
“establishment” constructed by the dominating group, the government agency charged
with indigenous affairs is in a state of contradiction. On the one hand, it has the
responsibility to assist indigenous peoples. On the other hand, it is generally perceived
as the source of indigenous oppression, both in the past, and at the present time.
The representation of “the other,” the way “otherness” is structured and
construed by the dominant, colonizing group, and the cultural imprints left on the
colonized groups are some o f the major focuses o f post-colonial literature. Indigenous
peoples around the world, as the objects of internal colonialism (see Hsieh Shih-chung
1994a; Walis YuGan 1994a for Taiwan’s case and Wilmer 1993 for others), are
colonized through institutionalized social and political arrangements, such as
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education, mass media, the legislature, the power o f naming people and landscape, the
ethnic division of labor, and the stereotype. It is a colonialism o f wars and
exploitations, as much as it is about the colonization o f minds and bodies (Corbridge
1993) and of ethnic space itself. Colonialism that is thus defined is much more
difficult to overthrow or transcend. Colonial values and practices can easily survive
long after political de-colonization (Corbridge 1993).
While “classical colonialism” is often associated with imperialism during
territorial expansions and economic exploitation (Watts 1994), internal colonialism is
often presented in tandem with cultural imperialism. This cultural imperialism
involves a universalization of the dominant group’s historical experience and culture,
and the formalization of this history, as common social norms (Young 1990:59).
According to this interpretation, cultural imperialism is similar to the concept of
cultural hegemony. In fact, according to Raymond Williams, hegemonism is use as an
alternative to imperialism in some current cases (Williams 1983:144). Despite the fact
that hegemony implies some notion of consent within the mass o f the population - that
is, the acceptance, either willing or unwilling, o f the value system and institutional
arrangements of the dominant group (Sassoon 1991), however, the ultimate foundation
of cultural hegemony, like colonialism, is still the military threat, or use, o f force.
In Taiwan’s specific context, the efforts to integrate Taiwan into Japanese
empire were replaced by Sino-centralism since the end o f World War II. History and
geography had their instrumental function in constructing and changing national
identity. The KMT’s conception o f “Chinese” was portrayed as a highly homogeneous
culture and people incorporating five major ethnic groups (Han, Manchurian,
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Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uighur). Ethnicity, then, is relegated to a secondary aspect of
identity after nationality. Different ethnic groups came to solidarity under the banner
of national security and economic development In contrast, expressions of ethnic
differences were perceived as threats to national solidarity. Taiwan’s “Local dialects,”
such as Hakka, Minan, or Austronesian languages, were prohibited from being spoken
in public; Taiwanese folksongs were kept outside the State-controlled mass media.
Local geography and histories were restricted in school curricula and kept from the
public arena. Han Chinese supremacy was taught as dogma in primary schools in
sharp contrast to the portrayal o f the headhunting savage aborigines.
According to the argument o f Taiwanese nationalists, Han “Taiwanese” have
also been oppressed by this cultural hegemony and the colonial rule o f the foreign
KMT regime (Chen Fang-ming. 1995). It should be reasonable to consider that
Taiwan’s aborigines suffer a sort of “double oppression” from both Chinese and
Taiwanese national discourses due to their ignorance o f the aborigines’ request for
national status. Given the early KMT ideology, indigenous social and cultural systems
were dismissed as backward and worthless. Simply put, they needed to be modernized.
However, indigenous peoples were, in accordance with the Constitution, to be giving
status as citizens with the chance o f assimilation so that in time, there would be no
distinctions from other Han people IF they were willing to acquire Chinese language
and culture. One major goal o f the indigenous movement in Taiwan is to subvert the
one-dimensional cultural politics imposed by the KMT regime created through these
extensive social and political controls.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

The emergence of the indigenous movement in Taiwan has its own peculiar
backdrop. Many factors which are inextricably intertwined contribute to this
remarkable outburst in the mid- to late-1980s. These include: extensive urbanization, a
sound material base resulting from rapid economic development in the past few
decades, the lifting o f martial law, the intensifying exploitation o f minority people
under the capitalistic economy, and increasing tolerance toward social movements
associated with the decline o f the authoritarian party/state control (Hsieh Shih-chung
1987b). However, conservative scholars tend to eschew the issue that indigenous
people are in fact “peoples” (or “First Nations,” to use the term o f Canadian Indians),
rather than just another interest group asking for their share of national resources, or
alternately as but an underprivileged minority demanding more political and social
equity. In Hong Chun-hu’s dissertation (1992:64-82), despite his discussion and
review o f Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, Modernization Theory
underlies his suggestions of “solving” the indigenous “problems.” Such “solutions,” in
my view, are culturally biased and so are politically futile. Aborigines are often
regarded in the same light as other economically and politically weak groups, such as
workers, women, homeless people, and pollution victims. Clearly, the cultural
dimension, including its special connection with particular spaces, is missing from
either Hong’s or the PPRA’s considerations with respect to relations between the State
and the indigenous nations.
Serious political reforms in Taiwan which started in the mid-1980s brought, of
course, changes in other dimensions. Taboos were lifted and minds were emancipated.
Staid cultural policies, as other social policies, are no longer a “given” condition, but
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rather a field of contesting ideas, ideologies, and o f course, cultural politics. Ideology,
thus, is not a “fixed” product of either a certain mode o f production or a specific
economic structure, as the classical Marxism might argue, but rather is a new field of
political struggle (Sassoon 1991). It is under these socio-political contexts, that the
concept of multiculturalism, at least from my perspective, was developed to
accommodate different perspectives and worldviews existing in a nation-state. This
concept is, of course, evolved in the West but also rapidly spread to the rest of the
world. The establishment o f multiculturalism, as explicated by Kobayashi (1993), has
experienced three stages:
“first, the ‘demographic’ stage, a state o f ethno-cultural diversity
towards which no coherent official policy exists; second, the
‘symbolic’ stage, wherein it is official policy to recognize and
promote multiculturalism, without a firm commitment to bring
about its objectives; and third, the ‘structural’ stage, at which
legislative reform provides the basis for social change.”
Canada was among the first countries to promulgate an official multicultural
policy, the third stage in Kobayashi’s classification. This policy is a further step from
the “original dual languages” and “dual cultures” policies designed especially for the
two largest ethnic groups in Canada: the English and the French. However, this policy
relinquishes the rights o f cultural development o f the First Nations and other
immigrating groups (Chen Mao-tai 1993). The primary goals for the implementation
o f multicultural policy are not only to tolerate cultural differences, but also to
countervail political centralization (Chen Mao-tai 1993), which often gives dominant
groups privileged over minorities. The idealistic outcome o f this multiculturalism is to
create a social condition in which individuals can not only form one unity under a
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single social and political entity, i.e. a nation state, but also permit the preservation of
a personal cultural singularity and the right to be different.
Industrial capitalism, personal rationality, democracy, equity before laws, and
civil rights are the essential conditions for Canadian multiculturalism (Chen Mao-tai
1993). However, uneven regional development, especially the differences resulting
from both different degrees of urbanization and industrialization often trigger ethnic
conflicts over economic issues (Chen Mao-tai 1993). The lack o f integration in forging
an expected national “unity” renders the Canadian multiculturalism as only a
“multicultural mosaic” (Chen Mao-tai 1993). However, it is the expectation of some
future (national) integration which is implied in the multicultural policy that reveals its
defects.
Due to the inequity of resources and political clouts among different cultural
groups, an unreflective multicultural policy, or even an egalitarian, every-group-isequal cultural policy will inevitably lead to the situation that the policy strives to avoid
- the dominance of few larger groups. This is the result o f the “myth o f equality.”
Equal promotion and opportunity should be the minimum protection of minority
groups. Therefore, multicultural policy cannot succeed without considering extensive
resource redistribution in social, political and economic fields. Moreover, in an
arguably postmodern era when differences are supposed to be celebrated and
respected, the human “mosaic,” which emphasizes the individual singularity rather
than integration, is a less oppressive measure for ethnic minorities in their struggles to
resist assimilation policies.
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In Taiwan, the reforms induced by the indigenous movement and other new
social movements have currently propelled the State and mainstream social values to
move forward the transition from the second to the third stage o f multiculturalism
defined by Kobayashi. Symbolic multiculturalism and respect o f cultural differences
are at ieast recognized among some State agencies and progressive groups, and are no
longer conceived as threats to national solidarity.
It is at this stage that one o f the most prominent ideas in post-colonial literature,
“hybridity,” comes into the focus. The idea o f hybridity is that the transaction o f the
post-colonial world is not a one-way process. It is not that the oppression obliterates
cultural traces of the oppressed, or the colonizer silences the colonized in absolute
terms (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1995). The capability for some distinctive aspect
of the oppressed culture to survive, even under the most potent suppression, makes it
integral part of the new cultural formations which arise from the interactions between
the native and, if I may say, the imperial culture. Hybridity not only happens in post
colonial societies where colonial powers invaded to consolidate political and
economic control. It also occurs when settler-invaders dispossess indigenous peoples
and force them to assimilate to new social patterns (Ashcroft, Griffith, and Tiffin
1995). New cultural forms are produced even though the older forms continue to exist,
perhaps with some modifications. The degrees that these new cultural forms become
“hybridized” varies greatly across situations, between cultures, and from place to place
(Ashcroft, Griffith, and Tiffin 1995).
Recently, the “hybridized dimension” of Taiwan’s culture, that is, the
combination of the influence of the Han Chinese, the Japanese, the Americans, and the
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most unique to Taiwan, the indigenous cultures, are generally cited within Taiwanese
national discourse (see the book edited by Shih Cheng-fong 1994). Although the term
“hybridity” or “post-colonial” are not necessarily specified, terms such as
“multicultural” or “multiethnic” gradually have become acceptable. Cultural hybridity
seems to be a reality, rather than simply an abstract concept circulated only within the
academic elite. However, this does not mean that Taiwan’s culture as “hybrid” can be
accepted by the majority o f people when it comes to important political implications that is, an “impure” and perhaps a new culture is developed in Taiwan independent of
Chinese culture advocated by the old rigid regime.
I have discussed the impacts of tourism development on indigenous harvest
ceremonies in Chapter 4. In my opinion, these ceremonies illustrate the “hybridity”
most clearly in that they have become adapted to the changing socio-economic
conditions and bestow different meanings upon w h at, on the surface, seem to be
traditional customs. Traditionally, the harvest ceremony was held at a certain time of
the year with complicated rites which were often linked to particular hunting and
religious activities. However, the nativistic cultural revitalization movement which has
evolved in Taiwan’s modem capitalist society clearly reflects modifications. The time
o f the ceremony has been changed to weekends or holidays to accommodate the
schedules of tribal members who, mostly youths, either work or study in the cities.
Prolonged rituals must be cut short to fit both the needs of tourists coming from
outside and the schedules of the young, working, tribal members. The sacred spaces in
the mountains, perhaps, will be replaced by other places offering easier accessibility to
the tourists and to the participants.
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Some traditional rituals are “banned” by local churches and Christian leaders
(Interview G). Commercial performances in aboriginal cultural parks that compete for
“authenticity” (which is often turned into “exotic”) of traditional cultures in order to
seek to maximize tourism profits, and sometimes, mislead the ongoing process of this
indigenous cultural renaissance (for example, see Hsieh Shih-chung 1994d). However,
this current cultural revitalization, to some degree, does arouse ethnic identity and
pride for some aboriginal performers, despite the fact that their performance/culture is
no longer “pure.” Perhaps, this “hybrid” culture will develop into a new form of
“authentic” culture in the future as the product of social adjustment.
So, what are the nature and the direction of indigenous movements, particularly
that occurring in Taiwan? Is the movement an ethnic movement embedded with
exclusiveness? Or is it a means o f functional social transition in a democratic society?
These kinds o f questions might be attributed to the lack of delicate discourse
construction on the indigenous movement and Taiwan’s aborigines’ relatively
restricted connections with an international perspective, due to Taiwan’s international
isolation. These questions also reflect the insufficient acknowledge o f ethnic
differences in Taiwan’s society (Walis YuGan 1992), and therefore lack the
consensus, experience, and social and geographical imaginations to find appropriate
solutions. The indigenous movement, its ensuing nativistic cultural revitalization, and
the concurrent calls for territorial autonomy have imposed upon every sincere social
movement and its activists a moral demand. The indigenous movement demands every
person to reflect upon the relationships among the State, the civil society, the impacts
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o f cultural hegemony on Taiwan’s population, the dying indigenous nations (see Sun
Da-chuan 1991), and the human-land relations.
7.2 Indigenous Sovereignty and the Ideology of the Nation-State
The politics o f representation is epitomized in the process o f nation-state
building in which the homogenization process demanded by mainstream nation-state
ideology subjugate the representation of “otherness.” In other words, politics is
involved in the formation of identity o f nations and all incorporated ethnic groups.
Thus, the prototype of the modem nation-state, quite opposite to common assumption,
is not natural, primary and permanent so as to precede history (Hobsbawm 1990:14).
Rather, the fundamental ideology of the nation-state, that is, nationalism, is a product
o f construction, manipulation, invention, and imagination (Anderson 1991;
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The boundaries o f nations are thus artificially created,
constantly floating, negotiating, and breaking up over time. Contemporaries are often
unselfconscious about their uses o f the term “nation” so that it means different things
in different context at different places. From geographers’ viewpoints, the definition
and organizations of modem nation-states are now essentially stmctured around
territory, which links the construction of national discourse to this spatial dimension of
national territory. Even those “nations without states” have a space to where they are
spiritually linked. Following the restricting principles of both self-determination and
the nation-state, it seems that a nation is assumed to form only one state and its
citizens constitute one “indivisible whole.” Since states are, in the modem era, mostly
spatially “fixed” and, on the contrary, peoples are spatially mobile, this notion o f “one
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nation, one state” neither fits the current reality, nor can such an interpretation judicate
boundary, territorial, and national disputes across the globe.
When indigenous sovereign claims collide with modem nationalism, conflicts
rise. The most prominent case comes from Quebec, Canada. Both French Quebecers
and indigenous Inuits in northern Quebec are seeking recognition o f their respective
ethnocultural distinctiveness in Canadian state. Competition by these two groups was
lively when Quebec political leaders rejected requests by First Nations people for
indigenous sovereignty in recent years (Salee 1995). As a result, this tension led to a
highly conflictual dynamic relation which renders a social and cultural coexistence
extremely difficult (Salee 1995). The history o f colonization shows that indigenous
peoples, the First Nations, were not the beneficiaries of post-WWII independent
statehood. This fact seems to be epitomized in the request of the Canadian First
Nations. While French Quebecers asked to separate from Canada given a main reason
of cultural distinctiveness, Quebec’s indigenous people’s demand for sovereignty,
based on the same reason, was crudely turned down. So far, neither group has
achieved political sovereignty.
7.2.1 Indigenous Sovereignty, the Chinese Nation, and Taiwanese
Nationalism
In Taiwan, self-autonomy rather than the establishment o f indigenous
sovereignty is the goal of the indigenous movement. In the estimation of the
indigenous elite, an appeal for complete sovereignty within an island state is
practically infeasible and politically harmful to their future campaigns, despite the fact
that the current Han-dominated KMT state has no legitimacy from their point of view.
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Chinese anthropologists conducted research on minority groups in Southwest
China during the Second World War (mainly because the KMT’s Nationalist
government had moved to Sichuan province). Their studies on those minority groups
were later criticized as mostly used only extensive reviews o f ancient literature to
identify the origins of the minorities in question. Often, these studies led to a priori
results that the current ethnic groups originated from some ancient groups mention o f
which are found in ancient Chinese historical records (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990, cited in
Chen Chao-ru 1992). In a word, the early anthropologists lacked the concepts required
to establish ethnic histories from their fieldwork (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990, cited in
Chen Chao-ru 1992). Crude conclusions could be partially attributed to the limits of
the wartime environment which forced these scholars to depend almost exclusively on
such ancient records rather than actual field observations. However, their often a priori
conclusion on the origin of ethnic groups could not be simply attributed to this
difficult environment (Chen Chao-ru 1992). Again, it is more about ideology then the
harsh wartime circumstances.
The problems embedded in the reports of these early anthropologists regarding
ethnic origin become clearer once we review their theoretical construction with respect
to the formation of the Chinese Nation.
“The major factor for the formation of the Chinese Nation is
assimilation. Because the appropriate emanation of the Chinese
culture, the peoples in surrounding areas are touched and
generated some kind o f centripetal, pulling force. This force
enables these people to seek for light, so they are willing to come
to merge with us” (Ruey Yi-fu 1953, cited in Chen Chao-ru 1992,
translated by the author).
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The above paragraph reveals at least two implicit messages. First, ironically,
although early research on minority groups relied on extensive reviews of ancient
Chinese historical documents, the final research results were often ahistorical. Second,
these early studies indicate how subjective researchers can be as they sought to
understand minority groups (Chen Chao-ru 1992). The orthodox Chinese cultural
supremacy and one-dimensional Sino-centralism are haunting, and remain to the
present.
Some of these anthropologists came to Taiwan with the KMT after 1949, but
remained interested in the “origin” of Taiwan’s aboriginal minorities. Not
surprisingly, studies related to this issue again resulted in the conclusion that the
culture of Taiwan’s “mountain savages” is linked to common “Chinese” ancestors
(Way Hui-lin 1967, cited in Chen Chao-ru 1992). Archeological discoveries in prehistorical sites o f Taiwan were often used to prove this ancient connection o f Taiwan
with China by some subjective speculation (Chen Chao-ru 1992). The power o f the
Chinese ethno-centralism ideology is so prevalent that it infiltrates virtually every
aspect of daily life and is even internalized into supposedly “impartial” social science.
As part of the measures carried out in the process of “empire building,” Japanese
anthropological studies on Taiwan’s aborigines still exerted great influence long after
the KMT took control o f Taiwan. The early anthropologists who came to Taiwan with
the KMT had to rely heavily on the Japanese studies to construct their theories on
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. However, the internalized Chinese orthodoxy inevitably
led their academic researches into a linear perspective supposing a clear relationship
among peoples and nations. In summary, the linear evolution is Han Chauvinism —
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Chinese Orthodoxy

China’s Minority Groups

Taiwan’s Aborigines (Chen Chao-ru

1992). This ethno-central nationalism provided the ideological basis o f later
assimilation policies. Anthropologists, as well as geographers (discussed in Chapter
5), offer their knowledge and research for the construction o f concepts favored by the
ruling elites, intentionally or insidiously. These imaginative historical and
geographical constructions generated by intellectual elites went unchallenged for
decades until the mid-1970s when a mature civil society was ready to question the
political taboos and set the stage for an eruption o f challenges in the mid-1980s.
From the very beginning in the mid-1980s, the evolution o f the indigenous
movement has been inextricably intertwined to the development of socio-political
reform movements in Taiwan. The publicity o f Taiwanese nationalism, a breakthrough
o f the KMT’s political taboo, also stimulated the imaginary and theoretical
constructions of potential “natural sovereignty” desired by the indigenous movement.
However, the reality of true power relationships has subtly subordinated indigenous
demands of either sovereignty or self-autonomy to the demand o f Taiwan
independence. The current political strategy is that Taiwan must be first independent
from China, and then, and only then, it is possible for its aborigines to negotiate any
further recognition of their cultural distinctiveness. Certainly, the premise o f this
strategy is that the new Taiwanese nationalism is more tolerate and willing to
accommodate differences than the old Chinese nationalism.
The emergence o f the concept of the “Taiwanese nation” has its material base
embedded in rapid economic development, the islandwide traffic network laid by the
Japanese, and perhaps as Anderson points out (1991), in the growth of print capitalism
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whose prerequisite is a high literacy rate. In Taiwan, current debates on nationalism
centered mainly on different Han sub-ethnic groups. Only a small proportion of the
debate is devoted to dealing with the relationship between the aborigines and the State
(see the various essays in Chang Mao-kuei et al 1993). Chao Kang (1996), on the
other hand, distinguishes two types of nationalism in the current Taiwan context.
“Ethno-nationalism” refers to the nationalism that emphasizes “primordial factors”
such as blood relationships (or kinship) and language. From this perspective, these are
the essential conditions for forming a nation. In this situation, a nation is identical,
then, with an ethnic group. The other concept of nation comes from progressive
liberalism, with emphasis the equal union of a sovereign people. Common ancestors or
language are not used to draw boundaries between “we” and “the other.” Instead,
“liberal nationalism” concentrates on expanding the base of solidity to strive for the
universal rights for entire body of citizens (Chao Kang 1996). However, even this
“liberal nationalism” cannot fully account for, and accommodate, the indigenous call
for sovereignty due to its lack o f consideration regarding marginalized groups. A
(grassroots) “democratic nation” is proposed by Chao Kang within which a coalition is
constructed among the socialist left, progressive liberals, and marginal groups. A
Nationalism which aims at “increasing the country’s wealth and strengthening military
force,” which most likely will benefit dominant groups and international powers, is
denounced by this vision o f national imagination.
In fact, the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism is perhaps, more appropriately
seen as centered around the changing concept of “Who are Taiwanese?” In tracing the
evolution of this concept we can easily distinguish different phases for a collective
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definition o f what is meant by “Taiwanese.” These phases are by no means clear cut
and are subject to debate as far as who is incorporated is concerned. At the dawn of
the Taiwanese nationalist movement in the 1970s, Taiwanese were referred to only as
the Holo people, which is the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, whose language was
called Taiwanese (taiyu). This literally means Taiwan’s language. Later, when the
opposition camp needed to expand its social bass to exert pressure on the ruling party,
the Hakka group was incorporated into the formed definition o f “Taiwanese.” The
Hakka rights movement is, in fact, one of the eighteen social movements identified by
Hsiao Hsin-huang (1992) as o f 1989. The emergence o f the Hakka rights movement
reflected both a desire for a separate ethnic identity from the larger Holo group as well
as the recognition that inadequate attention was paid to the Hakka group in the process
o f political democratization.
Ironically, indigenous peoples were recognized as “Taiwanese” only after their
ethnic voices were heard and recognized after the mid-1980s. Indigenous peoples, the
once sole masters of the island o f Taiwan, have been subordinated and silenced by the
succeeding alien regimes since their first contact with the outsiders some four hundred
years ago.
Mainlanders, even to the present, are still hardly accepted as Taiwanese by hard
line nationalists. However, some Taiwanese nationalists are in fact, mainlanders or
their second generation offspring. The definition o f Taiwanese, then, was extended
later to any people in Taiwan who identify themselves with Taiwan, rather than China.
Repeated newspaper poll surveys report that, after the early 1996 crisis in the
Taiwan Strait when the PRC held several military exercises to intimidate Taiwan in
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advance o f its first ever popular presidential elections, self-identity o f people as
Taiwanese soared to the highest point while a self described “Chinese identity”
reached the lowest ever level. The case exemplifies the fact that external threats can
exert significant influence over domestic identity politics and help to form a sense of
social coherence for the population as a whole. This external military intimidation of
“China vs. Taiwan” gradually replaced the internal ethnic tension o f “Taiwanese vs.
Mainlander” as the largest socio-psychological force for mobilizing Taiwan
sentiments. Indeed, these events led to a new construction of nationalism discourse. A
KMT party now led by native Taiwanese and the shift of the party to a “Taiwanized”
representation also substantially lessened its alien characteristics and helped gain
support from the native population.
7.2.2 The Relationship between the Indigenous Movement and Han
Taiwanese Nationalism
Although the indigenous movement is viewed by many as simply another social
movement in post-martial law Taiwan, there is one dimension o f the indigenous
movement that is genuinely neglected by any other of the current movements; that is,
the relations between the two “peoples” in a countiy where “quasi-colonialism” is still
o f great concern to many indigenous activists. The cultural and political implications
of the indigenous movement cover a broad spectrum o f socio-political reforms that
would require radical institutional rearrangements ranging from a bona fides
comprehensive territorial plan to significant changes in school curricula. This section
will focus on the various possible interactions between the indigenous movement and
Han-Taiwanese nationalism which might evolve in the near future. The discussion
mainly follows the framework provided by Chang Mao-kuei (1995), but also
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incorporates my own re-interpretation and modifications based on more recent events
and conditions.
I have discussed the status of Taiwan’s aborigines in the “Chung-Hwa-MinTzu”, or Chinese Nation in Chapter 5. Basically, within the framework of the Chinese
Nation, Taiwan’s aborigines are not granted special status. They are not even included
in the five major peoples that constitute Chinese Nation. Indigenous peoples are at
most, minority groups or mountain compatriots in the “frontier/border areas.” On the
other hand, the discourse o f Taiwanese nationalism, especially the so-called “new
Taiwanese” discourse, recognizes the aborigines’ as an integral part of the new
Taiwanese nation. Aborigines, together with Holo, Hakka and the “new immigrants”
(to replace the old, and sometime incorrect, name of “mainlanders”) are the four major
components of the Taiwanese Nation. Indigenous peoples are, then, “nations within a
state.” This dynamic framework keeps open the possibility o f “adding” other new
elements into the forming nation and relies less on blood relations or the belief of
common ancestors.
The realization of this more idealist Taiwanese national discourse is still to
contingent upon the result o f Han people’s political struggles in the greater political
economy (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). In the face of political interest conflicts, Han
people’s interests are likely to take priority over indigenous peoples’ interests.
Aboriginal affairs might be only a by-product in the process of compromise and
political negotiation. Thus, it is a difficult task to find a right “spot,” or position for the
indigenous movement in relation to the Han people’s nationalist movements,
regardless of either a Chinese Nation or Taiwanese Nation outcome. It takes political
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insights and strategies to situate the minority movements at a vantage point and to find
a balanced place within the intricate socio-political conditions which currently
dominate, so that the indigenous groups can play a role which might be called
“decisive minorities” in the political arena dominated by Han people.
Table 7.1 shows the six possible relations between the indigenous movement
and Han people’s nationalism. At a time when the independence/ unification issue is
considered as the “fundamental” problem on Taiwan’s future, the indigenous
perspective offers a new way of thinking on this issue. Central to interpretations of the
table are the definitions of two terms: “identify”, and “accept.” According to Chang
Mao-kuei (1995), “identify” is defined as the status in which recognition, passion,
value and activity are all in a balanced situation. It represents a positive attitude, which
includes the tendency to adopt real supporting activities towards the identified object.
“Accept” simply means some degrees of consent on dominant ideology and values.
The latter term lacks the necessary sentimental attitude which is embedded in the term
“identify.” To adopt an “acceptable” attitude towards either the Chinese or Taiwanese
Nation could be the result of either utilitarian and opportunist approaches, or merely a
choice conformable to the will o f dominant ideology, without other options (Chang
Mao-kuei 1995). In brief, “identify” means an active support while “accept” simply
indicates a passive consent.
In situation (I), no efforts need to be taken or made. It follows the whole
assimilation policies provided by the KMT and accepts the whole set o f ruling
institutional arrangements developed by the ROC government. Under this condition,
Sinicization will continue to be prevalent in every aspect o f daily life. Those KMT
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Table 7.1 The Possible Relations between Indigenous Movement and Han
People’s Nationalisms
Han People’s Nationalisms
Taiwanese Nation
Chinese Nation
1. politically Sinicized
Identify and 1. politically Sinicized
2.
one component of Taiwanese
2.
maintain
status
quo
Accept
Nation, with the possibility of selfAutonomy
(I)
OD
1. temporary alliance
Not Identify 1. temporary alliance
2. becomes “pressure group” 2. becomes “pressure group” under
with
under Chinese Nation
Taiwanese Nation
But
av)
Acceptable
aiD
1. total alienation
Not Identify 1. total alienation
2. aboriginal-Han (Chinese) 2. aboriginal-Han (Taiwanese)
with and
struggles
struggles
Not
(VI)
Accept
(V)
Source: After Chang Mao-kuei 1995.
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“mountain” legislators who always helped the KMT establish its legitimacy might fit
into this category (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). Another possibility is that the indigenous
movement might identify with another Han regime, the PRC. In this case, the
aborigines will need to face the independence/unification choice just as their Han
counterparts must face the issue. The leaders o f the indigenous movement will then
side with the pro-unification force in current Taiwan, and national identity will take
priority over ethnic identity.
The second situation is to take the side of the progressive, idealistic forces
within the largest opposition party, the DPP, and to identify with the Taiwanese
Nation. The progressives are the sole, and most probable, supporters for indigenous
autonomy (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). To identify with the Taiwanese Nation it is
probably assumed that Taiwanese Nation will be more progressive and more tolerant
to different cultures than the rigid concept o f the Chinese Nation. However, taking this
position poses two problems. First, the Taiwanese Nation may not be as progressive as
it is supposed to be. The nature of Taiwanese nationalism will depend on what kinds
o f socio-political forces emerge in forging the character o f the new nation-state. This,
again, will be decided mostly by Han people’s political struggles. Second, it is quite
possible that the aborigines’ cultural uniqueness will be lost in the resulting Sinicized
politics. The indigenous movement has to take the risk to be co-opted into the pro
independence camp to fight the trend towards unification promoted by the KMT hard
liners, the Chinese New Party, and the PRC. Aboriginal affairs certainly will not be in
the top priorities o f the political agenda which will invariably be dominated by Han
people.
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In situations (III) and (IV), the indigenous people do not identify with either the
Chinese or the Taiwanese Nation. Rather, the position is chosen either because of
instrumental or strategic positioning, or because there is no other feasible options at
the time this choice must be made (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). Under these
circumstances, the indigenous people will tend to partially accept the current
institutional arrangements and government policies but strive for some extent of
autonomy. This autonomy will maintain indigenous peoples’ status as effective
“pressure groups” or we could anticipate them forming political alliances to escalate
their influence (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). Thus, ideally, the indigenous movement will
not be ignored or terminated by the overwhelming social, political, and economic
forces associated with the unification/ independence issue. Nevertheless, there is no
exact way to figure out the “right distance” that should be kept between the movement
and these two national discourses. In situation (III), the indigenous movement will ally
with the “Chinese KMT” and the Chinese New Party, while in situation (IV), the
alliances will be, perhaps, the “Taiwanese KMT” and the DPP.
Situations (V) and (VI) enable the indigenous groups to completely alienate
themselves from the unification/independence issue surrounding Han people’s politics.
The indigenous movement will deny the legitimacy o f the current establishment and
engage in the opening of some new fronts for aborigine-Han ethnic struggles (Chang
Mao-kuei 1995). By so doing, there will be few alliances with any groups. The
ensuing social disorders perhaps will cost the present achievements o f the indigenous
movement and might even bring even crueler persecution and suppression from the
majority Han people (Chang Mao-kuei 1995).
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As I pointed out above, the nature o f the currently constructing Taiwanese
nationalism may be different from that of Chinese nationalism. From the indigenous
activists’ point o f view, Taiwanese nationalism might have more progressive elements
which are willing to accommodate indigenous requests, such as self-autonomy, which
is virtually impossible under the ideology of orthodox Chinese nationalism. Since a
complete break with Han nationalism will probably “cost” too much for the
indigenous movements, the real political situation tends to be a combination between
(IV) and (V). That is, indigenous leadership neither identifies nor accepts the Chinese
Nation, but maintains an allied relationship with Taiwanese Nation within the attitude
of “not identify with but accept” the ideas of the newly formed nationalism (Chang
Mao-kuei 1995).
Nevertheless, from my own observation, it seems pro-KMT indigenous leaders
may oscillate between the situations of (I) and (II), reflecting power/ideology struggles
inside the KMT party. This could also reveal the reality of the currently confused
identity facing the KMT indigenous elites.
Another perspective regarding the future relationship between the indigenous
movement and Han Taiwanese nationalism is to locate the indigenous movement on a
geometric plane where the unification/independence issue forms the vertical axis and
continuum o f a left/right political orientation forms the horizontal axis. On this chart
(Figure 7.1), there are four constant variables, the political Left and Right and the
Unification or Independence of Han people’s nationalism. The indigenous movement
and its various factions will all assume some positions on this chart. Other social
movements can also be located in this chart together with the indigenous movement.
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Figure 7.1 The Chart of Left/Right and Unification/Independence
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The tendency towards each “pole,” or the “degree” of the tendency can be
measured by the distance from the center, where zero is politically neutral. In the case
of the indigenous movement, a neutral positioning on the Unification/Independence
issue can not be interpreted as “not identify with and not accept” any kind o f Han
people’s nationalism as define by Chang Mao-kuei. Rather, the neutral position should
be interpreted as a “confused identity” or just mere indifference.
The selection o f these four variables by no means imply that these are the more
“fundamental” factors than others, or that the unification/independence issue should
take priorities over other social movements. It simply means that these are the four
important factors which have emerged from my approach on the relationship between
the indigenous movement and Han people’s nationalism. For example, the
Presbyterian Church-led indigenous movement would probably locate within Sector
two (2) where a pro-independence stance is clear but has varying degrees o f
inclination towards the political right. The “tribalism” movement, with its goal on
grassroots radical democracy and its emphasis on nativistic cultural rehabilitation,
would be located within Sector three (3). The indigenous delegates associated with the
Chinese New Party in the National Assembly would situate within Sector one (1).
Some progressive indigenous activists who are influenced by certain old left-wing Han
intellectuals, mostly political prisoners imprisoned during the forty-year-long martiallaw era and now associated with the small Workers’ Party (lao tung dang), are best
situated within Sector four (4). The overall trend, i.e. the “mainstream” indigenous
movement, will be slightly left-oriented and heavily pro-independence. That is, the
right and lower comer of Sector (3) within the area o f (A).
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There is a seemingly strong tendency towards radicalism within some of the
indigenous activists. The more radical the person becomes, the greater justification the
person tends to enjoy. This radical inclination tends to escalate and politicize all
indigenous requests for reform and change to a state of nation-to-nation affairs where
Han people are viewed as illegal intruders. By defining Han people in this way, the
goal of peaceful ethnic co-existence is significantly undermined. “Natural
sovereignty,” arguably the most controversial idea in the worldwide indigenous
movement, at its most extreme form, could be another form o f ethno-nationalism,
where citizenship is only conferred to members o f specific ethnic groups, in this case,
the aborigines. In fact, some conservative forces, such as the PPRA, will co-opt the
idea and polarize its implication to create an impression that all supporters of the
indigenous movement aim to expel all the Han people to beyond the Taiwan Strait.
However, in its “softer” form, natural sovereignty is a revolutionary concept in re
examining the dominant ideology o f “state” sovereignty and could lead the way to
building a culturally diverse political entity, which may not ultimately be in the form
of current nation-state.
For the land-related issues, the prevalent radicalism within the indigenous
resistant elites is epitomized in the ideas of one o f my main informants. He insists that
the “starting point” in the (future) negotiation between the aborigines and the Han
government, should be the official recognition that the indigenous peoples are entitled
to the original reservation lands as defined by the Japanese during the colonial era
(Interview A). Although this is a justified argument to me in terms of ethnic justice, its
feasibility remains highly doubtful. Its real implementation would inevitably trigger
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extensive social disorder, which in turn, would possibly negate the present
accomplishments of the indigenous movement and give rise to intense ethnic hatred
directed quite locally as well as nationally at the indigenous population.
The much-publicized idea of aboriginal self-autonomy receives relatively little
attention and discussion in terms o f actual plans. The absence o f any theoretical
construction in the substantial details of the idea of self-autonomy would simply create
another beautiful but empty radical slogan. The self-government issue involves
intricate social, cultural, and political affairs that are specific to each geographical
location. Different indigenous groups in different areas of Taiwan require special
designs for the implementation of self-autonomy, not to mention the role which the
direct application o f previous experience abroad might possibly play in this new
condition.
7.3 N ature, Landscape and the New H um an-Land Relations
The watershed area o f Te-Chi Reservoir has experienced more negative side
effects from human activities than any o f the other major reservoirs in Taiwan. The
ecological consequence of excessive development of slopeland in the Li-Shan area
was cautioned against long ago by many scholars, including geographers (Chang
Chang-yi 1992). A landslide monitoring project is being built to watch closely the
potential hazard.
As public environmental awareness increases in Taiwan, the steep slopeland
cultivation practiced in the Li-Shan area immediately became the object of public
condemnation. Both indigenous and Han farmers are blamed for the visible
environmental deterioration. Virtually the whole environmentalists’ argument is
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focused on slope cultivation and its possible consequences. The role o f the
government is thus confined to the elimination of “illegal” cultivation, which was set
as the cultivation o f any land exceeding 28 degrees. As the problem evolved, the state
was tactically detached from assuming responsibility for its own policies which
contributed significantly to the problem. Rarely did anyone blame the mode of
production and the developmental ideology which the potentially dangerous land use
patterns reflected. The “scientific fact” o f the 28-degree limit encounters no challenge.
Moreover, the continued use of the Te-Chi reservoir seems to be taken for granted by
the academic community and environmentalists and continues to be justified by the
developmental ideology long promoted by the government.
The environmental concerns in the Li-Shan area seem to give too much
emphasis to the technical dimensions of the problem while at the same time ignoring
locally specific social and historical conditions. Few look at the problem from the
viewpoint of the greater political economy, which would probably reveal that the
intensive utilization o f marginal land is the result o f displacement o f both forestry land
and the related subsistence economy by a profit-seeking capitalist mode o f production.
However, the political economy does not determine quite as many locally specific
outcomes as some radicals would expect (Bebbington 1996). O f course, there are
many perspectives on this issue that clearly involves more than just environmental
issues in the plains areas, and the presence of the indigenous population. Often
missing from most studies, is the question regarding how locally specific historical
and geographical contexts help to shape the current social and political relations found
in the Li-Shan area. What are the implications o f the landscape changes which have
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occurred in the past forty to fifty years? And how can we interpret these changes
predicated on efforts to bring about “modernization”? Does the presence of indigenous
peoples provide any unique perspective to the current situation? And lastly, perhaps, is
the even more fundamental question “What is the relationship that we want between
Nature and society?”
One of the most significant historical events in the Li-Shan area is the
colonialism experience of the local aborigines. The Japanese established the Taiwan
Power Company in 1919 to exploit the hydroelectric power potential o f the upper
reaches o f the island’s major rivers (Chang Chang-yi 1989:39). Although hydrologic
surveys were conducted on the Da Chia River by the colonial government in its
attempt to develop mountain resources, the Te-chi reservoir was actually not
constructed by the KMT government until 1969 (Chang Chang-yi 1989:61). The
introduction o f the capitalist mode of production and the commercialization of local
agrarian products such as fruit following the opening of the cross-island highway in
1960 accelerated the displacement of the traditional indigenous way o f life. Li-Shan’s
high altitude not only enables the growth of temperate-zone fruits and vegetables in
Taiwan, but also draws Han people, with their capital, and a different social and
political economy into the mountains. With respect to changes in social and political
structures, those with positions in public office and as clergy in Western religions have
replaced the traditional symbols of authority. The heads of the hsian, the village, and
the peasants’ organizations, and even the local cadres of political parties now exert
more influence than traditional tribal authorities.
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Human labor, together with capital investment from beyond the region
transformed the “natural,” “primitive” landscape into a different “cultural,” if more
“profitable” landscape (at least from the Han people’s point of view). The sacred
landscapes, often associated with the traditional symbols of authority, are now viewed
from a different, more secular stance. If landscape can be “read” as a “text,” the
continual changing landscape can then possess different embedded meanings at
different times, for different people, and for different places.
In the Li-Shan area, previous geographical studies focused on the conservation
of nature, on deforestation due to slopeland cultivation, and on the safety of reservoir
(see Chang Chang-yi 1989). The so-called “natural” landscape has never been
problematized. As a matter of fact, in the discourse construction of the “natural”
landscape, some people and voices are systematically silenced, or even erased, while
certain voices are granted the authority to speak for others (Willems-Braun 1997). In
Li-Shan’s case, the cultural meaning o f the landscape for the aborigines is absent from
previous studies. The cultural interpretation o f the landscape gives way to the
environmentalist’s explanation o f “natural” landscape and “resource management,” to
profit-driven commercialized agriculture, and to law-enforcement government
agencies. However, the dichotomy of voice and voiceless does not necessarily mean
that the separation is cut precisely along the ethnic lines, or that the indigenous people
in Li-Shan are all silenced. Resistance does occur in various forms, including most
importantly for this research, the re-assertion of ethnic identity. The heterogeneity
within the indigenous people also makes internal divisions possible.
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The nodes of this triangle o f the new hegemonic discourse, thus, are the farmer,
the environmentalist, and the state bureaucracy. Local indigenous people’s culture is
disenfranchised from their surrounding landscape in the proposed “solution” for this
local environmental problem. The new regimes o f power and knowledge authorize
particular visions and provide a new legitimate base for state intervention, while at the
same time, either consciously ignore or unconsciously filter out certain visions/voices
in the discourse construction of Li-Shan’s environmental problem. That is, the voices
of the indigenous people who live in the area are ignored. In the fields of conservation
and resource management, nature is made to appear as an empty space separated from
indigenous cultural activities (Willems-Braun 1997).
Native village sites became tied to a traditional, nonhistorical
culture, and separated from a surrounding landscape that was
figured, in turn, as a field for the enterprise of a dynamic modem
culture. Colonial discourse... did not erase, it displaced. Erasure
occurred, to be certain, but not through lack of attention
(Willems-Braun 1997).
In the “colonial gaze” of both the Japanese and the KMT, primitive culture and
pristine nature in the mountain areas were the objects of colonial conquest. The
relation between indigenous culture and nature were simply a subject o f
anthropological studies. In the construction of colonial discourse on resource
management and development, “nature” in the indigenous territory was displaced from
its local contexts and relocated into the abstract spaces of the nation-state (WillemsBraun 1997). In the context of the colonial history, nature was made available as a
landscape of resources rather than cultural and social landscapes (Willems-Braun
1997). In this sense, nature becomes an object o f “imaginative geography” (after Said
1986) in the process of socio-political construction for conquest and exploitation. This
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nature, thus, is less a “natural” product than a human factor. Thus, the State was able
to resolve the problem o f indigenous rights of access, presumably by assigning
aborigines certain portions of the “wilderness” as “reservation lands,” while the rest of
the “nature,” with no visible signs or traces of culture, could be appropriated into the
administrative space o f either the empire or the nation-state. The whole “wilderness”
was then subject to “rational” management, or conservation, or development. For a
developmental state in which economic growth was the legitimate base o f continued
power, rational resource management in essence, was to encourage development,
according to local geographical conditions. Li-Shan, therefore, became the largest area
for the production of temperate-zone fruits in Taiwan.
For indigenous peoples in Taiwan, colonial relations with the state did not end
when the Japanese empire collapsed after WWII. The new developmental programs
imposed by the KMT threatened to re-inscribe colonial histories throughout the
indigenous territories and erased the efforts of the present-day struggles for indigenous
sovereignty. The natural “wilderness” o f the Han people’s rhetoric, which is subject to
political and economic calculation for state administration and resource exploitation
respectively, is a highly “cultural” landscape in the local aboriginal rhetoric (WillemsBraun 1997).
The ongoing “modernizing” policies and processes which occurred in the LiShan area have generally been considered as an example of domination over nature by
modernization. After the emergence o f the pan-indigenous movement in Taiwan, the
“primitive” aborigines are, willingly or unwillingly, located “closer” to “mother
nature,” and considered to possess more environmental ethics associated with
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sustainability. In fact, however, recently indigenous ecological wisdom has received
wide attention throughout the world. It is so broadly conceived that some define
indigenous peoples as having a special relationship with the earth. Indigenous peoples
seem to exist inseparably with the nature and they are also inextricably connected with
the concept of sustainable development in “alternative” development discourse
(Merchant 1992:222-227). This is one of the most positive social representations and
imaginations incorporated in mainstream constructions o f indigenous peoples, despite
the fact that aborigines’ descendants may be assimilated into “modern” citizens and
lose connections with the (mainstream construction of) “nature.” Ironically perhaps,
and despite these widely held perceptions, the process o f land and resource
appropriation is continuing in various indigenous territories. Those displaced are
forced to relocate and frequently moved to even more peripheral areas where their
connections with their own ancestral lands are terminated. Given the effects of mining,
fishing, logging, and pollution in many indigenous areas, the World Council of
Indigenous Peoples in 1981 identified multinational companies “as the most
immediate and serious threat to the survival o f Indigenous Nations o f the Fourth
World” (Wilmer 1993:128).
A simple bisection which stresses that modernity marks the transition from
harmony with nature, to the exploitation o f nature, is, however, problematic. WillemsBraun (1997) argues that,
... what differentiates premodern from modem relations with
nature is not harmony versus domination so much as different
knowledges and technologies that articulated nature as a social
object and made it available to economic and political calculation
in new ways, (original italics)
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Knowledges and technologies are thus socially constructed and cannot be value
free. This is particularly clear in the social movements which incorporate ideas of
indigenous knowledge and practices into their alternative choices (Bebbington 1996).
On the one hand, indigenous agrarian technology is not only “an instrument of
environmental manipulations, but is a symbol speaking to rural people of their social
history and relationships, a sign by which they read their identities and their
relationships with past, present, and future” (Bebbington 1996). On the other hand,
colonial knowledge as well as modem technologies help contribute to the creation of
Li-Shan’s current landscape and geography as Taiwan’s biggest production area of
temperate-zone crops.
A new human-land relationship which is inspired partly by indigenous
ecological wisdom is evolving among environmentally conscious individuals and
groups. A plan which incorporates traditional hunting ethics with modem wildlifemanagement is being put into practice in Southern Taiwan. Perhaps counterintuitive,
the academics involved in this plan claim that hunting may actually help protect the
environment and assure sustainable resource use (Chang Chin-ju 1997). The pressure
on Taiwan’s wildlife populations has rarely come from the aborigines who have
practiced hunting for thousands of years. Rather, urbanization and capitalism not only
brings environmental problems directly to cities where industrial pollution is
prevalent, but also indirectly to the mountains by “luring” indigenous people to leave
their homes for wage incomes. Thus, the deserted villages and empty households only
make it easier for outside intruders to come in and “hunt” for profits. At present, rare
and /or wild animals are sold as commodities without the full complement of
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traditional religious, ethical, social beliefs, and cultural meanings. By returning these
“natural” lands to indigenous people, involving them in resource management
decisions, and “recovering” the ecological wisdom embedded in their traditional life,
the possibility o f sustainable development seems to be greater. This combination o f
modern academic and traditional knowledge can potentially also create new income
sources to bring back youths from the cities. This return migration o f indigenous youth
is an important goal o f the new “tribalism” (Interview E).
A solid material basis (viable economy, food, shelter, and water) is the
prerequisite to sustain a cohesive cultural identity. However, under the current policy
context, the material basis in indigenous territories is genuinely threatened either by
the deteriorating conditions in the rural economy due to the uneven development
found in these places in Taiwan, or by unsustainable developmental policies. To
recover the economy in mountain areas demands the creation of new types of non
agrarian activities (Bebbington 1996). Eco-tourism is a solution proposed by one o f
my informants who is the major figure in the “tribalism” movement. He calls for
returning the nature to the aborigines’ management with the cooperation from
academics (Interview E). As “modem mountain guardians,” regulated hunting and
harvesting by indigenous peoples, in fact, will not only maintain the health of the
ecosystem, but also could possibly rejuvenate entire aboriginal communities both
socially and economically. He argues that, by so doing, the young aborigines will have
to learn traditional wisdom from experienced hunters to become professional tour
guides in order to lead “eco-tourists” into the “nature” that is filled with “cultural”
meanings. Through such activities and as a further benefit, urban dwellers will learn to
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respect indigenous cultures and thus, aborigines will re-establish ethnic pride while at
the same time, they will be able to deriving an income from traditional cultural
practices.
The call o f tribalism, in fact, corresponds to the new trend o f international
conservation strategies to involve indigenous peoples, whose ways o f life and identity
are tightly linked to particular places and territories, into resource management and
establishment o f protected areas (Stevens 1997). Historically, the establishment of
many supposedly “uninhabited” national parks has posed major threats to the cultural
survival and sovereignty of indigenous peoples (Stevens 1997). Through the
involvement of indigenous peoples in conservation activities, both mainstream and
indigenous societies are more aware o f human rights and sovereignty issues raised by
the establishment o f national parks and other protected areas. This theory (and trend)
o f indigenous involvement in grassroots conservation can also be mirrored in the
development of tribalism in Taiwan. “New” types of national parks based on this
principle in which indigenous peoples share policy making and management
responsibilities with government agencies, can be seen in many countries (Herlihy
1997; Nietschmann 1997). Indigenous peoples are not only involved in conservation
activities, but also in re-gaining the “rights to interpret” their homelands by engaging
in indigenous map-making projects initiated by scholars from outside (Herlihy 1998).
In Taiwan, another successful example o f indigenous management of natural
resources comes from Shanmei Village in Chia-yi County in southern Taiwan where
the collective cooperative efforts o f the villagers have systematically prohibited
outsiders from electrocuting and poisoning the fish in Tanayiku River. The Thao
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indigenous people set up their own protected area which stretches 15 kilometers along
the river, and then established the “Shanmei Village Environmental Protection
Association” in 1989 (Cheng Yuan-ching 1992). Many aboriginal areas drew capital
from outside business groups for the development of tourism only to see their
environment destroyed, but Shanmei is an exception (Cheng Yuan-ching 1992). Lands
are held by the aborigines because o f a democratically reached consensus among
villagers to protect their lands and environment from commercial development.
Although the villagers do not apply the term “tribalism”, such aboriginal conservation
actions hold out hope for cultural preservation and possibly economic renaissance to
the indigenous community as well as attracting youths back to their tribe.
The relations between society and nature are, of course, dynamic and constantly
changing. The modernist binary discursive construction, however, tends to separate
these two into “pure” and irrelevant domains and ignores their deeply interrelated
realms (Swyngedouw 1996). In this discourse, nature belongs to the purely physical,
natural world and is only transformed by the social (Swyngedouw 1996). Nature itself
as a historical-geographical process is completely neglected so that the hegemonic
culture has the legitimacy to exploit the “primitive” physical world. Nevertheless,
when the concept of nature is considered as socially constructed and culturally varied,
we also need to be alert to the danger o f slipping into the extreme relativism (Proctor
1998).
A new human-land relation can only be constructed through a different dynamic
natural-social process, and through respecting different cultural perspectives toward
nature. Different cultures utilize and interpret nature in different ways, just like
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different eco-systems, and as such these perspectives also have their own places in the
physical world. If eco-diversity is crucial to the balance o f the natural/physical world
and the sustainability o f resource management, similarly, perhaps, cultural diversity
will be the essential way for humanity to raise its chances to survive on the earth
(Ming Li-Kuo 1997). In this regard, however, I agree with the humanistic view that
the current environmental protection and ecological conservation should not be the
end to surpass human values, but a means to a more culturally diversified, livable
world.
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CHAPTER 8. RETROSPECT AND LIMITATIONS: THE
FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF STUDIES
The final chapter will provide an extensive retrospect considering the research
process and the obtained results. I also discuss some limitations o f this research and
offer other possible directions for further studies.
Although the land rights claims of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples is the major
focus o f my research, other issues are essential and unavoidable in dealing with the
relationships between lands and aborigines. Under current socio-political conditions, a
call for indigenous separatism, as many indigenous activists seem to suggest, is an
impasse. Moreover, indigenous ethno-separatism will not only draw hostility from
every social class and political platform, but also such radicalism will offset the
previous efforts in constructing indigenous movements. As the movement was
initiated by social minority and political underprivileged groups, it is worthy of
sympathy and support. My observation is that the pursuit of radicalism misled some
indigenous activists into either ethno-nationalism or indigenous chauvinism. The
former, as I analyzed previously, cannot benefit the progressive movement. The later
is simply another loser’s psychological desire to displace the winner’s hegemonic
status. To use Fanon’s “Black Skin, White Masks” as a parallel example, the ideology
of aboriginal chauvinism reflects only the deep frustration of self-esteem. Some
indigenous intellectuals are aware o f this possibility and call for a more tolerate and
less self-centrist approach in awakening indigenous peoples’ consciousness at the
grassroots level (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
Indigenous youths, face both a rapidly deteriorating traditional culture, and an
increasing lack of understanding of the ancestral lands, mountains, and forests
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surrounding the tribes. They must resist not only the tremendous pressures for further
Sinicization, but also ignorance of their own cultures and traditions. Therefore, each
individual expressions of aboriginal consciousness, such as speaking aboriginal
languages, engaging in traditional hunting, participating in religious ceremonies, and
becoming involved in nativistic cultural activities, regardless these activities are
carried out by Han or indigenous people, are resistances against hegemonic cultural
assimilation. The study of the “geography o f resistance,” either in daily life or in the
national political arena, will deploy a new perspective in search for a more reasonable
and egalitarian ethnic relationship. It is also from the accumulated successes of minor
resistance that the minority groups may one day have their say in the formation of
some form o f “cultural hybridity” in post-colonial societies.
Land conflicts between indigenous peoples and the dominant groups around the
world seem to surround economic interests. Many cases actually involve multinational
corporations, and/or a coalition of State and business groups (Wilmer 1993:128-31).
To indigenous peoples, land issues also involve the formation o f identity, culture,
religion, and way o f life. The meaning o f land is always far beyond simple economic
interests. In this regard, the ecological wisdom of indigenous peoples has many issues
in common with environmentalists. My concern is how the global
environmental/ecological movements can combine both local knowledge and downto-the-earth activities in order to be successful. The experiment of “tribalism” in
southern Taiwan to involve indigenous people in local natural resource management
presents a prospective alternative for the construction of a new society-nature
relationship.
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The capitalist modes of both mass production and mass consumption seem never
suitable to the indigenous peoples’, arguably, sustainable way o f live. Any discussion
on “sustainable development” without mentioning the alteration of the current
economic system will be largely in vain.
From the global/local dichotomy, another interesting perspective is derived by
an examination o f the impacts of the development o f both democracy and technology
on various locations. On the one hand, the objectives of the “farmer-first” approach,
introduced by Bebbington (1996), are to promoted farmers’ participation in
agricultural development, to engage in the democratization of farmers’ organizations,
and to “challenge prevailing ‘taken-for-granted’ power relationships in which the rural
poor are always convinced o f as ‘clients,’ recipients, and the objects o f somebody
else’s development strategy.” The democratization o f farmers’ organization at the
local level in Taiwan is a particularly urgent issue since heads of many local farmers’
organizations have a common reputation of being the surrogates for gigantic business
groups or even underground gangster organizations. For farmers, simply having the
right to vote for their organization’s head is not enough to improve the long power
imbalance between farmers themselves and the agri-business networks centered in the
metropolitan areas. So far, the farmers in Li-Shan still rely heavily on advice from
private agri-business groups for critical information on the application o f agri
chemicals to their crops. The private companies monopolize essentially all information
sources of the Li-Shan farmers and enable the perpetuation o f this uneven power
relationship between rural farmers and core capital.
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On the other hand, especially for the indigenous farmers in Li-Shan, the
application of modern technology seems to signal an increasing distance from the past,
from traditional “authentic” indigenous cultures, and reflects an increasing
dependency on the elite groups (Bebbington 1996). However, this could also be an
opportunity to escape from the old social relationship (i.e. domination, discrimination,
and oppression) with the dominant groups. The result o f the application o f modem
technology depends upon how the indigenous farmers are incorporated in the political
economy context and through what ways the farmers are offered accesses to modem
technology.
The establishment of indigenous autonomous zones might be a very remote but
meaningful goal for activists. The demarcation of the autonomous zones in a small
island like Taiwan requires, of course, a tremendous amount of negotiation, political
compromise, and requires an imagination of a broad future picture. Not only the
current administrative structures and boundaries require adjustment, but a new attitude
towards “the others” is also needed in developing a peaceful and mutual beneficial
solution. In my view, it is the inability, by all, to imagine both a new relation among
ethnic groups and the possibility o f “shared sovereignty” over a certain territory o f a
nation-state that manifests the largest obstacle in the creation o f the true autonomous
zones within a nation-state. The long-established idea o f nationalism that demands
both the homogenization represented by a “national culture” and the citizens’ loyalty
to the State erects an almost invincible ideological hurdle for founding a differencesensitive multicultural nation-state. Thus, land conflicts also incorporate the political
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struggles over cultural politics, once the geography-sensitive indigenous peoples are
involved.
The suggestion from the core members of the PPRA to relocate the aborigines to
collective farmland reveals the disrespectful mainstream attitude towards minority
groups. The long-time stiff indoctrination of reactionary nationalism within the
compulsory standardized education has certainly contributed to the formation o f Han
chauvinism in Taiwan.
As social values and “high” or “low” culture are defined and measured from the
perspective o f dominant Han culture, the indigenous populations in Taiwan have few
items left for the formation o f a positive ethnic identity. It is not surprising that the
landscape has become the center o f identity formation for indigenous peoples. What is
a “natural” landscape o f mountains and forests from a Han perspective, is the
landscape full o f cultural and religious meanings for aborigines. The interpretation of
landscape in the development of tourism, frequently mentioned in the tourist
brochures, thus, becomes another political arena for indigenous peoples to regain their
rights to interpret the landscape that is possessed with cultural meanings. In fact, I find
that new pan-indigenous identity in Taiwan is forged partially through the recovery of
landscape meanings to local indigenous communities. For example, the peak o f the
Pei Da Wu Shan has recaptured its status as the sacred mountain for both Paiwan and
Rukai peoples in southern Taiwan, while Da Pa Chien Shan is sacred for Atayal
people in central Taiwan. Before the emergence o f the indigenous cultural renaissance,
these two mountains were simply the objects o f conquest for both Japanese colonial
mountaineers and modern urban mountaineers. Colonial relationship also vividly
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expressed in Japanese “conquering” Taiwan’s Central Mountain Ridge when the
resource surveys were conducted, and in the erection of a statue o f one high-ranking
KMT official in the top o f Yu— Shan, the highest peak in Taiwan.
This struggle to recover the original cultural meanings o f landscapes is another
manifestation that resistance to cultural hegemony has occurred through some very
common daily routines, at every possible geographical location, and in every potential
arena.
This dissertation takes considerable space to deal with the development and
retrospections of the many indigenous movements in Taiwan. However, my goal is not
to provide a self-righteous, theoretically sound and practically feasible strategy or
approach for the indigenous movements. Actually, it is probably beyond the capability
and responsibility o f any academic to point out a “correct” direction for the
development o f indigenous movements. However, I do not wish to imply that the
academics should remain politically neutral and innocent. Rather, as the proponents of
hermeneutics will argue, no researchers can eschew personal involvements,
emotionally or academically, in their field studies of the research objects (see the
argument o f Duncan and Ley 1993). The representation and description o f both
individual persons and indigenous movements in which they participate are eventually
based on the author’s own ideology and reflect the selective absorption of “field data”
gathered and the outcomes o f participant observation.
Another concern that is worth noting in the concluding chapter is the question
regarding whether or not it is appropriate to apply theory and methodology developed
in/from the Western World to the study o f social phenomena in a society that has
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completely different historical, geographical, social, cultural, and political contexts. In
his insightful paper, Liao Ping-hui (1995) has already provided a critical examination
on this concern, but I would like to pursue these thoughts further.
Despite the fact that many theories were developed in the West (academic
colonialism?), what makes post-colonial theories special is that many o f important
figures in post-colonial literatures are from the Third World. These intellectuals had
established their academic reputations in the West and through their internationally
renowned celebrity, they have started to build up significant influences and help in
struggles against the imposition o f stereotypes on “the others” by the gaze o f EuroAmerican “imperial eye” (Chen Kuan-hsing 1996). Liao Ping-hui in fact, not only
problematizes the direct, uncritical application of the Western theories to Taiwan’s, or
more broadly, East Asian societies. He actually opposes the direct import o f post
colonial theories. However, post-colonial theory is hardly a homogenous
theory/phenomenon, as no colonialism created the same impacts at different time and
upon different cultures and peoples. Thus, colonial legacies always interact with local
histories and geographies to produce each individual, unique post-colonial society.
Moreover, to debate the suitability to “qualify” Taiwan’s society as post-colonial, one
might mislead and misuse the conceptualization of post-colonialism. As I argued at
Section 2.1, post-colonialism studies in both the colonial “mother countries” and
mostly, the Third World societies, which have not yet completely de-colonized in that
their colonial past still works on the formation of new identities, cultures, and
societies, should be a dynamic process rather than a fixed theoretical framework that
confines our geographical imagination.
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Finally, I will provide some other possible interesting directions for further
research in related topics. However, before more detailed research in Li-Shan can be
conducted, a long overdue extensive land use survey should be undertaken by the
KMT government. This survey should clarify the ownership and leasing rights of the
reservation lands. Only after the basic land data are publicly available can a realistic
picture o f contested autonomous zones be roughly sketched. Geographers and
anthropologists who are really concerned about the future development o f indigenous
autonomous zones (and actually, benefit from studying the topic and the people) in
Taiwan should take this social responsibility to push the KMT to enforce this
comprehensive survey. They also need to prepare for the confusion which will follow
if all voices are heard.
The aftereffects of the founding of Council o f Aboriginal Affairs can be
observed from the perspective that under what social and political conditions can the
State apparatus co-opts radical movements into the establishment and eliminates the
progressiveness of these movements. Another possible interaction between the State
apparatus and indigenous movements is that the State absorbs the proposals and
opinions from indigenous movements to further consolidate its rule over aborigines.
However, the Council is too new to make any conclusion from its brief history of
interaction with indigenous activists as
of fall 1998. What is sure is that the Council has absorbed some indigenous elites into
the establishment in the past two years.
Gender issues are basically absent from my analysis in all aboriginal affairs. In
the patriarchal Han state and society, indigenous women often suffer “double
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marginalization” from the outside world (the State, stereotypes constructed by mass
media and education) and inside world (men’s chauvinism embodied in father,
husband, and son). In identity politics, a frequently asked question by feminists is
“What identity and in whose country?” because traditionally, politics is a men’s
domain and the identity question is often treated, incorrectly, as gender blinded.
Maternal social organizations did exist among some of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples,
but the assimilating process significantly reduces the feasibility in practicing the
traditional way of organizing a society. Indigenous women have to fight not only the
paternal/military authority of the KMT regime, but also patriarchy deeply embedded
in some traditional aboriginal cultures. This may cast a dilemma for some female
activists as they try to recover the “authentic traditional culture” that includes the
unbearable patriarchal system. Nevertheless, this dilemma could also provide an
opportunity to forge a new indigenous female identity, which not only challenges
mainstream discourse of national identity (i.e. the Chinese identity), but also defies the
designated role of females by patriarchal authority. Furthermore, this dilemma also
offers a dynamic view towards the formation of a new (perhaps, the real post-colonial)
culture that is capable of changing itself and absorbing new elements in a dynamic
world.
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